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This Working Paper forms part of a series of five volumes dealing with the "Europeanisation" 
of product safety law. They are the result of a study carried out on behalf of the Commission 
of the EC which has so far been published only in German*. The publication of this English 
version has been made possible by a grant from Directorate General XI. 
The five volumes of this series of Working Papers should thus be read in context. Volume 1 
(Chapter I) aims to show why product safety law has given rise to extremely diverse 
regulation patterns and to provide an overview of the most important instruments for action. 
Volumes 2 and 3 (Chapter II) are concerned with recent developments in the relevant 
legislation of the economically most important Community Member States and of the United 
States. Volume 2 (Chapter II, Parts 1 and 2) contains reports on France and the United 
Kingdom, Volume 3 (Chapter II parts 3 and 4) deals with the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the US Consumer Product Safety Act 1972, which is of crucial importance in the 
international debate. 
Volume 4 (Chapters III and IV) analyses the development of the "traditional" policy of 
approximation of law and of efforts at a "horizontal" European product safety policy. In both 
policy areas it proved impossible to realise the Community's programmatic goals. As far as 
policy on achieving the internal market is concerned, the Commission itself has pointed out 
the reasons and called for, and implemented, a fundamental revision of traditional legal 
approximation policy. This reorientation of Community policy is dealt with in Chapters IV; it 
describes the most important precursors of the new internal market policy, namely ECJ case 
law on Articles 30 and 36 EEC since the Cassis de Dijon judgment, and regulatory technique 
for the Low Voltage Directive and then analyses the new approach to technical harmonisation 
and standards, whereby the Community will restrict itself in its directives to setting "essential 
safety requirements", leaving it to European and national standardisation bodies to convert 
these safety requirements into technical specifications. 
Volume 5 (Chapters V and VI) evaluates the effects of the Community's new approach to 
technical harmonisation and standards on product safety policy. Chapter V diagnoses a new 
need for action in the area of product safety policy, including in particular the internal 
organisation of the standardisation process, and participation by consumer associations in 
European standardisation. Chapter VI continues a comprehensive discussion of alternatives 
open for co-ordinating internal market and product safety policy. It argues that a policy of 
"deregulating" Member States' product safety legislation would not be feasible, and opts for a 
"positive" supplementation of the new approach by a horizontal Community product safety 
policy. This option is elaborated in a number of recommendations. 
 
* Christian Joerges, Josef Falke, Hans-W. Micklitz, Die Sicherheit von Kosnumgütern und 
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Product safety, product safety policy and  
product safety law 
Questions of product safety alarm the public again and again. Information on the 
hazardousness of products used daily in household and leisure activities, short- and long-term 
environmental hazards, and risk associated with materials and technical faults at the 
workplace occupy the media, attract the attention of experts, provoke a search for the guilty 
and demands for remedial measures to be taken by the State1. In addition to concern about the 
hazards of large-scale technology, public attention is focused on dangers presented by 
medicines, foodstuffs and chemicals, whilst in comparison, technical consumer products tend 
to offer less spectacular things to say2. The emphasis of sociopolitical and legal discussion is 
similarly distributed3. Empirical research aimed at showing how attitudes towards hazards 
caused by technology change and at drafting appropriate recommendations for the policy 
treatment of such risks4mainly covers large-scale technological projects. Legal science 
concentrates on the development of environmental law and new regulations, particularly on 
pharmaceutical products and also on chemicals. Against this background it is easy to forget 
that in the field of technical consumer products the results of large-scale and intensive 
accident research are available, that this research is indispensable in assisting companies to 
make decisions on the technical design of products, and that regulations on the safety of 
technical consumer products have long since left behind them the naive notion of abstract 
safety standards which can be fulfilled completely. However, the key legal concepts 
expressing this realisation sound more familiar, more small-scale and less ambitious. Product 
safety law is not concerned with threshold values, as in the case of law covering the 
environment, labour and foodstuffs or with "effectiveness" or "non-objection certificates" as 
in the case of pharmaceutical products, but with the "generally accepted state of the art" 
("allgemein anerkannte Regeln der Technik", § 3 of the Gerätesicherheitsgesetz) or with 
justified safety expectations which manufacturers have to comply with in accordance with the 
Product Liability Directive. 
There are objective reasons for these differences. The risks of nuclear power stations, the 
level of residual risk to be tolerated or the long-term effects of air pollution or food additives 
place different requirements on the identification and legal assessment of risks than do the 
dangers resulting from defective cots and playpens. Nevertheless, it would be illusory to 
imagine that the problems of technical consumer products are simple. The potential danger is 
considerable, and it can be just as difficult to assess the contribution of a construction feature 
towards accidents as it is to assess the health hazard of chemicals (see section 1 below). In 
connection with technical consumer products as well, we must ask which risks are 
unavoidable, which must be eliminated at all costs and which should be reduced through 
design requirements. The alignment of corresponding decisions to technical standards 
specifying general safety duties is equivalent to setting a threshold value establishing the 
extent of permissible risks in general terms (see section 2 below). And finally, a range of 
subtle and expensive instruments has also been developed for the purpose of regulating the 
safety of technical consumer products. The simple blanket clauses of safety laws in this area 
are entirely compatible with a regulatory practice which proceeds no less demandingly than is 
14





  1.The identification of risks 
The potential danger of technical consumer products was for a long time underestimated or 
only rarely appreciated by the public. A change in attitude began to be noted in the fifties and 
sixties. As early as 1961 the United Kingdom passed a first product safety law (the Consumer 
Protection Act 1961)5, and in the Federal Republic of Germany the Act on Technical Work 
Materials (Gesetz über technische Arbeitsmittel) of 1968 (GtA) was replaced in 1979 by the 
Appliances Safety Act (Gerätesicherheitsgesetz) (GSG) which laid down a general safety 
obligation for technical consumer products6; since 1983 France has had a general law on 
consumer safety (Loi No.83-660 relative à la sécurité des consommateurs)7. The sixties saw 
the development in the USA of a widespread social regulation movement which led to a large 
number of legislative measures8. The establishing of the National Commission on Product 
Safety in 1968, one of the most popular successes of this movement, can be regarded as the 






"Americans __ twenty millions of them __ are injured each year in the home as the 
result of incidents connected with consumer products. Of the total, 110,000 are 
permanently disabled, and 30,000 are killed. A significant number of them could have 
been spared if more attention had been paid to hazard reduction. The annual cost to 
the nation of product-related injuries may exceed $5.5 billion"10. 
This much-quoted passage from the final report of the National Commission on Product 
Safety on the potential hazards of technical consumer products refers to all accidents in which 
these products played "a role". As a result, a number of States subsequently developed 
accident information systems aimed at systematically identifying the involvement of 
consumer products in accidents and the data11 provided by these systems are as worrying as 
the National Commission on Product Safety's figures. 
In 1981 the Consumer Product Safety Commission reported that the use of consumer 
products had led to 33 million injuries and 28,000 deaths12. In Britain, where a start on 
preparing accident statistics was made in 1976 (England and Wales), the number of injuries 
requiring medical treatment is estimated at 3 million per year and the number of deaths at 
7,000 per year13. In the Netherlands, the 1985 annual report on the Privé Ongevallen 
Registratie Systeem (PORS) revealed that in 1984 there had been 633,000 accidents 
necessitating hospital treatment and 2,141 deaths14. The European Commission estimates that 
in the Community as a whole there are more than 30,000 deaths and 40 million injuries each 
year, at an annual cost of over 30,000 million ECU15. 
15
Shortly after publication of the National Commission on Product Safety's final report, an 
alternative survey method was tried out in the form of a "Household Safety 
Study"16 financed by several American companies and government departments. In the first 
phase of the study 27,000 households were questioned about injuries and damage sustained 
during the past three months. In the second phase diary records of 22,000 households 
covering a similar period were evaluated. "Environment-linked" accidents were found to be 
the most important category, with accidents in sport and play in second place; the user's own 
"misbehaviour" was universally found to be a major factor in the cause of accidents. A 
similar method was adopted for a study of household and leisure accidents carried out in 
1985 on behalf of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany by the HUK 
(association of insurance companies)17. 
According to the findings of this study, 3 million home or leisure-time accidents requiring 
medical treatment or having an effect lasting for more than 14 days (and 100 million minor 
accidents) can be assumed for the Federal Republic of Germany18, with 12,000 deaths per 
year. In order to be able to define the role of products more precisely, the study distinguishes 
between five accident categories. According to the study, only in the case of "handling" 
accidents, which account for 17% of accidents, are faulty appliances a potential cause; in 
practice they are responsible for still fewer, only 2% of all accidents. If cases of incorrect use 
are disregarded and a distinction made between old and new appliances, the figure falls still 
further. The conclusion is that "technical shortcomings on newly purchased machines, tools 





  1.2 <="" a="">Recording problems 
<="" a=""> 
<="" a="" style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: medium; 
font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: 
normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: 
none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; 
text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-color: initial;">"Measuring" hazards is a science 
in itself. When developing accident information systems it is necessary to reflect on whether 
data should be collected from hospital accident units and/or doctors' surgeries, how a 
representative sample can be obtained, to what level of detail information on the nature of 
injuries, the victims and the circumstances of the accident can be collected, and which 
product categories it would be useful to distinguish20. However, the data collected after 
clarification of all these questions still do not permit any definite conclusions on how 
dangerous products are. As well as the accident rate, the seriousness of injuries is also 
important. It is very difficult to grade and assess injuries. In the USA, the National Electronic 
Injury Surveillance System (NEISS) uses an Age-Adjusted Frequency-Severity Index for this 
purpose, taking into account not only the accident figures for individual product categories, 
but also the average nature of injuries, with an additional distinction by user's age21; as of 
late, accident-related economic costs are also calculated, using an Injury Cost Model. 
16
The "measuring" of product hazards can be taken even further. It seems logical for critics of 
the NEISS to insist that intensity of product use be considered or to call for epidemiological 
studies which would provide more accurate statistical information on the extent to which 
specific population groups are affected, or for the U.S. Product Safety Commission itself to 
test new procedures for gathering data on causes of accidents22 
But accident circumstances are extraordinarily complex23. They are influenced both by 
permanent and fortuitous background factors (physiological and psychological capabilities 
and environmental factors on the one hand, and personal factors such as illnesses and external 
circumstances on the other), and by unexpected events which distract the person's attention or 
disturb his concentration. Product quality, the effect of normal wear on the same, and sudden 
faults are no more than contributing factors to a complex process. Consequently, accident 
information systems can treat the data they collect on the involvement of products in 
accidents only as an impulse for more detailed follow-up studies of typical accident patterns 
or individual accident circumstances - the only way to obtain true information on the 
contribution of design features towards accidents. Such studies inevitably lead to a question 
of appraisal: as soon as statements on the hazardousness of products are no longer limited to 
statistical connections between product characteristics and accidents, in other words, where 
the safety of products is to be judged, a distinction has to be drawn between the spheres of 
responsibility of manufacturers and users. We shall return to this subject presently. 
The difficult measurement and classification problems encountered in developing and 
applying accident information systems cannot be evaded by alternative study methods either. 
The example of the HUK study and its conclusion brings this difficulty out. While the survey 
method used there does allow all accidents to be taken into account and distortions to the data 
resulting from concentrating on hospital accident units to be excluded, the involvement of 
hospitals has the advantage that a suitably trained external observer can record the relevant 
data immediately after an accident (particularly useful in the case of accidents involving 
children). A survey, by contrast, depends on the psychological skill of the interviewer and the 
ability of the interviewee to express himself and remember things accurately, which means 
that in some cases, particularly accidents to children, no reliable information can be obtained. 
The most important advantage of accident information systems over later surveys is, 
however, probably that they rule out one severe source of error, namely the victim's memory 
or forgetfulness24. 
The HUK study not only aims to measure hazards, but pursues the ambitious goal of 
assessing the safety of products as well. For this purpose a very small number of "case 
studies" were carried out, with the cases selected from among the handling accidents. These 
studies, based on the interviews with the persons concerned, contain some very firm 
assessments (users chose "easy alternatives", acted "carelessly", "did not pay attention", 
"were thinking about television", "were trying to carry too much luggage", "selected an 
unsuitable position", or "were distracted by children")25. Such assessments are no doubt 
unavoidable in evaluating product safety. But simply questioning accident victims is a very 
poor basis for making judgments. A pilot study by the US Consumer Product Safety 
Commission26 shows that only 27% of accident victims surveyed were capable of answering 
the question whether their accident should be attributed to a product defect, to the age of the 
product, to its design, to their own errors, personal inadequacies or environmental factors27. It 
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also stresses that the interaction between survey personnel and respondents influences the 
findings in ways that are hard to calculate, that there is a tendency on the part of accident 
victims to blame themselves, that it is, above all, unrealistic to expect reliable, appropriate 
statements on product defects, and even less design faults, from users, and that therefore 
interviewers must be trained not only psychologically, but also technically. Clearly, therefore, 
a product hazard survey that is not only to measure the involvement of products in accidents 
but also to supply conclusions as to causes and responsibilities has to be a much more 




  2. Assessment of hazards 
According to the well-known statement by W.W. Lowrance, "a thing is safe if its attendant 
risks are judged to be acceptable"28. The references to the limitations of accident information 
systems and the weaknesses of the HUK study will no doubt have demonstrated the 
importance of the distinction between identifying the hazards of products and assessing their 
safety. "Safety" is a normative concept and cannot be assessed by a generally applicable 
unequivocal formula. Safety assessment procedures must therefore be flexible, above all 




  2.1."Proper use", "foreseeable use",  
"foreseeable misuse", "unreasonable risk 
of injury" 
In the legal policy debate on consumer product safety, the distinction between "proper" and 
"foreseeable use" or "misuse" plays a central role. The distinctions represent intuitively 
plausible demarcations of the spheres of responsibility of manufacturers and users. Those 
who would like to see the responsibility of manufacturers limited to cases where products are 
put to their proper use plead for predictability and delimitation of liability, and at the same 
time appeal to the independence and judiciousness of users. Those who on the other hand 
wish to make manufacturers take account of foreseeable misuse are quickly accused of 
adopting paternalistic attitudes, and seem to assume that technical progress tends to place 
excessive demands on users. Between the two extremes of proper use and foreseeable misuse 
lies the category "foreseeable use". This compromise formula allows the manufacturer to be 
made liable in cases where, for example, his subjective definition of the use of his products 
does not correspond to the "normal" use; on the other hand, the user's own responsibility in 
the case of a foreseeable but "unreasonable" use is established. 
The legal discussions on these divisions have an important fundamental meaning, but their 
practical significance is limited. The abandoning of "proper" use as the basis for 
manufacturer's liability acknowledges that what safety law is about is social protection, which 
no manufacturer can determine unilaterally by laying down what "proper use" is, nor any 
consumer ignore in making his purchase decisions. In this context, the abandoning of the 
criterion of proper use is fundamental, and there is general agreement on this. 
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However, § 3 (1) of the German GSG explicitly protects the user of technical consumer 
products only where they are put to their "proper use" and also refers to the "generally 
accepted state of the art". In explaining the phrase "proper use", § 2 (5) of the GSG does, 
however, state that this is either the use specified by the manufacturer or the "normal" one for 
the product. These criteria may clash; accordingly, the reference to "normal use" means that 
the manufacturer no longer has the power to "define" the care to be expected from users of 
his product29. Even more importantly, especially in connection with safety matters, the 
relevant standards (DIN 820, Part 12, and DIN 31.000/ VDE 1000) lay down more stringent 
requirements, specifying that "foreseeable misuse" must be taken into account. This 
amendment to § 3 (1) of the GSG on the assessment of safety aspects corresponds to the 
general trend in present-day safety legislation and product and manufacturers' liability law30. 
Whilst it is important to retain this basic consensus on safety policy, it is difficult on the other 
hand to deduce precise criteria for establishing the appropriate safety level from the 
alternatives to "proper use". All norms are both capable of being interpreted and in need of 
interpretation. If, as required by DIN 820, Part 12 and DIN 31.000/VDE 1000, foreseeable 
misuse must be taken into account, a decision must be made on whether and to what extent 
this has to be done at the product design stage ("direct safety technique") or whether other 
protective measures are needed ("indirect safety technique"), or whether safety information 
should be sufficient ("indicatory safety technique")31. The concept of "foreseeable" use leaves 
similar room for interpretation. Whilst Article 1 of the French Consumer Safety Act of 21 
July 1983 (32) refers to "conditions reasonably foreseeable by an expert" and the level of 
safety which can "legitimately" be expected, a decision is still required on the degree of 
anticipation to be required of the manufacturer and where the limits of legitimate consumer 
expectations lie. The fact that such decisions involve a difficult compromise between hazard 
avoidance, technical possibilities and economic constraints is well-known from product 
liability law33. 
In the face of these problems the American Consumer Product Safety Act 1972 has contented 
itself, in § 1 (b)(2), with describing the aim of the legal regulations as protecting the 
consumer against an "unreasonable risk of injury". It is evident from the background 
material, though not from the text of the Act itself, that a multiplicity of factors are to be 
balanced against each other: the likelihood of damage, its severity, the usefulness of products, 
the costs of anti-hazard measures, but also the obviousness of dangers, so that the question of 
the user's own responsibility remains an essential and legitimate aspect34. 
As a result, terms such as "foreseeable use" and "foreseeable misuse" are certainly helpful in 
developing safety standards and in offering some guidance to courts and competent 
authorities35. At the same time, however, the need to adapt these terms shows that in order to 
be able to specify the appropriate safety level, a whole series of further aspects must be 




  2.2 Hazard assessment, freedom of decision and cost-benefit analysis 
The contrast between the "paternalistic" protection of the consumer against his own 
foreseeable incorrect behaviour on the one hand and insistence on the consumer's own 
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responsibility in the case of incorrect use of products is a permanent feature of the entire 
debate on the justification for and limits of product regulation by the State. The contrast 
between "paternalism" and "own responsibility" also takes the form of a dispute between 
political and moral judgement on the one hand and economic rationality concepts on the 
other. But not only have new terms been invented in these debates; relevant framework 




  2.2.1 Political and moral hazard assessments 
As soon as the safety level of technical consumer products is recognised as a normative 
decision problem, the question of the rationality of the procedures concerned has to be settled 
whilst at the same time the selection of a particular decision procedure also affects the criteria 
taken into account to arrive at a decision36. As long as the manufacturer does not have to 
comply with a specific safety level and consumers may define their own safety interests and 
are themselves responsible for observing the same, the safety level will remain a function of 
supply and demand decisions. 
On the other hand, if the "accepted" state of the art is to be regarded as the binding minimum 
norm, the logical consequence is to make technical experts responsible for laying down these 
rules37. Finally, anyone who does not wish to leave safety decisions to market forces, but 
also does not wish to abide by the average level or the state of the art and sees the 
guaranteeing of safety as a political task will assign this task to either State authorities or 
independent agencies. 
R. B. Lave has drafted a list of how such agencies can be used38. The elimination of hazards 
by strict bans can be called for, but as a rule such bans quickly turn out to be unenforceable. 
The best available technology can be demanded, but this norm, too, is usually controversial 
and particularly in the case of technical consumer products would be an illusion. Another 
possibility is to balance the health risks for a product against its uses, either ignoring or 
taking particular heed of economic factors; this means that in the first case the decision is 
based on safety criteria only, whilst in the second case all socially relevant factors will be 
considered. Even if in the latter case the decision framework remains discretionary, it is 
suitable for application in connection with consumer product safety regulation. The technical 
complexity and hazards of such products vary considerably. Some are essential despite 
inherent dangers, e.g. kitchen knives. Sometimes there can be a dispute about how necessary 
products are, as in the case of the banning of skateboards in Norway39. The ability to come to 
terms with hazards varies from one age group to another, as a result of which design safety 
demands also differ. Finally, the effects of safety requirements on production costs and 
selling prices do not just have an economic significance. They can put products beyond the 
means of specific population groups and thus have a discriminatory effect. 
This large number of potentially relevant aspects does not exclude appropriate structuring of 
the decision process. This is illustrated by the OECD report on "Product Safety, Risk 
Management and Cost-Benefit Analysis"40, which distinguishes six groups of considerations: 
general aspects of the product concerned (in particular its distribution and its usefulness); 
technical characteristics (including a check on technically possible alternatives); analysis of 
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hazards attributable to design or misuse respectively; analysis of hazards due to the 
organisation of the production process rather than to design; differentiation by age groups, 
recognisability of dangers, likelihood of misuse; increased costs resulting from safety 
requirements and anticipated economic effect of a reduction of hazards. 
  
 
  2.2.2 Economic rationality criteria 
In view of the intangible nature of normative safety policy decisions, the search for 
"objective" decision-making criteria is certainly understandable. The current call, particularly 
in the USA, for safety policy to be brought into line with cost-benefit analyses is often 
combined with a promise of clear and rational decision-making criteria. Cost-benefit analyses 
are seen as an instrument of regulation. However, the criteria of such analyses are linked to a 
view of the safety problem derived specifically from the market economy, namely the 
conceptualisation of the "optimal" safety level as an economically rational decision balancing 
the cost and benefit of safety. Microeconomically, this means that the usefulness of safety 
measures is to be measured in terms of willingness to pay for a reduction of hazards that 
entails costs. A cost-benefit analysis of safety measures cannot take account of individual 
safety decisions (readiness to accept costs), as the cost and benefit of such measures affect 
consumers as a whole (and not always to the same extent). Cost and benefit must each be 
aggregated, and the conceptualisation of the safety problem as an economic problem then 
means that the total cost of a measure should not in any event exceed its total benefit41. 
As far as the cost side is concerned, quantification can be based on the anticipated effect of a 
measure on the market price of the products concerned. Limitations on usability (e.g. time 
taken to open safety locks, etc.) and costs of implementing a regulation must be estimated, 
whilst on the other hand the medium- or long-term scale advantages which the introduction of 
a universally binding safety standard may bring must also be taken into account. It is still 
harder to quantify benefit. In addition to savings on medical costs and wage payments to sick 
workers, the suffering of potential victims must also be quantified; the American Consumer 
Product Safety Commission bases its findings on solatia awarded by American juries42, 
whereas the corresponding "benefit" in Europe would be considerably lower. The most 
familiar quantification problems concern deaths. One way is to use loss of income, but more 
widespread is recourse to wage differences between hazardous and less hazardous 
occupations, since an approach can be based on observable behaviour patterns on (labour) 
markets43. 
Taking a position in principle on the application of cost-benefit analysis to problems of safety 
regulation serves little purpose unless we go into the details of the different variants of this 
analysis method. However, a thorough cost-benefit analysis indisputably involves 
considerable expense, is often based on very unreliable estimates44 and does not take account 
of possible distributive effects or the effects of regulations on competition; furthermore, 
criteria for calculating benefit in cash have to abstract from individual suffering, so that cost-
benefit calculation requires willingness by the decision-maker to take an abstract approach. 
  
 
  3. Instruments of safety regulation 
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The spectrum of regulatory action is wide, and the possibilities include preventive approval 
regulations, performance standards, certification procedures, voluntary standards and safety 
symbols, warnings, safety campaigns, follow-up market controls (recalls and bans) and rules 
on liability. Employment of all these instruments is dependent on prior strategic and 
conceptual thinking. Product hazards can be reduced preventively by product bans, 
compulsory safety regulations or standards and certification requirements, as well as by 
information campaigns and, especially at work, by training measures. Liability rules, follow-
up market control measures and safety-conscious purchasing advice also have an indirect 
effect on the safety level of products. However, in practice the decision on which of these 
possibilities to apply is very much subject to objective constraints. The most obvious of these 
is a direct result of the area concerned: the number and diversity of technical consumer 
products, technical progress and the different behaviour patterns and protective interests of 
users make positive regulation of all safety aspects of consumer products impracticable. 
Accordingly, if only for pragmatic reasons, it is advisable to assess the efficiency and 




  3.1 Self-regulation by the market and market-complementary regulation 
Markets, too, are regulatory mechanisms. Their particular characteristic is that they do not 
specify the "regulatory outcome", but rely on the supply-and-demand discovery process. It 
can be shown that under certain circumstances markets bring about an optimum allocation of 
resources. This applies to the price-performance relationship in general and therefore also to 
the safety level of products. Here, too, it is a matter of weighing up benefit and cost in order 
to decide which safety precautions are economically viable and which hazards should be 
tolerated. However, the market process brings optimum results only under certain model 
conditions which in practice are difficult to guarantee, particularly as far as the level of safety 
is concerned45. This is particularly true of the rationality of a consumer's safety decision46. 
Only a "fully" informed decision would be economically rational. This condition is 
sometimes followed strictly, sometimes less so. It will certainly not be fulfilled, in fact it 
cannot be fulfilled, as long as the stage reached by medical research does not permit 
conclusions on health hazards. On the other hand, this condition is not sufficient in cases 
where the user of a product endangers not only himself, but others as well. "Normal" cases 
are more difficult to assess. The hazards are recognisable, but the user does not bother to 
obtain the information, for reasons of economy or convenience. Attention is drawn to 
hazards, but the information cannot be processed; hazards are seen but ignored, since "bad 
things always happen to the other guy"47. In addition, suppliers can put such cases of 
"information failure" to strategic use. In any event we should not expect product advertising 
to draw attention to hazards, and we must not automatically assume that a high level of safety 
is always beneficial to the supplier48. 
  
 
  3.1.1 Information policy measures 
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If under certain circumstances markets produce an optimum level of safety, the logical 
consequence is to react to safety problems primarily by means of regulative strategies aiming 
to guarantee the functional conditions of the market process. The policy of informing the 
consumer then has priority, especially as the individual consumer then has the freedom to 
make the best decision to suit his purposes. The actual organisation of such measures is in 
fact difficult and their effectiveness often questionable49. In order to "fully" compensate for 
information deficits, information should be supplied to the consumer in such a way that he 
can recognise and take notice of it. Simplification may help where receptiveness is limited, 
but information must also be expressed in a suitably explicit manner in order to overcome 
tendencies to ignore it. However, as shown by the example of the warning on swimming pool 
slides required by the Consumer Product Safety Commission50, these objectives may conflict; 
for instance, information in restrained form may be ineffective from the safety point of view, 
whilst effective information may have a dubious effect from the point of view of competition. 
Such conflicts can also occur in the case of broader information policy measures. Safety 
symbols can under certain circumstances be awarded or product tests designed in such a way 
as to provide simple and reliable safety information without unfairly distorting the 
competition process on the supply side. However, the safety effect of such measures is 
dependent on a large number of peripheral conditions51. Finally, whilst general information 
campaigns in principle reach all persons potentially concerned, they are a regulatory 
instrument with a tendency to go beyond the framework of an information policy aiming to 
optimise market processes52. 
  
 
  3.1.2 Product liability 
A manufacturer's strict liability for defective products constitutes, from the viewpoint of 
economic analysis of liability law, a form of compulsory insurance of consumers against 
particular hazards involved in the use of products; the customer's freedom to choose 
"uninsured", but cheaper, products and to rely on his own care in using the product is thus 
lost53. However, the obligation on the manufacturer to take responsibility is only an incentive 
to reduce product hazards. It remains up to the manufacturer what steps he takes in response: 
design changes, liability insurance, waiting and seeing. This indirect mode of operation of 
liability law, which exploits the market mechanism, explains why product liability is often 
interpreted as a "pro-market" alternative to direct government regulation of product safety, 
and recommended as such. 
The actual effects of product liability on the level of safety of consumer products depend on 
the details of liability, the treatment of development hazards, the requirements in respect of 
proving a connection between product defects and damage, the level of penalties and 
consequences of co-responsibility, etc. Moreover, only an analysis of these detailed 
regulations can show how far product liability in fact relies on the logic of the market 
process, and how far it additionally switches risks according to criteria of social acceptability. 
There are also other various factors which, independently of the more detailed legal aspects 
of liability, restrict its regulatory effects54. First of all, it is highly doubtful whether penalties 
under liability law are or ever can be so formulated as to produce the required safety policy 
effects. At any rate the "signals" of product liability law are rather too irrational; for example, 
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in the case of injuries to children a death can be "cheaper" than a serious injury. Secondly, the 
reactions of firms to claims for damages depend on contingent circumstances: the 
competition situation on relevant markets, the internal organisation structures and financial 
strength of the firm concerned, and its willingness not to simply ignore the possibility of 
future penalties in favour of sure short-term advantages. A third cause is the insurability of 
the liability risk. Insurance premiums are obviously not specifically matched to risk. It seems 
possible to make distinctions only between branches or product groups, as adapting 
premiums to product-specific risk factors in all cases would not be compatible with the 
philosophy of insurance protection, nor in any case with insurance practice55. A fourth 
weakness of product liability law stems from the extreme selectivity of the private 
prosecution system. Product liability law can neither guarantee that injured parties will take 
upon themselves the trouble and financial risk of a private prosecution, nor can or should it 
exclude out-of-court settlements56. 
  
 
  3.2Product standards 
The weaknesses of information policy and product liability law mean that in principle the 
justification for preventive safety regulations is undisputed. It is also undisputed that the 
technical complexity of product regulations and of continually adapting them to technical 
progress is beyond the means of general parliamentary legislation procedures, meaning that 
the task of introducing specific regulations has to be delegated. In this connection there are 
ideally two alternatives: the introduction of legally binding safety regulations by specialised 
public agencies, or the introduction of self-administered safety norms by the industry 
concerned. However, in practice these ideal alternatives are not encountered; product 
regulation is dominated by hybrid systems with a tendency towards "corporatism". 
  
 
  3.2.1Mandatory product standards 
As the assurance of safety is one of the duties of the State, it would appear logical to make 
State authorities responsible for drafting product regulations. This is the path followed by 
modern product safety laws. The UK Consumer Protection Act 1961 delegated the issuing of 
safety regulations to the executive authorities, giving Parliament only the right to participate 
in the process, and the right of subsequent annulment57. In the USA the Consumer Product 
Safety Act, in its original version of 1972, went even further. It set up, in the form of the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission, a State agency (though protected from the direct 
control of the House of Representatives or the Administration), which was allowed to fix its 
own priorities and draft its own regulations58. The practical and organisational problems of 
such an allocation of responsibilities match the complexity of a comprehensive normative 
assessment of hazards59. For such an assessment it is first of all necessary to "measure" risks, 
i.e. to develop an information system for the identification of product hazards. A second 
precondition is that the authority concerned should be competent, from the technical and 
scientific point of view, to assess design characteristics of technical consumer products, to 
identify any risks and develop technically feasible requirements aimed at reducing the risk. A 
third precondition is that it should be competent, from an economic and sociological 
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viewpoint, to assess the social consequences, implications for competition policy, costs and 
benefits of a regulation. Authorities invested with only legal competence to pass product 
regulations are not in a position, or if so only to a limited extent, to carry out a comprehensive 
assessment of risks. 
Technical safety legislation has nowhere made adequate provision for the assessment of risks, 
whether in organisational or in technical terms. In the UK, the CPA 1961 was based on State 
adoption of standards drafted by the competent institutions and did not seek to set up 
independent administration for the implementation of safety regulations; these shortcomings 
were only partly counterbalanced by later measures60. In the USA, the CPSC was set up 
taking into account the preconditions for drafting product regulations. However, there, too, 
the available resources meant that from the outset only selective action was possible; above 
all, the legal and technical fields of responsibility of the CPSC were subsequently reduced to 
such an extent that the Commission's role was limited to merely supervising standards drafted 
by the standards institutions, in sharp contrast to original intention61. 
  
 
  3.2.2Technical norms 
The normative aspect of safety assessment does not become any simpler when responsibility 
for drafting product standards is transferred to private organisations, and the practical and 
organisational advantages of reducing the burden on the legislative process in this way are 
offset by an endangering of the normative quality of safety regulations. In the past the 
impulse for the "voluntary" introduction of product standards came from the development of 
industrial mass production, as the need for technical standardisation became essential so that 
it would be possible to interchange and combine production elements62. This function of 
private standardisation is still valid, but has become more and more caught up in the 
whirlpool of society's increasing demands that "technical" solutions take account of safety 
and environmental aspects63. The basis for criticism is as simple as it is obvious64: as long as 
the industries concerned are themselves responsible for standards, genuine consideration of 
safety and environmental aspects cannot be expected. The justification of such reservations 
about self-regulation as opposed to State regulation is in principle generally acknowledged. It 
is therefore also generally accepted that such a transfer of decision-making functions must be 
compensated for by laying down special requirements for the drafting of standards, which in 
particular must guarantee a "balanced" representation of all interests concerned in the 
standardisation process and the consideration of "social" requirements, among them safety65. 
Finally, it is recognised that the State should remain in a position to set safety priorities and 
that standards should not become legally binding until they have been through an additional 
checking procedure. 
The actual role played by "private" norms within the framework of genuine governmental 
product regulation on the one hand and the influence of the State on private standardisation 
on the other moderate the contrasts between basically governmental and private 
standardisation. However, for the time being the forms of interaction between State and 
society vary considerably. In the Federal Republic of Germany66, the United Kingdom67 and 
now at European Community level68, the measure of influence of the State is restricted by 
conventions, or by mutually agreed "general principles". However, the formal rights of 
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participation of social groups differ, and the degree to which standardisation results are 
subjected to subsequent checks also does not seem to be uniform. In France the 
administration's possibilities for exercising direct influence seem to be more distinct69. In the 
USA the role of the CPSC in drafting voluntary standards has been defined in detailed 
regulations and its powers to introduce compulsory regulations remained significant for the 
inclusion of safety aspects in "voluntary standards"70. Consequently, the only principle to 
become generally accepted is that technical safety regulations should be developed by private 
standards institutions drawing on the technical expertise of the industries concerned ("it is 
expensive to reinvent the wheel"71). There is, however, no consensus on the regulative 




  3.3 Follow-up market controls (recalls and bans) 
All product safety policy instruments aimed at the preventive control of design hazards of 
technical consumer products have a selective effect. State regulations can cover only a 
fraction of risks potentially requiring regulation; private standards institutes too must lay 
down priorities and cannot enforce the implementation of their norms, which are not legally 
binding. When all is said and done, the primary function of product liability is to compensate 
for any damage, and its influence on the level of safety is indirect and incomplete. However, 
preventive safety measures are not only inevitably selective, but also imperfect. The 
complexity of accidents means that particularly in the development of new products it is 
impossible in advance to recognise all hazards precisely. The selectiveness of preventive 
safety measures and the uncertainty of hazard forecasts are already two reasons to suggest 
that monitoring products in use and powers of subsequent intervention are essential. 
However, follow-up market controls also have a redistributive function. If the marketing of 
dangerous products is banned, traders suffer economic losses; if the products are already in 
the hands of final consumers, the repair or exchange of the products or the payment of 
compensation involves additional costs. The development of effective instruments of follow-
up market control is, in the context of these functions, a difficult task from the legal point of 
view. However, primarily because of the costs involved, the loss of image which the 
companies concerned may suffer and the potential effects on product liability procedures, 
follow-up market control comes up against considerable legal resistance. 
In 1981 the OECD proposed solutions to the problems of follow-up market control based on 
the recall provisions of Section 15 of the CPSA 1972 72. The OECD report divides the 
procedure into three stages 73: (1) The essential first step is the systematic recording of 
information on product hazards. The main information sources are accident information 
systems and reports from supervisory or certification authorities, followed by reports from 
manufacturers and importers, and complaints from consumers and consumer organisations. 
(2) When the dangers have been identified, suitable remedies must be taken. First of all, the 
consumers concerned must be warned about the hazards, then positive action must be taken 
to eliminate hazards and provide compensation for any damage. Measures must be adapted to 
the individual case; repairs may be sufficient, but in some cases products will have to be 
exchanged or destroyed and damages paid. (3) For the collection of information, assessment 
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of hazards, and the preparation and monitoring of remedial measures it is necessary to set up 
a central authority which is in a position to carry out follow-up market control and must 
therefore be invested with the required legal powers. 
No Community Member State has yet fulfilled these requirements. German law provides for 
marketing bans (§ 5, GSG), but a recall obligation exists only in conjunction with producers' 
liability 74. English law provides for "prohibition orders" and "prohibition notices" which the 
Secretary of State can invoke in the case of "imminent hazards" (see § 3 (1) a-c of the 
Consumer Safety Act 1978); in practice, however, these instruments are not applied and it is 
not intended to develop them into a recall procedure 75. In France the Consumer Safety Law 
of 21 July 1983 is a potentially far-reaching instrument providing for recalls through the State 
machinery, but as yet it has hardly been tried out 76. 
In the face of such reticence and resistance in the Member States, it should be noted at this 
point that the Community's current efforts to complete the internal market will be bound to 
have consequences for the development of follow-up market controls. The principle that 
products with European certificates of conformity manufactured according to foreign 
standards or tested by foreign institutes should be allowed to move freely in all Member 
States will encounter safety-motivated reservations which may also be linked to protectionist 
interests. We will return to the resulting need for action at a later stage77. 
  
 
  4.Summary 
Product safety represents a scarcely consolidated policy area, where information measures, 
liability rules, self-regulatory mechanisms and legal intervention exist side by side. Each of 
these instruments fulfils specific functions and therefore uses different regulative 
mechanisms. However, at the same time each instrument leads its own legal life; as yet there 
is no coherent product safety policy to co-ordinate these instruments, take account of the 
effectiveness of each, harmonise safety standards and control the development of legal 
instruments with the overall aim of reducing product hazards. As far as the approximation of 
laws in the European Community is concerned, this situation results in both problems and 
opportunities. The difficulties stem from the fact that the approximation of laws in a specific 
field involves inter-State co-ordination of heterogeneous legal instruments, and therefore may 
result in changes which lead to gaps in protection, in turn causing difficulties in reaching 
agreement or even resistance to the implementation of Community law. On the other hand, as 
shown by the example of environment law, it is precisely in new policy areas that willingness 
to change and learn is likely to be encountered - provided that integration policy provides the 
incentives and constraints that are needed to bring about innovation. 
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Examples of product safety legislation 
It is no coincidence that up-to-date comparative accounts of Member States product safety 
laws are largely unavailable. This is no coincidence. Technical safety law, to the extent that it 
deals with technical consumer goods, has been largely ignored by academic legal science, 
and is therefore given less importance in comparative law. Moreover, product safety law is 
much more strongly bound up with technical and organisational administrative structures 
than, for example general civil law. These structures must be recognised in order to 
understand its regulatory functions, but are hard for the foreign observer to gain access to. 
The description below will therefore have to proceed selectively, and will be confined to the 
laws of France, Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany. Restriction to these States is 
problematic because it means overlooking innovative developments in smaller Member 
States and the current situation in new ones. But the choice of France, Britain and the FRG is 
in line with the economic importance of these States and their general influence in the 
Community. U.S. law is also taken into account, since important stimuli to the further 





Product safety law in France 
French product safety law is hard to fit into a market-oriented approach1. The French 
analytical framework, conceived from a State or administration viewpoint, of 
prevention/repression/reparation, cuts straight across a German market-oriented category 
frame of market-related rules, setting of standards and follow-up market controls2. Given the 
emerging Europeanisation of safety policy, it is important to grasp what convergence exists 
and seek to bring it into a European, self-contained product safety policy. 
  
 
1.1 French perspectives on product safety law 
An approach to the field can be established from a schematic overview of French safety and 
standards policy. A historical outline of the development of both policies will be attempted. 
An evaluation of the process might seem to be a bold venture, but the Europeanisation of 
product safety has to start from a definition of the state of Member States' product safety 
policy. A more technical matter is the explanation of the French categorical framework of 
prevention/repression/ reparation, but this is a necessary prerequisite for an understanding of 




1.1.1 Schematic overview of French product safety and standards policy 
The diagrams below make no claim to completeness, but do aim to outline the tendencies 
operating in both policy areas. This cannot be done without considerable simplification. The 
state of legal development at the turn of the century has been taken as a starting point. This is 
simply because relevant laws were enacted in France shortly thereafter. The thread of 
development is then picked up again for pragmatic reasons after the Second World War, with 
special consideration going to the wave of reforms in the 1970's, which then led to a phase of 
regression. Since there has not yet been a coherent product safety policy in France, at least 
not including technical standards, development in both policy areas must initially be 
described separately. This leads to a time shift, since standards policy as it were, leapt over 
the reform phase of the 1970's, and did not take on importance in France until economic 
crises, unemployment and the wave of deregulation began to determine day-to-day politics. 
For the conceptual framework, the classical French system of prevention/ 
repression/reparation3. has been adopted. A transfer of this conceptual approach into 
standards policy makes it possible to compare regulatory instruments in each policy area with 
each other and thereby show that there is no overlap. 
"Prevention" includes the following measures: information, standard setting, both private and 
governmental, follow-up market control (administratively ordered recall), prohibition orders 
and the work of the French Consumer Safety Commission. 
"Repression" concerns primarily penal sanctions, but also covers imposition of compensatory 
payments and accompanying measures of sanction (bans or recalls ordered by judges, 
confiscation, destruction, closures etc.). 
"Reparation" deals with the French version of product liability. 
The reasons for the French conceptual structure lie in the one-sided administrative 
perspective on product safety as a whole. The viewpoint has already undergone some changes 
through inclusion of reparation as an instrument of safety policy, first incisively practised by 
the Commission de la Refonte4. . The liberalisation policy pursued for some ten years now in 
France ought to lead to a blurring of the categorial outlines, since the private economy, the 
consumer and the courts will gain ground in safety regulation. However, at present, the whole 
political, legal policy and legal theory debate on standardisation and product safety in France 
continues to follow traditional lines. 
  
 
1.1.2 Product safety and standardisation side by side 
The conceptual framework of French product safety policy has (from the consumer's 
viewpoint also and especially) led to a very narrow understanding of product safety, which 
has no room for a number of relevant cross-connections. Thus, there is no systematic 
incorporation of standardisation into product safety policy. This is even truer of certification, 
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which is hardly discussed at all. Though product liability is included in safety policy, it is 
treated only as leading to individual compensation for damages, not as an instrument for 
controlling product safety. Finally, there is no discussion of the relationship between product 
liability and technical standard setting. The research approach pursued here, of bringing 
product safety and technical standards into relation with each other, meets in France, partly 
with rejection and partly with misunderstanding. It is rejected because the administration 
continues to be seen as the best guarantor of product safety; it is misunderstood because the 
connecting lines are not clearly seen, due to the absence of intermeshing between product 
safety and standards; indeed, perhaps they do not even exist. The last point is true, at any rate, 
for the sphere of product liability, which seems not to refer to technical standardisation at all. 
The French government is responsible for the regulation of product safety5 . Standards are set 
by order. The administration's responsibility for product safety has remained unshaken even 
after the reform attempts of the 1980's. The setting up of a Consumer Safety 
Commission6 was fitted seamlessly into an administrative product safety policy, for all that 
was done was to shift tasks from the administration, without at all limiting ultimate 
administration responsibility and control. Looking closely from the French viewpoint, at the 
distribution of roles among the three powers, the cautious inclusion of the courts appears to 
be the most desicive change in the newly introduced product safety law7 . Still existing 
legislative and executive mistrust of inclusion of the judiciary can be seen from the fact that 
though Art.1 is conceived as a general clause, it is not directed explicitly at the courts. 
Accordingly, until the significance of Art. 1 has become clear, more importance should be 
attached to the courts' power, newly introduced in 1983, to issue a banning order or withdraw 
products from the market by emergency procedure on application - and not just to the 
relevant secretary of state or consumer minister, or certain administration officials8 . The 
1978 law still saw product safety policy entirely from an administrative point of view, and 
was explicitly aimed at excluding the courts from prevention9 . 
French standardisation is a governmental task10 . AFNOR has been incorporated into the 
governmental organisation of standardisation, with the duty of drawing up technical 
standards, which, however, must be supervised and checked by the Commissioner for 
Standardisation as representative of the State. AFNOR has discretion only insofar as it is 
allowed by the French administration. The essentially governmental and administrative 
organisation of standardisation also means that the reforms of the 1980's changed nothing. 
Nevertheless, the reform of 1983 is bringing shifts that might in the long run, lead to a change 
in the division of responsibilities between government and the economy. The keywords are 
privatisation and politicisation of standardisation. Privatisation has come in since the reform 
made the administration yield some of its tasks to the privately organised standards body 
AFNOR; politicisation because creation of the Supreme Council for standardisation makes 
the guidelines for standardisation policy into a topic of public debate. The parallel with the 
standardisation agreement reached in 1975 between DIN and the Federal Government is self-
evident11 . No intermeshing of the reform attempts in product safety law and in 
standardisation, which were pushed forward in parallel, took place, at least openly. With 
some exageration, one might say that product safety was discussed without standardisation, 
and standardisation without product safety. Para. 3 of the GSG (reference to standards) 
constitutes, from the German viewpoint, the bridge between the two policy areas. C. Germon 
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and P. Marano12 proposed the "German solution" in their report to the French Ministry for 
Industry. No discussion of the advantages and drawbacks of the German approach took place. 
However, there were some hints at it. The rearrangement of French standardisation was 
aimed primarily at strengthening the French economy's competiveness; expansion of 
consumer protection and the setting up of a supreme council for standardisation were to 
enhance acceptance of French standards in public awareness. Though the German GSG and 
consumer trust in standards were taken by C. Germon and P. Marano as shining examples, 
the French plainly went their own way towards increasing national competiveness. 
Comparison of the reform proposals with the law shows that the French government 
ultimately shrank from copying the German method of reference. 
  
 
1.2 The "safety philosophy" of the 1983 law 
While Art. 1 of the French law on product safety13 does lay down a general obligation on the 
manufacturer to bring only safe products to the market, reference to the "generally recognised 
rules of the art" (allgemein anerkannten Regeln der Technik) is lacking: 
"Les produits et les services doivent, dans des conditions normales d'utilisation ou dans 
d'autres conditions raisonnablement prévisibles par le professionnel, présenter la sécurité à 
laquelle on peut légitimement s'attendre et ne pas porter atteinte à la santé des personnes". 
The constitutive elements of this general clause are (1) the "autres conditions prévisibles par 
le professionnel" and (2) "la sécurité à laquelle on peut légitimement s'attendre". It is 
sometimes disputed that these are indeed two constitutive elements, since the "safety one may 
legitimately expect" also covers admissible use. This is not so14. The "other reasonably 
foreseeable conditions" describe the safety requirements on product manufacture. The 
addressee is the manufacturer. The "safety one may legitimately expect", on the other hand, 
defines the consumer's justified expectations of safety. Though the two viewpoints can 
theoretically be separated, they are in practice very similar. For the actual safety level must 
include requirements covering both the manufacturer and the consumer's expectations. 
  
 
1.2.1 The general clause in Art. 1 
The important innovation in the 1983 law was the general duty of safety imposed on the 
manufacturer. France was thus drawing the consequences of the almost complete failure of 
the 1978 framework regulations15. 
Only two orders were issued between 1978 and 1983. Accordingly, administrative regulation 
of the classical type could be regarded as having failed. The cumbersome decision-making 
process within the administration must have given the stimulus for setting up a separate 
consumer safety commission, which would have some autonomy at least in the areas of 
information gathering, assessment and processing. In 1985 the Commission had a budget of 
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2.4 million francs at its disposal, 500,000 francs of which were designated for research 
purposes. The secretariat consisted of four people, including a secretary. 
According to the general clause, the Commission can itself consider almost any question and 
is not dependent on special authorisation by any order or provision. This was the specific 
weakpoint of the 1978 law16. Here there is no doubt that administrative cumbersomeness 
helped bring back the courts into the process of State standard setting. Yet even these changes 
do not alter the main thrust of product safety regulation. As before, the chief addressee is the 
administration, which alone can give the safety obligation legal bindingness, by specifying 
the general clause through the enactment of orders, or by a ministerial decree17. 
Since the French legislator has rejected adoption of the method of reference to standards, the 
question remains open as to how safety standards can be made specific. 
Technical standards can be adduced as aids to interpretation, but their observance does not 
offer the French manufacturer any protection against action under Art. 118. In practice, the 
manufacturer's main fear must be of the activities of the Consumer Safety Commission, 
which has explicitly stated that the safety requirements of Art. 1 may well lie higher than 
those of the technical standards drawn up by AFNOR19. 
  
 
1.2.2 Determination of safety levels 
The shift in French safety philosophy emerges clearly from the change in wording from the 
1978 safety law's "conditions normales d'utilisation" to the 1983 "autres conditions 
raisonnablement prévisibles par le professionnel (qui doivent présenter) la sécurité à la quelle 
on peut légitimement s'attendre". The 1983 safety law for the first time separated the distinct 
standpoints of consumer and manufacturer, and at the same time heightened the requirements 
on the manufacturer. The criterion is not proper use, but reasonably foreseeable use; this is 
what the manufacturer has to use as a guide in design and production. 
Not many problems are presented by the consumer's position. The definition states clearly 
that it is not the individual viewpoint that should be decisive, but the position of the average 
consumer20. 
Far greater difficulties of interpretation are presented by the intensification of the safety 
obligations on manufacturers21. The elementary political significance of the change in safety 
policy becomes clear from the stormy parliamentary debate. Admittedly, the preliminary 
draft had focused on "condition anormale d'utilisation" (improper use), thus considerably 
contributing to heating the debate. Efforts then concentrated on clarifying what was to be 
understood by "autres conditions raisonnablement prévisibles par le professionnel". The 
French debate becomes comprehensible only if it is borne in mind that consumer 
organisations were pressing for adoption of "improper use". The move away from "condition 
anormale d'utilisation" made two things clear: (1) improper use resulting from culpable 
conduct by the consumer was not to be covered by the general clause; (2) on the other hand, 
foreseeable collective error was to be covered. The parliamentary debate centred on the 
"condition anormale" alone. By contrast, there was wide unanimity about obliging 
manufacturers to take account not only of foreseeable conduct but also specifically of 
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foreseeable misuse. But even the French formulation of the general clause is of no further 
help when it comes to distinguishing collective foreseeable misuse from misuse that is 
unforeseeable because it is improper. The distinction will be left up to the judge, who will 
have to decide how far the marketing of a faulty product is criminal, or else to be 
compensated for by payment. This presupposes that in the specific case, an order has been 
issued that makes the general clause specific. 
It is hard to give any meaningful summary of experience with the new product safety law of 
1983. The fact remains that France is the only EC-country where a "safety philosophy" that 
explicitly includes foreseeable "misuse" does exist. 
  
 
1.3 Consumer Safety"Information policy and the Commission for Consumer Safety 
A State policy on safety information has existed in France only since 1983. The 1978 law22, 
even though its title includes "information to consumers", provided no measures to meet the 
consumer's specific safety requirements. It was only with the enactment of the 1983 law23 and 
the creation of the Consumer Safety Commission that an instrument aimed essentially at 
improving information could be said to exist. 
  
 
1.3.1 Information from regulatory bodies 
The Commission has the task of gathering, analyzing and (within limits) informing the public 
of necessary data on product safety24. The establishment of a database is onbly possible if all 
authorities and institutions concerned with consumer goods and safety problems inform the 
Consumer Safety Commission of eventual infractions25. Theoretically, therefore, all 
authorities nationwide would be obliged to notify the Consumer Safety Commission of all 
damage, accidents, and suspicions that might have to do with the manufacture or use of an 
unsafe consumer item. The courts are included in the obligation of notification. In practise, 
this is a compromise in the dispute over the setting up a national accident surveillance 
system. Just as with other European Community Member States, France, too, in the early 
1980's, gave out contracts for research into the feasibility of a national accident surveillance 
system to combat accidents and unsafe products26. The arguments adduced against the 
setting-up of a national accident surveillance system more or less coincide with the German 
stance against a Community one27. In fact, the Community directive on setting up an accident 
surveillance system has overtaken developments in France28. The Consumer Safety 
Commission has, since its creation, done the necessary preliminary work to permit a 
nationwide accident surveillance system. To date, four hospitals have declared their 
willingness to co-operate. The question of how far the notification obligation on French 
supervisory authorities is suitable for the establishment of a wider, or different, data picture is 
still open to debate. At any rate, the French courts have been de facto refusing co-operation29. 
The Commission's 1985-6 annual report allows no conclusion as to whether the authorities 
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furnish the Commission with information, or as to whether the information that does come in 
is at all of technical use to these authorities. 
The Consumer Safety Commission is further responsible for sifting incoming data, 
determining significant points and selecting those to analyze further. Here it may draw on the 
help of the French laboratories. Its small staff makes it hard for the Commission to develop 
activities of its own to any noteworthy extent. It is largely reduced to using factual and issue 
analyses from third parties, or to trusting to their quality. Co-operation has intensified in the 
second year of the Commission's existence30. 
Data evaluation finds its formal conclusion in the production of reports or parliamentary 
position papers. These are later published in the activity reports for each calendar year. The 
Commission is aiming at publication in the French Official Journal31. 
  
 
1.3.2 Consumer information 
The Consumer Safety Commission can also approach the public itself32. Though it is 
forbidden from sending reports or opinions to the press, it does have the possibility of 
publishing a summary. This has in fact been done and without objection. This means that the 
Commission has opened up a way of bringing safety problems in handling consumer goods to 
the attention of consumers. The Commission is at present considering how it can reach 
consumers more effectively. A quarterly publication of its findings, a safety bulletin as it 
were, might serve this end. For direct contact with the consumer, however, it has not yet been 
determined to whether the videotext system TELETEL, widespread in France (1.8 million 
users) can be successfully used to disseminate information. A pilot study has furnished 
conclusions about the prospects by the end of 198733. 
  
 
1.4. Preventive regulation of product safety34 
In the whole conception of product safety law, the administrative regulation of product safety 
stands at the centre of interest. For it is only if the general clause can be made specific in 
further administrative measures that it can - quite apart from the range of tasks of the 
Consumer Safety Commission - develop a legal effect on the commercial circles involved. 
The distinction between normal procedure and emergency procedure is central to an 
understanding of French safety law. 
  
 
1.4.1. The normal procedure for product regulation 
For removing unsafe products from the market, the law35 provides for a still relatively 
cumbersome procedure, justified on grounds of finality and of possible heavy damages for 
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the industries concerned. In formal terms, the procedure can be split into two sections. The 
first phase takes place before the Consumer Safety Commission, which is called on by either 
the minister, a consumer organisation, the industry, trade or individual, to take up a problem. 
The Commission may also examine a matter itself. Once the procedure has begun, the 
Commission calls on experts from laboratories and other scientific institutions to evaluate the 
product. At the same time firms involved are consulted36. They can present their position and 
may make proposals for removing the hazard by modifying the product. The Commission has 
wide discretion as to how it acts during such negotiations. Only if it is convinced that the 
product fails to offer the safety required by Art.1 does it furnish a recommendation as to how 
the ministries should respond to the hazardous aspects of the product. 
The second phase then takes place within the administration. The ministry or ministries are in 
no way bound by the Commission's suggestions. Their importance will ultimately depend on 
whether the relevant ministries tend to follow the recommendations, or to incorporate them 
into measures to be taken. According to the text of the law, two categories are available: 
- firstly, general measures laid down by way of regulation, that concern a wide range of 
products or of services. These regulations require agreement among several ministries as to 
whether there is, in fact the need to adopt a regulation; 
- secondly, specific measures, referring to a named product or service which may be laid 
down by ministerial order. Agreement among ministries is necessary before action can be 
taken. 
By contrast, there are no differences as to the ministries' available means for banning a risk. 




1.4.2 The emergency procedure for product regulation 
However, the normal procedure is much too clumsy when a danger that has arisen has to be 
responded to quickly. Accordingly, the law provides for the possibility of emergency 
measures, to be adopted without involving the Consumer Safety Commission. At the same 
time, though, they are provisional in nature. The only requirement for initiating the 
emergency procedure is the existence of an actual situation of risk. This need not be grave; it 
is the imminence of the damage that creates the urgency, not the severity. Accordingly, a 
non-immediate risk situation justifies initiation of only the normal procedure, even if it is 
severe. With a view to increasing the range of possibilities of intervention, the law38 provides 
for various types of emergency measure, which coexist: 
- the minister, or secretary of state, responsible for consumer protection may adopt a 
provision, without involving the Consumer Safety Commission. This kind of measure is valid 
for at most one year: long enough for decision-taking within the normal procedure as to 
whether a definitive regulation should replace the provisional one; 
- a judge too can issue a injunction order for recall of a product. He makes his decision on 
application from a consumer organisation or a ministry. The provisions upon rights to take 
action derive from the Loi Royer39. The injunction order may not have a duration of more 
38
than six months. The normal procedure has then to be used to decide whether the measure is 
to be maintained or suspended. Firms are no longer allowed, as hitherto, to market the 
products again after this period has expired. If penal proceedings are embarked on, the 
examining judge or the criminal court is competent. The judge can take only specific 
measures relating to a particular product; 
- various administration officials specifically mentioned in the law40 may seize products and 
even have them destroyed. Such measures will lead to the commencement of court 
proceedings, with involvement of the public prosecutor within 24 hours. A prerequisite is that 
the urgency of the measure be beyond all doubt. In cases of mere suspicion, the officials can 
only block the product for 14 days pending results of scientific and technical tests. Whatever 
the outcome of the measure, a copy of the record of proceedings is to be sent to the Consumer 
Safety Commission. 
It is still quite unclear whether the emergency procedures will make headway. 
  
 
1.5. Post Market controls 
Any description of French safety law has to go thoroughly into the administration's role in 
follow-up market controls. Neglecting the whole repressive control machinery would give a 
completely distorted picture of French product safety law, since this is the area where control 
is centred41. The repressive powers will first be described (1.5.1), and then a special 
description of recall given (1.5.2). 
  
 
1.5.1 Repressive product regulation 
Scarcely anywhere else in French safety law does the fragmentary nature of its provisions 
emerge more clearly. This concerns, in part, the substantive legal requirements for action by 
way of post market control. There is nothing in the 1983 law that makes marketing unsafe 
products a criminal offence42. Were that so, the control authorities could engage in post 
market controls without first having to specify their powers by ordinance or ministerial 
decree. In the absence of any ordinance laying down specific penal sanctions for the 
manufacture and distribution particular products or groups of products, the only grounds for 
intervention have to be based Art. 1 of the 1905 law in its 1978 version. Since that date, the 
scope of Art. 1 has included acts of deception in connection with the use of the item to be 
sold43. Thus, for instance, sale of a hazardous product can be punished if the risks ought to 
have been previously brought to the buyer's attention. The fragmentariness of the 1983 Act in 
regulation is still more striking when it comes to the question of who enforces the law. The 
1983 Act creates no administrative infrastructure, no special safety authority with hundreds 
of inspectors, but merely extends the area of action of the "Direction Générale de la 
Consommation et de la Répression des Fraudes" (DCRF)44. Admittedly, the 1905 law 45 also 
extended that body's powers of intervention; in part, to specific controls on products, but in a 
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more general sense, i.e. to the whole area of application of the 1905 law. This composite 
makes it hard to understand the control machinery, for outsiders and authorities as well. 
The first step in control is the search for and establishment of breaches of the law. The 
relevant provisions of the 1983 law on the one hand, strengthen existing intervention powers 
of DCRF officials, and on the other, create new control instruments. A full picture cannot be 
given; we shall confine our description to an outline of the chief powers46. 
The officials have a right to enter firms' premises at any time of day or night. This access 
right is now extended to rooms not used exclusively for business purposes but also private 
ones. Should the person concerned refuse access, officials may inspect the premises only if 
the public prosecutor gives them permission. More recently, the officials have also been 
given the right to inspect production documents. Without prior court permission, they can 
seize dangerous products or remove them. 
If breach of the law has been found, a broad range of sanctions is available. The prerequisite 
is either that a decree provides for punishment for the manufacturing or marketing of an 
unsafe product, or that the intervention requirements of Art. 1 of the 1905 Act are present. 
Sanctions available under the 1983 Act centre around a range of measures besides 
punishment that can be ordered at the time of sentencing. This requires the issuing of a decree 
in the normal procedure or else the issuing of a ministerial order in the emergency procedure. 
Three types can be distinguished: the court may order publication of the decision or require 
specific information of the public; it may order recall or destruction of the product at issue; it 
may confiscate illegally acquired gains. 
In addition to the new provisions on measures accompanying punishment, mention should 
also be made of the codification of long-standing case law of the Higher Criminal Court, 
according to which the manufacturer of a product infringes upon Art.1 of the 1905 Act if he 
brings a product to market without first checking that it complies with safety and health 
provisions in force. The Higher Criminal Court had viewed criminal responsibility of the 
manufacturer as established when, against the explicit tenor of Art. 1, he could be accused 
merely of gross negligence47. The regulations take over the case law, but do not extend it to 
mere dealers. That does not mean, however, that dealers can escape their responsibility. 
French case law48 has long recognised that they can be made responsible under the provisions 
of Art. 1 of the 1905 Act if they have neglected any of their specific duties (unsuitable 
storage, inadequate conservation, inadequate labelling). Indeed, a trader has even been 
condemned for breach of Art.1 of the 1905 Act because he had distributed goods whose 
nonconformity with the legal provisions was clear. 
The closeness in content to comparable efforts at differentiation of product liability in 
German case law is evident. But while in the FRG breach of duty by the manufacturer or 
trader as a rule leads to entitlement to compensation for damage, France relies more 
intensively on an administrative solution to the problem. The parallel is interesting above all 
from the viewpoint of allocation of the burden of proof. German civil case law considers 
infringement of safety provisions in force (or non-compliance with technical standards) as 
a prima facie indication of the defectiveness of a product and therefore also of fault. 
But prima facie rules of this kind are not enough to justify criminal condemnation of the 
manufacturer. In principle, the administration has to show that the manufacturer had not 
carried out the necessary checks. This seemingly clear burden of proof is however brought 
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into question by Art. 7 of the 1983 Act. Art. 7 states that a manufacturer who has not 
officially observed prescribed checks on verification of compliance with the law has, unless 
the contrary is shown, infringed Art. 1 of the 1983 Act. But there is a difference between 
Art.1 of the 1983 Act and Art. 1 of the 1905 Act insofar as the 1983 Act lacks a criminal law 
general description of an offence, allowing condemnation merely because a product does not 
comply with the requirements of the general clause. Nevertheless, one may envisage types of 
cases in which the presumption under Art. 7 of the 1983 Act leads to condemnation under 
Art. 1 of the 1905 Act49. 
  
 
1.5.2 Product recalls 
The 1983 Act for the first time, provides the possibility of ordering he recall of a product. 
This requires either the issuing of a regulation or in urgent cases, a ministerial order. 
Art. 2 says: "These regulations may likewise specify that products be removed from the 
market or recalled for modification, that the purchase price be reimbursed in whole or in part 
or products be exchanged, and that consumer information obligations be laid down". Art. 6 
says: "They (the Ministers responsible for consumer protection or the departmental Minister 
concerned) may also order the publication of warnings and precautionary measures for use, as 
well as recalls for exchange, repair or full or partial reimbursement of the purchase price". 
To avoid misunderstandings, it should be clear that the Courts, too, can order recalls on the 
basis of Art. 1 of the 1983 Act, without being empowered by a regulation or ministerial order. 
To date, no use has been made of the regulatory powers of Art. 2. 
Conversely, it would be wrong to conclude on the basis of the formal absence of regulations 
that product recalls with involvement of governmental bodies do not take place in France. O. 
Dellenbach50 has presented a case study that draws a strict distinction as to whether the safety 
threshold appearing in technical standards was demonstrably set too low, or whether a safety 
standard existed at all. In the first group of cases, Dellenbach has concentrated on three cases 
that caused much furore in France in the second half of the 1970's: (1) crash helmets that 
were subject to material fatigue; (2) fan heaters that easily caused fires; (3) electrically unsafe 
automatic egg boilers. In spite of all the differences in detail, the three cases took an almost 
identical course. The unsafeness of the products was discovered after a series of product tests. 
Attempts by consumer organisations to negotiate an agreement with the manufacturers on 
possible recall and its terms were to no avail. The consumer organisations then went before 
the public, while informing the competent authorities of the safety risk. Under public 
pressure, the French administration saw itself compelled to put pressure on the firms to 
ensure recall of the products. 
The picture is less clear cut in areas where the technical standards contain no safety 
requirements: carry-cots and child-proof seals on cleaning products. Once again it were 
consumer organisations that discovered the problem. The campaign for child-proof seals 
gained additional weight through the involvement of anti-poison centres51. The campaign 
against unsafe carry-cots led, after six years, to the establishment of a technical standard, 
which was however declared non-binding and did not cover other similar dangerous products. 
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French consumer organisations had asked for the passing of a relevant regulation, on the 
basis of the Act of 10 January 1978 (the predecessor of the 1983 Act). The fight for child-
proof cleaning product containers ultimately led to adoption of a regulation on the basis of 
the Council Directive of 18 September 1979; this concerned the harmonisation of legal and 
administrative provisions for the classification, packaging and labelling of dangerous 
substances (Art.15(2))52. Far more interesting than the course of proceedings in this group of 
cases is an international comparison of delays in making a regulation. In Britain a safety 
standard for carry-cots has been in existence since 1965, and child-proof seals have been 




Following the development of contractual guarantee liability and of liability in tort virtually 
irrespective of fault between 1962 and 197255, French case law in the next ten years went on 
to make a considerable contribution towards bringing the two types of liability closer 
together56. While the rule of non-cumulation (of claims based on contract and tort) continues 
to apply, the case law has nevertheless de facto developed a unitary concept of fault for both 
law of tort and law of contract. This unitary concept of fault is based in law of contract on 
liability of the professional vendor, or else through direct liability of the manufacturer, while 
in law of tort it leads to liability irrespective of fault as the outcome, at least where the injured 
party was demonstrably supplied with a faulty product57. The injured party to the contract has 
the burden of proving that the defect had arisen before supply. This allocation of the burden 
of proof may lead to problems, particularly in supply chains where it can no longer be 
determined where the defect arose. Liability in tort presupposes, as in German law, that the 
injured party can show the defectiveness of the product. 
A second important approximation of law of contract to law of tort lies in the development of 
groups of cases comparable to those in German law. This is true at least for defects in design, 
manufacture and instructions. Development defects can consistently be covered only by 
contractual liability in France. Conversely, as far as can be seen no duty to monitor products 
(post market or post sale duties) seems to exist in law of tort. 
The approximation of the two types of liability has been considerably strengthened by 
adoption of the product liability directive58. The typically French problem of two types of 
liability according to whether the contractual partner or an uninvolved third party is the 
injured party was eliminated at the preparatory stage of the Community directive in favour of 
a unitary type of liability for injured contracting parties or an uninvolved third party. Though 
national law on contractual liability continues to exist, the classical distinction loses 
significance in practice. 
An admittedly cursory survey of French case law seems to conclude that consumer disputes 
are of prime importance, but also points out that the most significant cases of injuries were 
involving specifically French peculiarities. Since no central gas supply was provided in 
France into the 70's (and to some extent is still not today), many households need to store 
propane gas containers. The explosion of these containers during transport, on consignment 
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or in use, have much concerned the French courts and made their contribution to the 
development of manufacturer liability in tort. A second specifically French variant in the 
development of manufacturer liability is the great importance of liability cases connected 
with the production, supply and use of agricultural products. Characteristically, French case 
law has transferred strict contractual liability to agriculture, without any beating about the 
bush59. Correspondingly, the French bill to implement the product liability directive is likely 
to include agricultural products60. 
France is ahead of all Member States in almost fully unifying the concept of defect in the area 
of prevention and repair. Art. 1 of the 1983 Act and Art. 6 of the Product Liability Directive, 
in the French version, are very similar, and in part identical in tenor. Throughout negotiations 




1.7 Technical standardisation and product safety62 
The basic structure of French standardisation, with its peculiar interweaving of government 
and the economy, was created by the Vichy Government in 194163. It gives the French 
Government great influence on standardisation that goes beyond a single company. This 
influence primarily affects the organisation of standardisation. This is largely integrated with 
the national administration, if not organisationally then at least functionally. The 
Commissioner for standardisation exercises the office of Government Commissioner in 
AFNOR. AFNOR and the Bureaux de Normalisation (trade associations for standardisation) 
are part of the Service Public, i.e. they are comparable with firms under controlled 
administration. AFNOR's statutes are laid down by the State, which also determines and 
appoints its decision-making bodies. A special statute provides for financing of AFNOR 
through a parafiscal levy. Another peculiarity is the possibility of giving technical standards, 
gradations of legal effect. The range goes from quasi-binding for the administration to 
universal bindingness for the economy. 
  
 
1.7.1 Privatisation trends 
A multiplicity of ministerial decrees and orders over the decades has not shaken the basic 
division of tasks. The decree of 26 January 198464 on the status of standardisation also 
maintains the basic structure. At the same time, one may note a shift in responsibilities within 
the fixed framework from the State towards AFNOR, i.e. the private standardisation 
organisation. This development was actually already introduced with the 1941 Decree. Until 
last year, France had pursued the intention of organising standardisation governmentally65. 
Accordingly, AFNOR had no standardisation powers. It was only to encourage the drawing 
up of standards, verify the proposals from the standardisation associations and propose them 
for recognition by the Comité Supérieur de Normalisation. The 1941 Decree clearly cut back 
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administrative standardisation activities. This continues to be possible formally, but the 
emphasis in governmental activity has since been on the supervision exercised by the 
Minister for Trade and Industry or the Minister for Agriculture over all technical 
standardisation above company level. In practice, this control is exercised by a high official 
in the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Commissaire à la Normalisation (Commissioner for 
standardisation). The Standardisation Commission is at the top of the French administrative 
hierarchy. Only five people work in it: the Commissioner himself, a deputy and three clerks. 
This small staff contradicts glaringly with the broad tasks assigned to the Commissioner by 
the 1941 Decree. He is not only to lay down general guidelines for the drawing up of 
standards, supervise the application of standards and decide on applications stemming from 
them, and supervise the work of the French standardisation agencies, but also - at any rate 
theoretically - to verify the content of each individual standard. In this he was supported at 
the time by the Comité Consultatif, which was later absorbed by the Comité Supérieur de 
Normalisation. The wide range of tasks led to manifold difficulties, which the Commissioner 
sought in 1964 to eliminate by abandoning practically all technical control66. But the 
Commissioner was unable to perform the other control tasks. In practice, what emerges as its 
most important task is the organisation of communication between ministers interested in 
standardisation and AFNOR, or the Branch Standardisation Committees. The relationship 
between the Commissioner for Standardisation and AFNOR as newly regulated in the 1984 
Decree, takes account of developments over the last 20 years. Registration of technical 
standards had de facto been transferred to AFNOR before 1984, and it now decides on 
homologation as well67. All that remains of the former wide powers of the Commissioner for 
Standardisation is the duty of supervision and the right to veto. The Commissioner has also 




1.7.2 Democratisation tendencies 
The stepwise privatisation of standardisation - from governmental standardisation pre-1941 to 
comprehensive supervision and control over privately organised standardisation, from 
recognition of privately organised standardisation subject to an ultimate governmental veto - 
has run parallel with a process of democratisation of the guidelines of standardisation 
policy69. The term democratisation is justified in so far as the circles of participation in policy 
formation have been steadily enlarged. While in the Comité Supérieur de Normalisation, the 
State had dominated policy formulation; the economy was already given a place in the 
consultative activity of the Comité Consultatif. Creation of the Standardisation Supervisory 
Board70 completed the opening to consumers and trade unions, which now have a seat and a 
say in a body with an important political role. "The Standardisation Supervisory Board shall 
propose to the Minister for Industry, taking account of national and international economic 
requirements, of the major national programmes and of the special needs of both sides of 
industry as expressed in the economic plan, the general orientation for standardisation 
work"71. Though without powers of decision, the Standardisation Board is to provide 
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assistance in setting French standardisation policy guidelines. In other words, the French 
State is trying to compensate for its retreat from standardisation by strengthening the 
participation of consumer organisations and trade unions. Democratisation of policy 
formation cannot therefore simply be equated with greater orientation of standardisation 




The stepwise shift of standardisation work from the State towards AFNOR has considerably 
affected its range of action and tasks72. Today, centralisation and co-ordination of all French 
standardisation activity is incumbent on AFNOR. It passes instructions from the Minister's 
authority on standardisation or the Commissioner for standardisation to the Bureaux de 
Normalisation and verifies their implementation. It is responsible for supporting technical 
standardisation committees in working out draft standards, and for homologation procedure. 
In practice, standardisation work lies largely in the hands of AFNOR itself. The industrial 
standardisation associations are often not financially in a position to set up their own 
technical standardisation committees and maintain them. AFNOR has to provide assistance, 
set up a technical standardisation committee in the technical sector concerned and support it 
with staff and above all resources. Yet AFNOR is not entirely autonomous here, since the 
setting up of a technical standardisation committee requires ministerial authorisation. 
  
 
1.7.4 Categories of standardisation 
The shift in powers from Government to AFNOR can be most clearly seen in the various 
categories of standardisation, only two of which are, however, important for our purposes: 
approved and registered standards73. 
(1) Approved standards have existed since 1941. These are standards that have been given 
official recognition by the State. Approval takes place through ministerial decree, and is 
published in the "Journal Officiel". The 1941 Act does not define in any more detail what the 
verification criteria in the approval procedures are. Over-simplifying heavily, one might say 
that the Commissioner for Standardisation has to verify standards brought before him to see if 
they are against the "public interest". This category of standards is the most important, both 
in number and in the importance of each individual standard. However, the numbers are 
steadily declining in relative terms. While in 1968, 70% of all official French standards were 
still given approval, this percentage had fallen to 54% by 197274. Observance of government-
recognised norms was made compulsory for all national procurements by the 1941 decree. 
However, this obligation was not often applied in practice. Accordingly, the competent 
Minister, following detailed consultations between the various ministers, the Commissioner 
for Standardisation and AFNOR, issued an administrative order75 whereby the bindingness of 
standards for government contracts in principle remained; the principle was not to be applied 
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rigidly, but flexibly, in accordance with the needs of the Administration and of the general 
public. Pragmatic count was thus being taken of the actual facts. 
The 1941 Act also allows approved standards to be declared universally binding. Branches of 
the economy involved are then obliged to take the binding technical standards into account. 
The 1941 Act, however, fails to clarify the conditions in which this declaration of universal 
bindingness can be made. With the restructuration of standardisation, the decision on 
approval of technical standards was transferred to AFNOR. AFNOR has to check a proposed 
standard to see whether it is in line with the general interest and does not offer grounds for 
objections that might prevent its adoption (as a government-approved norm). Approval as a 
norm is declared by AFNOR's Administrative Board, after the proposed standard has passed 
the verification and control procedures. The Commissioner for standardisation can however 
oppose AFNOR's decision on approval of a draft standard. Decree No. 84/74 of 26 January 
198476 contains no provision for the case where the Commissioner for standardisation makes 
use of his veto right. In particular, no procedure for taking up the conflicting interests is 
provided for. 
At the same time, the Decree of 26 January 1984 once again confirms the bindingness of 
approved standards on public procurements by the State, public bodies or state-subsidised 
firms. Therefore, the previous legal position has basically remained unchanged. What is 
unusual, though, is the way in which the French Government seeks to stress this intention. 
Against customary usage, the Prime Minister had a circular to this effect published on 26 
January 198477. Its contents largely coincide with the 1971 compromise sketched out above. 
The circular nevertheless demonstrates how little attempts to increase the importance of the 
approved standards have borne fruit in practice. 
As before, approved standards can be declared universally binding. But the conditions under 
which a declaration of universality can be made are now specified. Art. 12 of the 1984 
Decree says: 
"Where for reasons of public order, public safety, protection of the life and health of people 
and animals or safeguarding of vegetation, protection of national cultural treasures of artistic, 
historical or archeological value or for compelling reasons connected with the effectiveness 
of tax inspection, the propriety of business procedures and the protection of the consumer, the 
need arises, application of a confirmed (approved) standard may by decree be declared 
mandatory, subject to the special exceptions provided for under the conditions of Art.18 
(admissibility of possible departures)". 
This clarification was a response from the French Government to frequent criticism by the 
European Court of Justice and the Commission of the EC, of the general provisions allowing 
standards to be declared universally binding78. The links with European law will be more 
specifically dealt with below. 
(2) Registered standards were introduced in 196679. They have since enjoyed a steady 
increase in popularity. This is shown inter alia by the fact that by 1972, 33% of all French 
standards were already in this category, whereas in 1968 the figure had been only 18%. This 
popularity is closely connected with the simpler procedure for bringing out a registered 
standard. This category of standard is favoured above all in areas of rapid technical change. 
Registered standards have not been the object of governmental regulation to date. A change 
has taken place in practice, since registration initially took place through the Commissioner 
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for Standardisation but has gradually passed into the hands of AFNOR. Registration is not 
bound up with any verification of contents. It takes place when the technical standards 
committees consider the standardisation procedure to be complete and wish to make their 
results available to the economy. There is a link with approved standards to the extent that 




1.8 Certification and product safety 
No special certification procedure for verifying safety standards, nor offering an external 
indication of them by a special safety mark exist in France. The proposal by C. Germon and 
P. Marano80 to introduce a special safety mark, on the model of the German regulations, was 
rejected, for unknown reasons. Accordingly, safety can be an object of certification only 
along with other characteristics of the product. Types of this comprehensive certification are 




1.8.1 NF mark of conformity 
The conditions for awarding the French mark of conformity, NF, are regulated by a decree of 
194281. To that extent, certification was an integral part of the overall reorganisation of 
standardisation in 1941-43. The mark of conformity can in principle be issued for any 
product but is in practice more important for household appliances. The mark testifies that the 
product bearing it has met the standards drawn up by AFNOR or the standardisation 
associations, and subsequently been given approval. It is incumbent on AFNOR to check 
whether the product in fact meets the standard. From this standpoint, the NF conformity mark 
provides objective information. However, this information is often misunderstood by the 
consumer. Consumers believe that the conformity mark indicates a particularly high quality 
of product, whereas in fact the standard merely lays down a kind of minimum82. This 
problem is quite common and arises in other countries too. The safety of a product can 
theoretically be checked by the legally prescribed procedure where the underlying norm 
regulates important elementary characteristics of the product. This is exactly what happened 
with the technical standard on durability of crash helmets, since the French Government has 
by decree, obliged all crash helmet manufacturers to put their product through certification 
procedures. This is, however, a unique exception83. 
Criminal penalties can be derived from Art. 1 of the 1905 Act, if the manufacturer uses the 
NF conformity mark without authorisation. The civil-law position is not as clear84. The 
purchaser can, referring to the absence of conformity, terminate the contract and perhaps 
even claim compensation for damages. But the purchaser may also by Art. 1382 of the Code 
Civile claim damages from the Certification Office itself, if it has neglected to exercise its 
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control powers. Such a claim for damages is a purely hypothetical case, as even AFNOR is 
not in a position to set up an all-embracing control network to guarantee disclosure of 
infringements. Moreover, in the event of unauthorised use of the conformity mark NF, it 
would have to be clarified to what extent Art. 6 of the 1942 Decree ruling out such liability 
by the Certification Office, still applies. 
  
 
1.8.2 Certificates of qualification 
The conditions for issuing certificates of qualification are regulated in the 1978 Act85, the 
predecessor of the 1983 Safety Act. The relevant passages have not been abrogated by the 
new Act. The motivation for the legal regulation of the issuing of certificates of qualification 
was the growing enthusiasm of industrial associations to pump up sales of their products by 
creating a quality mark for their association and regulating the certification procedure 
internally. Familiar examples are "Coton Flor" or "Qualité France". A problem, and not only 
from the consumer's viewpoint, was that neither minimum nor quality requirements existed 
for awarding the certificates. A 197686 commissioned by the French Government called for 
an end to this confusion. ( for the sake of a properly functioning market ). 
The object of the 1978 legal regulations was to allow certificates of qualification only where 
they gave the consumer objective and comprehensible information on the characteristics of 
the product. This was to be secured partly by allowing certifications henceforth only by 
Government-recognised bodies. The competent Ministry, the Ministry for Industry, must 
verify the institution's impartiality during approval procedures, and guarantee in objective 
(technical) and personal terms, that the certification procedure can be properly carried out. By 
early 1984, 18 institutions had been accepted, AFNOR foremost among them. This seemed to 
have put a stop to the practice of self-certification of products to promote sales, but only on 
paper, since self-certified products have not yet disappeared from the French market. 
In order to meet the self-set goal of providing the consumer with objective information, the 
legislature, would through the certification procedure, have to set minimum requirements for 
"quality". The difficulties of such an endeavour are obvious. The French legislature has 
dodged the issue by speaking merely of "certains caractéristiques" (certain characteristics), 
conveniently avoiding a more explicit definition of quality. Industry associations and 
consumer organisations were given the task of specifying through negotiations what the 
"certain characteristics" might mean in specific cases. These negotiations are given formal 
shape in an Advisory Commission to the Ministry for Industry. It is not hard to see the 
opposing positions of the parties to the negotiations. The consumer side sees the chances of 
objective information as maximised, if quality is standardised. Standardisation must, on this 
view, cover the functional and utilitarian characteristics of the product. Industry rejects the 
idea that quality can be standardised. Standardisation would allegedly eliminate differences 
between products and threaten the mechanism of competition. The debate closely resembles 
the discussions in the Federal Republic of Germany on the meaning and purpose of 
comparative product information on quality87. The German legislature, too, declined to define 
quality and handed over the task to both sides of the market. This road seems, in both 
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countries, to have ended in a blind alley. Neither has arrived at any noteworthy amount of 
comparative quality information. Theoretically, the French model could also be applied to the 
issuing of safety certificates. But this aim would be obstructed by the one-sided sales-oriented 
regulation of certificates of qualification. The safety of a product can be used only to a 
limited extent to boost sales. 
  
 
1.9 The 1983 Act in the light of European Community law 
The object of this analysis is to bring the French viewpoint into the debate on European 
safety law. The sole basis for a treatment of the French position to date is the study by J.-P. 
Pizzio88. His whole portrayal is adapted to the French way of looking at things, to the extent 
that European Community law is also considered and analysed from the viewpoint of whether 
administrative means of sanction are available to implement product safety. European 
Community policy has always allowed Member States much leeway in their implementation 
of the substantive law. The report keeps to this premise89. Community intervention with 
French administration arouses considerable mistrust. The inclusion of the Single European 
Act in the description gives Pizzio a chance to dive into the relationship between internal 
market policy and product safety policy in more detail. Since by contrast with environmental 
and labour protection, consumer protection was not included in the treaties as a policy 
objective, product safety must be subordinated to the goal of creating free movement of 
goods90. 
The analysis of the relationship between the Product Safety Act and European Community 
Law has been done in two stages. The 1983 Act is first checked for its interaction with free 
movement of goods, and then specifically for the effects of the new approach on French 
safety policy, and on the 1983 Act itself. 
  
 
1.9.1 The 1983 Act and free movement of goods 
(1) Scope of the 1983 Act: Art. 8 is aimed at regulating cases of conflict between Community 
law and the 1983 Act. The wording seems to make it clear that the 1983 Act is no longer 
applicable where the products concerned are already covered by a Community directive. An 
interpretation au pied de la lettre would have the consequence of excluding only regulation 
by Statute, while the French government would be free to regulate product safety by decree 
even in the event of conflict. This rather dishonest version is however immediately 
abandoned, and for all forms of regulation the substantive focus is whether the products have 
already been the object of a Community provision. It follows that in cases of total 
harmonisation France retains competence only in emergency cases, provided for in the 1983 
Act. But even here Community law can retain primacy over French national safety law as 
long as the harmonisation measure includes a special safeguard clause explicitly covering 
such emergency measures91. 
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(2) The duty to notify regulatory measures under the 1983 Act: If these are measures to be 
taken as part of a normal procedure, then the objective scope of the Directive of 28 March 
198392 covers a comprehensive obligation of notification including now agricultural products, 
foodstuffs, medicaments and cosmetics93. To date (1986) the duty of notification has become 
relevant on two occasions, when the French legislature embarked on specifying the general 
clause in the 1983 Act by issuing special decrees94. In the first case, Pizzio notes a delay of 
nearly two and a half months, but the proposed decree has not yet come into force in France. 
The second case is more interesting, above all because it involves the first decree issued on 
the basis of the 1983 Act95. It forbids the manufacturer, sale and importation of erasers that 
look like foodstuffs. The Community has since, in response to various national measures 
banning imitations of edible products, adopted a wide-ranging directive on products of 
misleading appearance that are liable to endanger consumer health or safety96. 
The notification obligation becomes more problematic in the case of an emergency 
measure97. Certainly, the Information Directive provides for an abbreviated procedure, but 
localised bans, withdrawals from sale and the like, are not covered by the obligation of 
notification. However, since the French "Commissaires de la République" have wide-ranging 
competencies regionally, there is a loophole here for measures regulating safety that might 
escape Community notice. 
Another question is the extent to which regional measures on product regulation are (or must 
be) notified to the Community on the rapid information system98. 
Pizzio99 regards the notification procedure as extremely effective, since prior experience 
reveals that the Commission's consultation procedures offer adequate possibilities for making 
national safety regulations compatible with Community Law. 
(3) Compatibility of the 1983 Act with Articles 30 and 36 of the EEC Treaty: "Measures 
having equivalent effect" discussed in Art. 30 EEC also include technical standards drawn up 
by AFNOR. A specifically French possibility of conflict results from the possibility of 
declaring standards legally binding by decree. Action was brought for breach of treaty, 
because of the legal bindingness of a technical standard on the manufacturing of 
refrigerators100. Following the Commission's intervention, France changed the scope and 
coverage of the standard but kept its legal bindingness101. Nevertheless France feels quite 
confident of its chances of justifying national health and safety provisions through Art. 36 
EEC or the Cassis de Dijon Case Law on Art. 30 EEC. 
  
 
1.9.2 The 1983 Act and the new approach to technical harmonisation and standards 
In his commentary on the new approach to technical harmonisation and standards, J.-P. 
Pizzio102 points to a number of noteworthy problems which are, however, only partly dealt 
with in his report: 
- The essential requirements should be defined in such a way as to be capable of leading to 
sanctions (behind this there is once again, the specifically French - administrative - approach 
to safety policy). 
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- Member States should be banned from subjecting technical products to prior approval 
procedures. 
- Should consumer protection necessitate the inclusion to any large extent of technical 
specifications in the fundamental requirements, recourse to the new approach would, he says, 
not be appropriate. Deciphered, this means that Pizzio doubts the effectiveness of reference to 
standards in this very area of the safety and health of persons. 
- The problem of certification could be solved following the example of the Franco-German 
bilateral model; i.e. mutual recognition of certification institutes and their certificates, and 
also mutual recognition of safety marks (though one would have first to be created in France). 
In very general terms, the new approach claims to have effects on the relationship between 
product safety and technical standards. Member States would have to adopt a policy of 
deregulation in the area of product safety. Accordingly,de jure or de facto binding technical 
standards would in the long term have to be broken down and adapted to the requirements of 
the common market. This would require the building up of trust in technical standardisation 
as a guarantee of product safety, but also, at the level of the Common Market, compel 
recognition of the equality, in principle, of safety levels, even where solutions differ. 
At the end of the report, Pizzio103 asks the decisive question: What happens when the 
Community has adopted a directive defining the safety requirements in principle but a 
Member State nevertheless wants to take national measures that go beyond the defined goal? 
The problem already arises with the Directive on simple pressure vessels104, which, in 
departure from Art. 1 of the 1983 Act is based on a safety concept that does not include 
foreseeable misuse. By a circuitous route through a treatment of the Cremonini v. Vrankovich 
ruling105 of the European Court of Justice, Pizzio106 arrives at the following conclusions: 
- The primacy of Community law makes it compulsory to allow even products that would not 
comply with Art. 1 of the General Clause of the 1983 Act to circulate freely. (Although 
Pizzio does not say this explicitly, the differing safety concepts in the Community Directive 
on simple pressure vessels (usage in accordance with instructions) and in the 1983 Safety Act 
would not be an obstacle to the capacity of their circulation). 
- Recourse to Art. 36 would be open to Member States only when the basic requirements 
have not been fully defined. 
- It would follow that where the Community has adopted particular directives on the basis of 
the model Directive, a Member State would be able to pursue a national safety policy only in 
the context of the safeguard clause procedure. 
  
 
1.10 The bilateral agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and France 
on the removal of technical barriers to trade107 
In July 1983 Chancellor Kohl and French Prime Minister Mauroy agreed to the 
following measures on a reciprocity basis108: 
- mutual recognition of safety standards of equal value from a technical viewpoint; 
- improvement of relations between applicants and test centres; 
- mutual recognition of test centres. 
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The negotiations for converting the agreement into national law on each side were handed 
over to a Franco-German working party. The object of the following account is not so much 
to give a detailed analysis of the bilateral agreement as to attempt to estimate the effect and 
function of the bilateral agreement for a European safety policy. 
  
 
1.10.1 Background to the bilateral agreement 
Immediately after enactment of the German Machine Protection Act 
(Maschinenschutzgesetz), various Member States were already active in Brussels to ensure 
that the Act would not have any negative effects on free movement of goods109. The Federal 
Government agreed at the time to incorporate foreign standards, especially those of 
Community Member States, in a separate list accompanying the Machine Protection Act 
(today the Appliance Safety Act (Gerätesicherheitsgesetz)). AFNOR then drew up a sixty-
page list of 1,000 French standards on technical devices, which was submitted to the German 
authorities. On the German side, however, the view was taken that it was impossible to take 
the French standards into account. The requirement for the incorporation of a note into the 
standards in the annex to the Act was to be in compliance with the following three conditions: 
a) the French standards would have to be available in German translation. 
b) the French standards would have to contain specifications on the safety of persons. 
c) the French standards would have to be individually verified by an expert committee. 
In fact, the Federal Government did not then meet its formal agreement. 
From the mid-70's onward, German technical standards and therefore the Appliance Safety 
Act as well were increasingly under fire from French critics110. There were reports of 
difficulties for French industry in exhibiting their goods at trade fairs in the Federal Republic. 
These obstacles to trade in themselves would hardly have been sufficient to make the 
technical standards into an object of high-level politics. But the issue acquired greater 
importance when in the late 70's and early 80's, the French made a connection between their 
growing current account deficit and technical standards. In fact, according to Commission 
statistics, German consignments to France more or less doubled between 1977 and 1982, thus 
rising by 100%, while in the opposite direction, the rate of increase was only around 75%111. 
We need not go into here whether there is indeed a connection between the balance of 
payments deficit and German standards as potential technical obstacles to trade. In any case, 
the French succeeded in moving in the European Community, in the person of DG III 
Director-General Braun. In a lecture to a German audience, Braun more or less adopted the 
French version as his own, by calling the Germans the secret sinners in the setting-up of non-
tariff barriers to trade. Encouraged by the press, the equation 40,000 German standards = 
40,000 technical obstacles to trade began to circulate. 
On the other side, the Germans referred to a practice of French authorities begun some time 
in the early 1980's of adopting decrees that de facto made the import of German products into 
France impossible112. These decrees for particular individual groups of products were always 
built up on the same pattern: (1) the product had to meet a French standard and (2) this had to 
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be documented by a test certificate and a NF-mark. The majority of decrees concerned safety 
requirements for wood-working machines113. 
These mutual reproaches led in 1983 to the surprising outcome of a bilateral agreement. 
Apparently, following the controversially pursued public debate, pressure to negotiate was so 
great on both sides that action had to follow. The exchange of ideas and information between 
the authorities and the relevant institutions intensified. One product of the intensified 
relationships was the colloquium organised in Strasbourg in June 1984 by the Franco-German 
society for science and technology on co-operation between German and French testing and 
standardisation institutions114. At this conference, competent experts discussed the areas that 
the Community had mentioned in the preliminary work on the model directive as deserving 
priority in harmonisation : construction, measuring equipment, materials testing and welding 
techniques. 
But the bilateral agreement did not fully meet with acceptance. The joint declaration by 
AFNOR and DIN makes reservations about the need for a bilateral level of standardisation 
clear115. Bilateral agreements might, from the viewpoint of the standardisation institutions, 
serve a transitional function only as an interim solution for relevant problem areas, while in 
principle, standardisation at European or international levels was a goal. It is hard to say how 
far the commencement of an action for breach of the Treaty against the French decrees on 
admission of woodworking machines was directly or indirectly induced by the bilateral 
agreements116. It is, in any case, conceivable that through its action, the Community wished 
to pull the rug from under the bilateral agreements between France and the Federal Republic. 
One indication in this direction is the almost complete identity in the thrust of the German 
and European criticisms of French administrative practice. In the action for breach of treaty, 
the European Community attacks precisely those market admission regulations on 
woodworking machines that had been the basis for the German attacks on the French 
Government117. On the other hand, the Commission's bill of complaint was not submitted to 




Following the end of the political talks, AFNOR in an initial phase, checked at the highest 
level, 281 DIN standards in 19 branches of industry (excluding electrical engineering) to 
compare them with the 295 corresponding French standards118. This list was the starting point 
for initial activities by the competent authorities in both countries facilitating the circulation 
of goods. The conference organised by the Franco-German Society for Science and 
Technology supplies further illumination as to the chances and difficulties for the bilateral 
agreement. In relation to the three objects of the agreement mentioned at the beginning, the 
following provisional balance sheet can be drawn up: (1) the chances for mutual recognition 
of standards differ considerably from one branch of industry to another. The Strasbourg 
conference brought out highly differentiated findings in the branches discussed there. The 
situation in the construction industry is so different in both countries that necessary research 
work would first of all have to be done in order to be able to define political goals. By 
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contrast, the situation as regards measuring instruments is relatively clear. While there are 
considerable formal differences, in substance the two systems largely overlap. Harmonisation 
seems possible if the political will to break down the formal distinctions is present. The 
situation is different again in the area of welding techniques and material testing. Here the 
need for removal of existing obstacles to trade seems to be very great, but the objective meets 
with both political and technical difficulties. Experts all agreed when it comes to electrical 
engineering. Here the international network of technical standards and testing centres is so 
widely developed that a bilateral agreement could at most have negative effects. 
The nature of the bilateral agreement has since become clear. It is certainly not concerned 
with facilitating trade in consumer goods. To that extent, there is only a very indirect 
connection with the topic being discussed here. However, the bilateral agreement is 
interesting in the way in which it uses techniques to make the legal systems compatible with 
the various foreign standards. 
The A has, according to information from the French Ministry for Foreign Trade and 
Industrial Development, published an initial list C of 118 French standards119 on the general 
administrative provisions of the Appliances Safety Act. The list is based on an assessment 
that the French standards listed therein are, in principle, equivalent to the German standards 
contained in list A. The authorities should intervene only where there is reason to doubt 
whether the French standards correspond to the safety level prevailing in the FRG120. 
French law requires different solutions, since it does not have the device of the derogating 
clause as in the Appliances Safety Act. Since manufacturers are obliged to comply with a 
norm specified by a decree (Arrêté), German standards can be incorporated into the system 
only if they also meet this obligation. This presupposes abstract verification of the 
equivalence of German standards before including them in the decree. The French Ministry 
for Industry has in this way incorporated 9 DIN standards important in the eyes of the 
German Federal Ministry for the Economy, into its system of binding technical standards, 
thereby giving them the same legal bindingness as the corresponding French standards121. 
(2) To improve the relationships between applicant and test centre particularly in the case of 
small and medium-sized enterprises, both governments have decided to explain the bases of 
the test centres' activities and the relationship between test centre and applicant. In the 
meantime, circulars for the test centres, in accordance with the Appliance Safety Act, and 
general guidelines for applying the conformity tests in accordance with the French decree on 
standards, have been published122. Both publications explain the administrative, technical and 
financial aspects of the national conformity tests. 
(3) There is still a long way to go politically, before test centres are mutually recognised. 
Although there is agreement that certificates or test marks probably cause greater technical 
obstacles to trade than do different technical standards, the bilateral agreement has so far 
shown hardly any effect. Nevertheless, inclusion of the LNE (Laboratoire Nationale d'Essais) 
in the list of test centres under the Appliance Safety Act has begun. Information on this 
procedure is provided by the Joint Declaration by AFNOR and DIN123. 
"In the area of certification with the NF mark and the DIN test and inspection mark, AFNOR 
and DIN will collaborate by, in principle, carrying out tests of products and inspections of 
methods of manufacture in the country of origin, and by systematically aiming at mutual 
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recognition of these tests and inspections in the context of and in implementation of, the 
regulations drawn up for the purpose by CENCER". 
This passage makes it clear that a strict distinction has to be drawn between full mutual 
recognition of test results and conveyance of certifying power to a foreign office. The 
furthest-reaching goal is full mutual recognition of test results, but at present efforts are being 
concentrated on conveying certification powers. This would mean, to give one example, that 
German testing institutions would be entitled to test French products to see whether they meet 
the requirements of the NF conformity procedures. Conversely, the Federal Republic has 
declared its willingness to grant French test centres the authority to confer the German safety 
mark GS, if full mutuality is guaranteed "with the maintenance of the usual reservations"124. 
  
 
1.10.3 Effect and function of the bilateral agreement on the creation of a Community 
safety policy. 
The opposite poles of the analysis are an accusation of protectionism and a possible 
pioneering role. Protectionist tendencies might be pointed to in the bilateral agreement 
because, in the European Community, a Franco-German axis has been built up that might 
have detrimental effects on integration in the common market. While list C under the general 
implementing regulations for the Appliances Safety Act is at least theoretically, also open for 
the inclusion of norms of other European Community Member States, in France, explicit 
inclusion of foreign standards in the decree is necessary, in order to guarantee the possibility 
of in-state trade. This cumbersomeness of the French administration has readily been treated 
as an argument for the flexibility of the German system of reference to standards. This would, 
however, be to overlook that an administrative act is also necessary for incorporation in the 
list. To that extent, the accusation of protectionism applies both to France and to the Federal 
Republic. The tendency towards a Franco-German alliance within the Community is 
strengthened still further if the fact is included, that with regard to standardisation, the French 
are concerned above all with information technology125. Finally, the cautious attitude of both 
DIN and AFNOR should be pointed out, since both continue to maintain the objective of 
international standardisation and regard bilateral agreements as, at best, a transitional 
possibility, tending as they do to impede international trade in goods. 
Yet there are positive things about the bilateral agreement, too. Mutual recognition of 
standards in special Franco-German committees is objectively nothing other than political 
harmonisation. Franco-German preliminary work, as done for instance at the Strasbourg 
colloquium in 1984, might thus accelerate procedures in the Standing Committee. Possibly 
even more important, however, is the attempt to achieve mutual recognition of test centres. 
The model directive did not cover this issue126 and the standardisation organisations 
themselves have hardly made any progress outside the field of electrical engineering. A 
bilateral solution to this extremely important question might serve as a model for European 
regulations on mutual recognition. In very general terms, the bilateral agreement seems in 
relevant technical and political circles to have aroused considerable response and not only in 
Germany and France. 
55
 
1. Since France can be regarded as a market economy in the German sense only 
conditionally; see Behrens/Korb-Schikaneder, 1984. 
2. This classical approach can be found in precisely the same way in the consumer 
policy debate; see Calais-Auloy, 1985, 77 et seq. 
3. This distinction is based essentially on the work of the Commission de la Refonte 
(note 2 supra) and the description of product safety law by Pizzio, 1984, 13 et seq. 
and 19 et seq., which is so far the sole comprehensive overall description of the law. 
4. See Calais-Auloy, 1985. 
5. For details see 1.4 infra. 
6. See 1.3 infra. 
7. Pizzio, 1984. 
8. See point 1.4.1 infra. 
9. Calais-Auloy, 1980, 113 et seq. 
10. See point 1.7 infra. 
11. Cf. Chapter II, 3.4.2. 
12. Germon/Marano, 1982. 
13. Loi no. 83-660 du 21 juillet 1983 relative à la sécurité des consommateurs et 
modifiant diverses dispositions de la loi du 1er août 1905, German translation in PHI 
1984, 71 et seq. 
14. Schmidt-Salzer, 1986, Art. 6, Nos. 13 et seq., 116 et seq., 138 et seq. 
15. Loi no. 78-23 du 10 janvier 1978 sur la protection et l'information des consommateurs 
de produits et de services. The decisive passage of Art. 1 goes "dans des conditions 
normales d'utilisation". On the Act, see Calais-Auloy, 1980, 113 et seq. 
16. Pizzio, 1984, 14-15. 
17. More details in 1.4 infra. 
18. Pizzio, 1984, 17, No. 13. 
19. Commission de la Sécurité des Consommateurs, 1er Rapport au Président de la 
République et au Parlement, 1985 (cited infra as Commission, 1985), 15; Commission 
de la Sécurité des Consommateurs, 2ème rapport au Président de la République et au 
Parlement, 1986 (cited infra as Commission, 1986), 13. 
20. Pizzio, 1984, 15. 
21. On all this see Pizzio, 1984, 15-17. 
22. Op. cit., 14-15. 
23. See supra, note 13. 
24. Pizzio, 1984, 19-20. and the two annual reports of the Consumer Safety Commission 
(note 19 supra). 
25. Art. 14 (2) of the 1983 Act (note 13 supra). 
26. Accidents Domestiques, 1981; cf. esp. the ministerial position on this report: Ronze, 
1981. 
27. See esp. Ronze, 1981, in his "Resumée et Conclusions". 
28. See the Council decision of 22 April 1986 concerning a demonstration project with a 
view to introducing a Community system of information on accidents involving 
56
consumer products, OJ L 109, 26 April 1986, 23; for details on this see Chapter III, 
3.3. 
29. For a criticism see Commission, 1985, 13. 
30. Thus Commission, 1986, 12-14. 
31. See Commission, 1986, 16-17. 
32. On this cf. Commission, 1985, 15. 
33. Commission, 1986, 5. 
34. The following account is based on the final report of the Commission de la Refonte 
(note 2 supra) and the explanations by Pizzio, 1984. 
35. Art. 2 of the 1983 Act (note 13 supra). 
36. As stressed by Commission, 1985, 5. 
37. On this see 1.5.2 infra. 
38. Art. 3 of the 1983 Act (note 13 supra). 
39. Calais-Auloy, 1980, 205 et seq. 
40. Art. 4 of the 1983 Act (note 13 supra). 
41. On this see the account by Pizzio, 1984. 
42. Significantly, the Commission de la Refonte (note 2 supra, 82) calls for precisely this 
general penal clause. 
43. Calais-Auloy, 1980, 128. 
44. Pizzio 1984, 19 et seq. 
45. Loi du 1er août 1905 sur les fraudes et falsifications en matière de produits ou de 
services. 
46. This account is based on Pizzio, 1984, 19 et seq. 
47. Calais-Auloy, 1980, 129, and references from the case law. 
48. On this Pizzio, 1984, 25, No. 47. 
49. Op. cit. 
50. For an account of the issues, see Dellenbach, 1984, 32-44. 
51. Activité des Centres Anti-Poisons, 1982. 
52. OJ L 259, 15 October 1979, 10. 
53. On issues connected with this regulation see Viscusi, 1985, 537 et seq.; see also 
Chapter II, 4.6. 
54. The following account is based essentially on Viney, 1975; Ghestin, 1983 and Lamy 
Commercial, Concurrence-Distribution-Consommation, 1985, 1286 et seq., Nos. 4678 
et seq.; a description from a German viewpoint is given by Weber/Rohs, 1984. 
55. See Ghestin, 1983, 244 et seq. (esp. 251 et seq.), who follows the stages in the case 
law on the development of guarantee liability irrespective of fault. There is no key 
decision like the German Hühnerpest judgment (BGHZ 51, 90 et seq.) in the law of 
contract. The case is different in law of tort. Here the decisive judgment that altered 
the burden of proof in favour of the consumer was Cour de Cassation Civile, 21 
March 1962, Bull. Civ. I, 155. Other decisions in this connection are in Viney, 1975, 
76, note 19. 
56. Much information can be found in Lamy Commercial (note 54 supra), 1286 et seq., 
Nos. 4678 et seq. A description of the legal position from a German viewpoint is 
offered by Weber/Rohs, 1984. 
57
57. References in Lamy Commercial (note 54 supra), 1288, No. 4683. 
58. Ghestin, speech at the Conference "Sécurité et Défense des Intérêts Economiques des 
Consommateurs. Droit National et Communautaire", 17-18 April 1986 in Dijon. 
59. Lamy Commercial (note 54 supra), 1289, No. 4687 b). 
60. Directive on liability for defective products of 25 July 1985, OJ L 210, 7 August 
1985, 29; more in Chapter III, 3.5. An official French bill converting the Directive is 
not yet available. 
61. This is largely due to Ghestin himself, who was involved in the government decision-
making process in France and likewise belonged to the Commission de la Refonte 
which had worked out the 1983 Safety Act; see also Ghestin (note 58 supra). 
62. A fundamental account in German is Lukes, 1979, 5 et seq.; the description is based 
on his account. Much information on the history is also in Rasera, 1980, 28 et seq. 
63. The relevant acts, decrees and orders are reprinted in Germon/Marano, 1982, 109 et 
seq. 
64. Décret no. 84-74 du 26 janvier 1984 fixant le statut de la normalisation, reprinted in 
Enjeux No. 44, 2/1984 52 et seq., and in German in DIN-Mitt. 63 (1984), 255 et seq. 
65. Rasera, 1980. 
66. On this Lukes, 1979, 22. 
67. See 1.7.4 (1) infra. 
68. Germon/Marano, 1982, 69 et seq.; Annex 2, "Rapport du groupe de travail - 
Normalisation et sécurité des travailleurs". 
69. This process was introduced by Germon/Marano, 1982. On the "new" French 
standardisation policy, however, see also Marano, L'avenir de la normalisation, 1982; 
Marano, Quelle normalisation pour de nouveaux enjeux, 1982 and Antonmattei, 1982. 
Deux grands principes animent la réforme: concertation et décentralisation, entretien 
avec Laurent Fabius, Ministre de l'industrie et de la recherche, Enjeux No. 44, 2/1984, 
48 et seq. (in which the political objectives are very clearly expressed). From a 
German viewpoint, Schulz, 1983, and the German translation of the address by 
Laurent Fabius at the first meeting of the Supreme Council on Standardisation, DIN-
Mitt. 63 (1984), 610 et seq. 
70. See note 64 supra. 
71. From Art. 1 of the German translation of the Decree (note 64 supra). 
72. AFNOR statutes were also amended accordingly. The version adopted by the General 
Assembly on 7 December 1983 is reprinted in Enjeux No. 44, 2/1984, 55 et seq. 
73. The account in Lukes, 1979, 23-25, continues to be pertinent. 
74. Figures in Lukes, 1979, 24. 
75. Circulaire du 15 janvier 1971 relative à une recommendation de la section technique 
de la commission centrale des marchés publics convenant les spécifications 
techniques dans les marchés. 
76. J. O., Février 1984, N. C. 1127. 
77. Circulaire du 26 janvier 1984 portant sur la référence aux normes dans les marchés 
publics et dans la réglementation, J. O., février 1984, N. C. 1127, reprinted in German 
in DIN-Mitt. 63 (1984), 257-58. 
58
78. On the background to the problem see Lukes, 1979, 28. The European reference is 
discussed under 1.9.1 (3). 
79. Lukes, 1979, 25. 
80. 1982, 52. 
81. Reprinted in Germon/Marano, 1982, 124 et seq.; described in Lukes, 1979, 50 et seq. 
82. Calais-Auloy, 1980, 94, No. 65. 
83. For an account of the issues see Dallenbach, 1984. 
84. On the possible legal consequences see Calais-Auloy, 1980, 95 f., note 13. 
85. On this see Calais-Auloy, 1980, 95 (No. 9); Repussard, 1984 and Bonhomme, 1984; 
and comprehensively Schroeder, 1984. 
86. Repussard, 1984, refers to this in his account, though without mentioning the exact 
title. 
87. On this see Micklitz, Three Instances, 1984. 
88. Pizzio, 1986. 
89. Op. cit., 9-10. 
90. Op. cit., 15. 
91. Op. cit., 19 et seq. 
92. OJ L 109, 26 April 1983, 8. For details on this see Chapter IV. 3.1. 
93. OJ L 81, 26 March 1988, 75. 
94. Pizzio, 1986, 31 et seq.; and basically Lecrenier, 1985. 
95. Of 18 février 1986, published in J. O., 28 février 1986. 
96. OJ L, 11 July 1987, 49. 
97. Pizzio, 1986, 32. 
98. Council decision of 2 March 1984 introducing a Community system for rapid 
exchange of information on hazards in using consumer products, OJ L 70, 13 March 
1984, 16-17. 
99. Pizzio, 1986, 33-34. 
100. Written Question N° 835/2, OJ C 93, 7 April 1984, 1. 
101. See J. O., Novembre 1984, N. C. 10307; and in general Pizzio, 1986, 38. 
102. Op. cit., 52 et seq. 
103. Op. cit., 65. 
104. OJ L 220, 8 August 1987, 48. 
105. ECJ [1980] 3583, case 815/79, judgment of 2 December 1980. For details on 
the Low VoltageDirective, see Chapter IV, 2. 
106. Pizzio, 1986, 68 et seq. 
107. On this see Laurent, 1984; Winckler, 1984; Strecker, 1984; joint declaration 
by AFNOR and DIN on standardisation, DIN-Mitt. 63 (1984), 194 f.; Becker, 1985; 
Winckler, 1985, Beauvais, 1985. 
108. Thus Becker, 1985, 37. 
109. Strecker, 1984, 123. 
110. Laurent, 1984, 117, 
111. Winckler, 1984, 120. 
112. Strecker, 1984, 123. 
113. On this see Becker, 1985, 34 and Table I. 
59
114. AFAST, 1984. 
115. Joint declaration by DIN and AFNOR (note 104 supra). 
116. ECJ [1986] 419, case 188/84, judgment of 28 January 1986 - woodworking 
machines. On this judgment see also Chapter IV, 1.2.3. 
117. It is sufficient to compare the decrees attacked by the Commission in case 
188/84 (note 116 supra) with the survey in Becker, 1985, 35. 
118. Laurent, 1984, 118. 
119. BArbB1. 11/1984, 52 et seq. Cf. Becker, 1985, 37. 
120. Op. cit., 37. 
121. Op. cit., 37. 
122. Op. cit., 38. The German paper was published in BArbB1. 11/1984, 52. Cf. 
also Chapter II, 3.3.4. 
123. Joint declaration by DIN and AFNOR, DIN-Mitt. 63 (1984), 194-95. 
124. Strecker, 1984, 124. 
125. On this see Germon/Marano, 1982, throughout. 




Consumer product safety law in Britain1 
2.1 Introduction 
In the world's oldest industrial country, consumer product safety law has followed the path of 
development typical of most developed societies. It follows the tradition of governmental 
technical control beginning in the 19th century, and develops relatively late out of technical 
(plant/factory) safety law and safety-at-work law. Accordingly, it concentrates firstly on 
protection of life and limb. Its instruments are administrative control and criminal sanctions. 
Moreover, safety law for consumer products is, more than technical safety law and safety-at- 
work law, market regulation. That places it under stronger requirements as to economic 
efficiency and public policy legitimation. In Britain, too, this ambivalence marks the structure 
of existing consumer product safety law and the current debate on prospects for extending it. 
  
2.2 The Consumer Protection Act 1961 
2.2.1 Pre-history 
Technical safety law in England and Wales stands unchanged within the tradition of the 
heroic age of the 19th-century factory acts. This command and control model of government 
regulation of safety as a rule consists in a broad definition of goals by the legislator. To 
achieve the goal, an administrative structure is set up. To a great extent, the administrative 
body autonomously determines measures to be taken in order to secure the legal objective. 
Implementation and verification is incumbent on an inspectorate on the spot. Accordingly, 
there is relatively wide freedom of action. Informal conflict settlement and cooperation are 
clearly to the fore. Recourse to the criminal courts constitutes the ultimate - rarely used - 
legal means of sanction against safety infringements. While the Health and Safety at Work 
Act 1964 - the first comprehensive regulation of British safety-at-work law - still largely 
follows this regulatory model (with a separate administrative structure), consumer product 
safety law took a different road from the outset2. 
Till the end of the 1950's, there were legal regulations only for individual cases of particular 
consumer products [Fabrics (Misdescription) Act 1913; Heating Appliances (Fireguards) Act 
1952; Oil Burners (Standards) Act 1960]3. In 1959 the Committee on Consumer Protection 
was set up and in 1960 submitted an interim report, followed by a comprehensive final report 
in 19624. The main impetus for this initiative came from the "consumer sovereignty fallacy", 
which could no longer be overlooked. The Committee's proposal aimed at institutionalizing 
consumer power in the form of a governmental Consumer Council made up of independent 
persons5. Its main tasks were to be: gathering information, verifying the existance of a need 
for political action and influencing the public to take specific consumer-protection policy 
measures. Fifteen years later, the 1976 Green Paper on consumer safety again advocated the 
setting up of a Consumer Committee6; 21 years later a consumer protection committee of this 
type was set up in France7. In Britain, by contrast, legislation took a different course. In 1961 
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- before the Committee on consumer protection had finished its work but in implementation 
of some of the recommendations from its interim report - a safety law covering all 
consumer products was enacted for the first time: the Consumer Protection Act (CPA). 
  
2.2.2 The content of the CPA 1961 
The Consumer Protection Act (CPA) of 1961, slightly amended in 1971 and 1977, is a 
mere framework law. It does not itself contain any substantive regulations of relevance to 
safety. Essentially, it covers three points: 
- Section 1 implements the main recommendations of the 1960 Interim Report of the 
Committee on Consumer Protection8: the executive (the competent Secretary of State) is 
empowered to enact binding safety requirements for particular types of product where this 
appears advisable. The safety requirements relate to two things: 1) requirements on 
composition, content, planning, design, manufacture and packaging of products, to avoid 
danger to life and limb; 2) requirements on instructions and warnings to potential purchasers. 
- Section 2 contains the general obligation on every professional seller of the product in 
question at all stages of trade to observe the safety requirements formulated in the Safety 
Regulations. This duty of observance does not apply tointer alia private sellers (Section 2 (3) 
(a) CPA) or exporters (Section 2 (3) (b) CPA). 
- Section 3 regulates the sanctions for infringing the Safety Regulations. Infringements of the 
duty of observance pursuant to Section 2 are subject to criminal proceedings (Section 3 (2) 
CPA). In the event of damage, any person damaged by the unsafe product can raise criminal 
compensation claims against the seller (offence of breach of statutory duty - Section 3 (1) 





All in all, the CPA 1961 keeps to the approach of individual case regulation in safety law. 
Competence to regulate the individual cases is simply shifted from the legislature to the 
executive. For enactment of safety regulations, the CPA makes no formal approval by either 
House of Parliament necessary. Usually, though, the Joint Committee on Statutory 
Instruments, a joint committee of both Houses of Parliament, is involved. Section 1 (5) lays a 
duty on the Secretary of State to consult "such persons or bodies of persons as appear to him 
requisite" before issuing a regulation. A safety regulation can be suspended at any time by 
decision of either House of Parliament ("negative resolution procedure" - Section 1 (6) CPA). 
The CPA 1961 is innovative in its consumer protection policy effect in two ways: by 
extending the power of legal regulation to all consumer products and by making safety 
regulation dynamic through delegating power to issue safety regulations to the executive 
without involvement of Parliament. One weakness is implementation. No separate 
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hierarchical administrative structure was set up to apply the CPA. Verification of observance 
of safety requirements was instead left to the local authorities, the trading standards officers 
of the local Weights and Measures Authorities. These are entitled - but not obliged (!) - to 
carry out inspections within the area of application of safety regulations, and to take random 
samples of goods for further investigation. They are not given any further powers. In 
particular, the local implementing bodies cannot issue any prohibition orders. Over and above 
formal sanction, the CPA trusts to voluntary observance of the safety regulations and to the 
market-complementary method of consumer information or sensitization. Altogether, 
between 1961 and 1978, eighteen safety regulations on the basis of the CPA were issued10. 
There do not, however, seem to be any indications as to how many sellers had proceedings 
brought against them in that period for breach of safety regulations. 
  
  
2.3 The Consumer Safety Act 1978 
2.3.1 Background 
A further stock-taking of consumer product safety law in Britain came fifteen years after 
enactment of the CPA, in the form of the 1976 Government Green Paper on "Consumer 
Safety"11. This summarized the existing prospects for a British consumer product safety law, 
which in the later White Papers of 1982, 1984 and 1985 where merely taken up again in part 
and given new emphases. Four main points have been chosen to demonstrate shortcomings of 
consumer protection policy12: 
- Lack of regular systematic information on product-related accidents and of in-depth studies 
on the exact involvement in accidents of such products, or on cumulative causes of accidents; 
lack of international exchange of information; 
- Lack of BSI standards for consumer products, and difficulties in developing and/or updating 
them; 
- Cumbersomeness and procedural restrictions of safety regulations, in particular the absence 
of any possibility outside the regulations to respond to new hazards, issue banning orders, or 
have products recalled; 
- Weaknesses in implementing safety regulations. 
Among the proposals for improving consumer protection we shall here deal only with the set 
of technical standards. In order to secure a wider range of specific technical standards, the 
Government is contemplating the following possibilities13: 
- Introduction of special safety standards; 
- Setting of time limits for developing new technical standards; in this context, adoption of 
the offeror procedure practised by the American CPSC is recommended14; 
- Generalized formulation of safety requirements in safety regulations, even if no British 
Standard is available, so that manufacturers themselves can develop appropriate technical 
solutions; 
- A shift to the method of non-binding reference to technical standards in safety regulations; 
63
- Development of conformity marks; 
- Encouragment of economic associations to develop self-regulatory codes of conduct in the 
area of consumer safety law, similar to the codes in the area of competition law, encouraged 
by the Office of Fair Trading since 1973. 
  
2.3.2 The content of the CSA 1978 
An initial partial response to the criticism and proposals in the 1976 Green Paper was the 
Consumer Safety Act 197815/16. The characteristic of this Act, still authoritative today, is 
flexibility on the sanctions side. The rigid two-dimensionality of overall empowerment by 
statute and regulation of individual cases by the executive is abandoned. Besides the safety 
regulation, three other instruments are added to the executive's range of safety law measures; 
the prohibition order, the prohibition notice and the notice to warn. The only one important in 
practice is the prohibition order, which supplements safety regulations by acting as a time-
limited emergency measure. 
The CSA essentially contains five points: 
(1) Section 1 lays down "the law" of safety regulations. The objects of the regulations are 
firstly - here made explicit for the first time - the safety of consumer products17, and secondly 
the furnishing of consumers with appropriateinformation (Section 1 (1) CSA). The way these 
goals are to be met through the regulations is set out in detail in Section 1 (2). A notable 
feature, as a further reflection of the proposals in the 1976 Green Paper, is the prominent 
place given to technical standards. Technical standards as a substantive reference point for 
safety regulations appear in four of the nine points. In the context of measures to inform and 
warn the consumer, marks are also explicitly mentioned. 
The procedure for enacting safety regulations is, by comparison with the CPA, made formal. 
Competence remains with the executive (Secretary of State). However, the duty of 
consultation is extended. The Secretary of State is now obliged to consult organizations that 
represent interests affected by the regulation (Section 1 (4) CSA). One example of what this 
means is that in connection with the Novelties (Safety) Regulations 1980, 66 people and/or 
organizations were consulted. Additionally, safety regulations must now be approved by both 
Houses of Parliament (Section 7 (7) - "affirmative resolution procedure")18. Both mean 
considerable complication and prolonging of the procedure for issuing safety regulations. 
(2) Section 3 regulates the new instruments of action. The clumsiness of the safety regulation 
procedure is evidently to be compensated here by opening up additional possibilities of rapid 
regulatory intervention. 
Prohibition orders (Section 3 (1) (a) CSA) are orders that prohibit the sale of a particular 
group of products19. The Secretary of State has in principle to announce the issue of a 
prohibition order 20 days in advance, secure opinions and check those received. This 
"preliminary procedure" may be dispensed with only in urgent cases ("emergency 
procedure"). The prerequisites for an "urgent case" are not specified in any more detail. 
Prohibition orders expire by law after 12 months. Additionally, they may at any time be 
waived by decision of either House of Parliament (Section 7 (6) CSA). 
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Prohibition notices (Section 3 (1) (b) CSA) are issued to a particular person. The procedure 
for issuing prohibition notices is regulated in Schedule 1, Part II, CSA - in too much detail 
and out of all proportion to their practical relevance. Intensive exchange of information 
between the trader/importer affected and the Secretary of State is provided for. This seems to 
amount to legal regulation of the prevailing practice at the implementation stage of informal 
settlement of disputes. 
Notices to warn (Section 3 (1) (c) CSA) are instructions to suppliers to provide information 
or warnings on particular hazards of products supplied by them20. 
(3) Contraventions of prohibition orders, prohibition notices or notices to warn issued by the 
Secretary of State are criminally (Section 2 CSA) and civilly (Section 6 CSA - offence of 
breach of statutory duty) actionable. 
(4) For the first time, a comprehensive information right of the Secretary of State is also 
given legal embodiment. He may secure information, call for documents and ask to see them, 
etc. Breaches of this duty on suppliers constitute an offence. 
(5) Section 5, taken together with Schedule 1, Part III, regulates in detail the powers of the 
implementing agencies. These are - as under the CPA - confined to the right to enter business 
premises, see documents, take samples of products for further investigation, and where 
necessary, secure assistance from authorized agencies to enter business premises by force 
and, in compliance with prescribed procedures, forcibly open receptacles. 
  
2.3.3 Assessment 
The thinking of the CSA 1978 is characterized by the division of labour between safety 
regulations and prohibition orders. Prohibition orders are a response to new types of product 
hazard. During their 12 months duration, experience accumulated can be used to decide 
whether there is justification for extending the provisional measure into a safety regulation. 
Of the eight prohibition orders issued under the CSA between 1978 and 1983, six have been 
converted into safety regulations. Prohibition notices and notices to warn played no 
significant role in practice. 
Statements on the effectiveness of the CSA in guaranteeing the safety of consumer goods can 
only be tentative. Compared with the eighteen safety regulations made under the CPA 
between 1961 and 1978, fourteen were made under the CSA between 1978 and 198521. As 
regards formal punishments for contravention of safety regulations and prohibition orders, the 
government's first five-year report (pursuant to Section 8 (2) CSA) to Parliament on practice 
with the CSA (and CPA), of 1983, gives the following figures22: 
Contraventions of safety regulations 
Period Number of persons Number of breaches 
convicted of the law 
Nov. 78 - 31.3.79 54 59 
1.4.79 - 31.3.80 98 142 
1.4.80 - 31.3.81 109 158 
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1.4.81 - 31.3.82 185 439 
1.4.82 - 31.3.83 256 665 
Much greater importance, however, attaches to "soft implementation", to cooperation 
between the on-the-spot implementing agencies, the trading standard officers, and the 
manufacturers and traders concerned. 
Summarizing, one may say that there is consumer product safety law in Britain only to the 
extent that safety regulations and/or prohibition orders have been issued under the CPA and 
CSA. Local implementing agencies can act only on the basis of these provisions for 
individual cases. Their powers are limited to the disclosure of breaches. They have no powers 
to prohibit further sale of unsafe goods, far less order recalls of products that cause damage. 
The CPA and CSA continue the traditional dual strategy of British safety law unchanged: (1) 
voluntary compliance with safety regulations following informal warnings from the 
authorities, and (2) where necessary, penal sanctions. The only additional possibility is an 
official Government warning through the media against buying particular products. 
  
2.4 Present prospects for development 
2.4.1 Legal reform projects 
Six years after enactment of the CSA, the 1984 Government White Paper "The Safety of 
Goods"23 took a new look at British consumer good safety law. Moving on from the 
fundamental Green Paper of 1976, it singles out the following two main weaknesses of the 
CSA. 
As regards implementation, the possibilities offered for pursuing the most effective and 
cheapest road to consumer protection, namely preventing unsafe products coming to market 
at all, are too slight. Obligatory safety checks or safety marks as legal prerequisites for sale 
are rejected, with explicit reference to problems in connection with Community law 
(technical barriers to trade). Instead, more lasting preventive effects are expected from higher 
criminal penalties (higher fines), and extension of powers for local implementing agencies to 
make preventive checks is recommended. Moreover, local authorities have no way of 
preventing further illegal sale of goods or of withdrawing goods from the market that are 
clearly out of line with safety regulations or prohibition orders. Above all, institutional 
provisions are required in order to catch unsafe imports (specially from non-EEC countries) 
at the frontiers. 
It should be noticed in passing, that these suggestions led to an amendment to the CPA and 
CSA, the Consumer Safety (Amendment) bill, which was enacted in August 1986. As regards 
the problem of checks on imported goods, obviously felt to be urgent, the customs and excise 
authorities are given the right to impound imported products for 48 hours for investigation by 
the competent local implementing bodies. They have also to inform the competent bodies of 
any suspicions they may have. 
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The range of instruments available to local implementing bodies is extended by the 
introduction of the suspension notice. This allows the competent authorities, on justified 
suspicion of infringement of a safety regulation or prohibition order, to issue sales bans valid 
for 6 months. Finally, for the first time (!), the possibility is opened up of withdrawing unsafe 
products from the market. On application from a local authority, a court may order the 
destruction or confiscation of incriminated goods. Recall procedure is still not provided for. 
  
The decisive step towards making British consumer good safety law effective is however 
seen as a change in the underlying conception: replacement of individual case regulation 
through safety regulations and prohibition orders by generalization of the safety law 
approach. The introduction of a general safety duty, already present in the Health and Safety 
at Work Act (Section 6 HSWA) and favoured in the 1976 Green Paper, is once again 
advocated. This duty would require all manufacturers and traders (importers, wholesalers, 
retailers, etc.) to bring only safe goods to market in Britain. It would allow the implementing 
agencies, without having to pass through safety regulations or prohibition orders, to proceed 
directly against any trader because of any consumer product, provided it be unsafe. While the 
CSA 1978 was still endeavouring to give an exhaustive definition of the concept of safety 
(Section 9 (4))24, the 1984 White Paper completely abandons any such legal semantics of 
safety. The safety of consumer goods is defined by referring to "sound and modern standards 
of safety". The 1984 White Paper has thus brought into cosnumer product safety law what 
was originally achieved in 1974 by the HSWA, but later only hinted at by the CSA 1978: the 
step to delegalization, or to "legislation by reference to standards" (J. Fraser). "Sound 
standards" are in the first place British Standards25, but also European and international 
standards that have been recognized as such. Observance of relevant standards would indicate 
"due diligence", and rule out criminal responsibility26. 
  
The 1984 White Paper's approach - possibly influenced by similar considerations at the 
European level - very strongly links interests in the international competitivity of the British 
economy27 and in safety and consumer protection policies. Once this link is set up, 
experience shows that the latter have the worse of it. The consequences of this kind of 
"reference to standards" approach for consumer product safety policy are obvious, even 
though they have not yet been drawn and do not seem at all realizable: development of 
genuine (consumer product) safety standards and/or effective consumer involvement in the 
standardization process. 
The 1985 White Paper "Lifting the Burden"28 again expresses the Government's intentions in 
legal policy: to move towards a general safety duty and wind down single-case regulation. 
This consumer protection policy approach is now even more closely tied in with an overall 




2.4.2 Consumer Protection Act 1987 
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In November 1986 the British Government published the draft of a Consumer Protection 
Bill29, which was passed by Parliament in summer 1987. The Consumer Protection Act 1987 
(CPA) contains three substantive sections: 
(1) Incorporation of the Community Product Liability Directive into British law; (2) revision 
of the CSA 1978 by introducing a general safety requirement and (3) a regulation on 
deceptive price indications. In this context only the second part, on consumer protection or 
consumer product safety (consumer safety) is of interest. This part came into force in autumn 
1987. It thus brings both aims - generalization of consumer product safety requirements and 
policy of reference to technical standards - into legislative practice. In the future, the supreme 
principle in British consumer protection law will be not to bring any goods to the market that 
"fail to comply with the general safety requirement". Consumer goods within the meaning of 
the Act are products intended for private use and consumption. Separately regulated areas 
like cars, medicines, tobacco, etc. are excepted. 
The general safety requirement is not met if consumer goods "are not reasonably safe having 
regard to all circumstances" (Section 10 (2) CPA). Among such circumstances are 
mentioned: (1) characteristics of goods that would constitute a defect within the meaning of 
the Community Product Liability Directive; (2) technical (safety) standards; (3) the technical 
possibility of producing a product more safely, if this is in reasonable relation to the costs 
incurred, etc. 
The new Act does not apply to secondhand goods; to goods not intended for the British 
market; or to retailers to whom the lack of safety was not apparent. Moreover, it is always a 
sufficient defence to show that the product meets the requirements of a safety regulation or a 
tested technical (safety) standard. The regulatory instruments of the CSA 1978, as last 
augmented by the 1986 Amendment, are unchanged. In particular, the general safety duty 
does not correspond to any general recall powers for the competent Government offices. 
There is only the limited possibility of issuing a suspension notice on the basis of an existing 
safety regulation or prohibition order. 
As far as penalties go, a distinction has to be drawn: breach of the general safety duty is 
merely an offence punishable by fine or imprisonment. There is no civil sanction. This is kept 
for the new product liability law30, as a conversion of the Community Product Liability 
Directive. Contraventions of specific governmental regulatory measures, in particular safety 
regulations, retain their traditional twofold character as crimes and as the torts of breach of 
statutory duty. 
  
2.5 Accident information systems 
The consumer protection policy debate in Britain takes on a special quality because the 
relevant legal policy work was set on an empirically based scientific foundation. During the 
mid-70s, the UK began developing the most comprehensive accident information system of 
the times alongside NEISS in the US, namely the Home Accident Surveillance System 
(HASS). In 1977, following an initial stage in 1976, a system for collecting data on accidents 
at home and in the garden was developed in England and Wales. Twenty hospitals with 24-
hour accident and emergency services were incorporated into the system as information 
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sources. In an alternating pattern, ten hospitals at a time supply data on non-fatal accidents 
requiring medical treatment in hospital. Fatal accidents are surveyed and assessed by 
the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (OPCS). According to the last available 
HASS report, from 1986 and based on 1985 figures31, every year in Great Britain, i.e. 
England, Scotland and Wales32, 5005 people die in home accidents and 3.1 million people are 
sufficiently seriously injured as to require medical treatment. Home accidents constitute 40% 
of all fatal accidents in Great Britain (as against 42% road accident deaths), and at 34%, are 
by far the largest proportion of accident victims treated in hospitals. The number of fatal 
home accidents in the narrower HASS survey area, England and Wales, has been very stable 
at around 4800 since 1980. 
The hospital figures collected by HASS on non-fatal accidents are systematically assessed 
and published every year. In particular, the annual report contains product-related data on 
accident frequency. Additionally, the Safety Research Section of the Department of Trade 
and Industry does in-depth studies, or has them done, to determine where there is need for 
political action in the form of a safety regulation. 
The Community experimental model accident survey system of 1981 was largely inspired by 
this British example. Its present successor, the demonstration project of 22 April 1986, is 
however patterned more closely on the Dutch model (PORS), under test since 1980. It seems 
superior to HASS in three respects: (1) non-restriction to house and garden, but inclusion of 
leisure and sport activities; (2) inclusion of fatal accidents too; (3) diversification of 
information sources to more than just hospital casualty services. In Britain, HASS is at 
present being extended on the model of the Community demonstration project; specifically, a 
Home Accident and Death Database (HADD) is being added, into which sport and leisure 
accidents are subsequently to be integrated. The pilot stage began in November 1986 with 
one initial hospital. Inclusion of Scotland and Northern Ireland, i.e. the extension of the 
accident information systems (HASS/HADD) to Great Britain and to the United Kingdom as 
a whole, is still awaited. 
  
2.6 Technical standardization 
2.6.1 British Standards Institution 
The central institution for standardization in Britain today is the British Standards Institution. 
The BSI is similar in history and structure to the DIN. It started in 1901 as the Engineering 
Standards Committee, founded by engineering associations. The first technical standard was 
on rolled steel sections for rails. In 1918 it became the British Engineering Standards 
Association. A Royal Charter of 1928 gave it legal capacity. The present name was adopted 
in 1931. The tasks of the BSI, as formulated in Royal Charters of 1928, 1931 and 1981, 
consist primarily in developing technical standards and in certification of products. 
Today the BSI is headed by a board responsible for general standardization policy. Below the 
board are six Councils in specific areas: building, chemistry and health, engineering, 
electricity, technology and computing. There is also a Quality Assurance Council, responsible 
for product certification, tests and inspection. In 1984, the latter was transformed into the 
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National Accreditation Council for certification bodies. Its tasks are to monitor and authorize 
for product certification and quality assessment, certification bodies other than the BSI. 
Practical standardization work is done by some 300 technical committees33. These 
committees are comprised of some 28,000 experts, primarily from interested business circles 
who work on a voluntary basis. The BSI has more than 1074 permanent employees. 
Besides the technical committees, the Consumer Standards Advisory Committee is of 
importance from the viewpoint of product safety. Some 70-80 representatives of consumer 
associations take part in this endeavour. The Consumer Committee developed out of the 
Women's Advisory Committee introduced in 1951. Its task is to ensure involvement of 
consumer interests in the standardization process. The Consumer Committee is at present 
represented on 230 technical committees. Since consensus or unanimity by Committee 
members is a precondition for adoption of a technical standard by the BSI, opposition by a 
consumer representative can block a standard. 
At present there are 10,124 British Standards. 8,900 standards are being worked on (more 
than half of them international standards). The BSI budget currently amounts, according to 
the 1985-6 Annual Report, to 26 million pounds. This sum is mainly derived from 
contributions of the 18,000 members, from the sale of standards specifications and from 
government contributions (4.5 million pounds). 
  
2.6.2 Methods of reference to standards" 
British Standards, like DIN standards, are mere recommendations. They have no legal 
standing34. This has all changed since the British Government adopted the "reference to 
standards" policy in worker and consumer protection law in the late 1970's. This policy is in 
turn determined by the great political value attaching to British Standards for the international 
competitivity of the British economy in the last decade, especially following UK entry to the 
EEC in 1973. Among political expressions of this situation are the (already cited) 1976 Green 
Paper "Consumer Safety", the General Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, to which 
Britain acceded in early 1980, the 1982 Memorandum of Understanding between 
Government and BSI, and particularly the 1982 White Paper "Standards, Quality and 
International Competitiveness". 
Ignoring for the moment the possibility of using British Standards for contractual description 
of performance, something done above all by the State when placing orders, there are four 
particular important ways for giving technical standards legal relevance35: 
- Incorporation. A formerly widespread method is to incorporate a British Standard, in 
modified form or sometimes verbatim, into a safety regulation. An example of this is the Oil 
Heaters Regulations of 1961/1966. By contrast with reference proper, here it is the regulation 
itself - even though partly incorporating a British Standard - that independently, and 
exhaustively, regulates the technical requirements. 
- Strict reference. With this reference method, so far the major one in Britain, the provision 
(as a rule a safety regulation) refers for safety standard, test procedure, etc. directly to a 
British Standard, indicating the BS number and date. Compliance with this technical standard 
is then a legal obligation. In German terminology, this is a case of rigid/static legal reference. 
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Any change to the technical standard necessitates adaptation of the safety regulation. 
Examples of this are the Heating Appliances (Fireguards) Regulations (1973) and the 
Nightdresses (Safety) Regulations 1967. 
- Undated reference. In this case the safety regulation refers to one or more specific standards 
by simply mentioning the BS number, but compliance with the norm is not made binding. 
The manufacturer/importer then has alternative possibilities of meeting the safety 
requirements. This reference is made on a "deemed to satisfy" basis. 
- General reference. The legal provisions may however also describe the safety requirements 
in general, or abstractly contain a general safety obligation36. The 
manufacturer/importer/trader is free to choose the way he wishes to meet the requirements. 
One acceptable way will be to comply with the relevant British Standard, or equivalent 
technical standards, if they exist. More recently, the Ministry has gone over to providing so-
called administrative guidance. Here there is a clear statement of which technical norms 
satisfy the safety requirement concerned. This reference is made on the so-called "approved" 
basis. Practical examples are the Electrical Equipment (Safety) Regulations 1975, the 
Building Regulations and the area covered by the HSWA. By contrast with administrative 
provisions under § 11 of the German GSG, administrative guidance has no formal legal 
standing. 
This model ("approved" basis) ought also to be applicable now that a general safety duty has 
been statutorily introduced into consumer product law. Specific safety requirements will now 
be defined by "sound and modern practice" or "sound and modern standards of safety". What 
this in turn means would have to be specified in approval schemes, which would no doubt be 
worked out under BSI direction with broad involvement of governmental and consumer 
representatives. Technical standards passing this test of certification or approval would then 
be published in a list, comparable to that for administrative guidance. 
Though they have no legal significance, informal recommendations of technical standards by 
local implementing agencies continue to be of great importance in practice. 
The two methods of non-binding legal reference to technical standards ("undated and general 
reference") seem to be becoming steadily more common in Britain. In particular, the 1982 
Government White Paper "Standards, Quality and International Competitiveness" is 
decidedly in favour of this regulatory approach ("statute plus BSI"). The parallels with the 
"new approach" to harmonization of technical standards at Community level are 
unmistakable. The introduction of a general safety duty in consumer product safety law, 
announced in the 1984 and 1985 White Papers and brought about through the Consumer 
Protection Act 1987, is merely a consistent development of this legal area, in respect to both 
industrial policy and consumer protection policy. 
  
2.6.3 Product certification 
Certification is an area that has been intensively discussed and dealt with in Britain, partly 
also from trade policy standpoints. In 1982, certification procedure was available for between 
200 and 300 types of products. In the most part, BSI kitemarks are issued. Product 
certification is handled by the BSI through the Certification and Assessment Department. In 
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addition to this department, there are other recognized certification institutions in particular 
areas. Two examples are the British Electrotechnical Approvals Board (BEAB) for electrical 
products and the British Board of Agreement (BBA) in the area of building and construction. 
In Britain, three marks of conformity or quality are commonly used: 
- BS number. Mere use of the BS number is the least effective measure. It is merely a 
statement by the user or manufacturer, not checked by anyone else, that the product has been 
manufactured in accordance with the relevant British Standard. 
- Kitemark. This conformity mark has existed since 1903. Authorization to use the kitemark 
is given by the BSI following checking at the manufacturing plant to ensure that the 
requirements are met. At the end of 1986 there were 1,365 kitemarks. The BSI Inspectorate 
carries out continual checks to ensure that the provisions are still being complied with. 
- Safety mark. Since there are (as yet) no specific safety standards to date, and a British 
Standard is not necessarily oriented towards coverage of all possible relevant safety 
requirements, a safety mark was introduced in 1974. Firms may use it on products that have 
met special safety requirements when tested by the BSI. In practice, however, the safety mark 
has evidently not yet caught up with the kitemarks. Compared with the 1,365 kitemarks at the 
end of 1986, there were only 37 safety marks. 
A fairly important procedure in Britain is that of quality assessment. This centres not around 
an individual product, but rather on whether a manufacturing or service firm in general meets 
the requirements of BS 575037, the BSI's basic quality standard. Firms that meet the 
requirements - at present there are 1,402 of them - are registered by the BSI. This registration 
also seems to be of interest to the firms concerned from a marketing viewpoint. 
  
2.7 Liability 
Traditionally in British safety law, the main non-administrative response to contraventions of 
safety regulations is criminal sanction38. The CSA lays down penalties of up to three months 
imprisonment and fines of up to 1000 pounds (Section 2 (4)). However, the conditions under 
which the accused may put forward the defence of due diligence are in each case regulated in 
detail39. While the HSWA 1974 explicitly excludes civil sanctions, they are explicitly 
permitted by the CPA 1961 and the CSA 1978. The Consumer Protection Act 1987 once 
again provides only criminal sanctions for breaches of the general safety requirement 
(Section 10 (1) CPA). As to liability, in consumer product safety law in England and Wales 
there were three possible grounds of claim, of which however we shall describe only the first 
two in more detail, given their more direct relevance: breach of statutory duty, negligence 
("product liability in tort") and contract. Henceforth the new product liability law embodies a 
third one (modified strict liability). 
  
2.7.1 Breach of statutory duty 
The offence of breach of statutory duty is the most interesting one from a liability point of 
view, even if to date, it has no practical importance40 with regards to consumer product safety 
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law. This institution is controversial in the English legal literature on liability. 
Dias/Markesinis, for instance, say that it lies "between" liability on grounds of negligence 
and strict liability41. Firstly, Section 6 (1) CSA clearly states that breaches of obligations 
under safety regulations, prohibition orders or prohibition notices constitute a civil offence of 
breach of statutory duty. It seems also to be undisputed that this is strict liability, since the 
criminal law defence of due diligence is ruled out. Liability is based on merely marketing an 
unsafe or damage-causing consumer product. However clear this differentiation may seem, 
the demarcation becomes unclear when one comes to consider the cases of primary interest 
here, where the manufacturer/trader has complied with a technical standard referred to (in 
particular a British Standard). No problems arise with the case where a safety regulation 
bindingly prescribes compliance with a particular standard (Section 1 (2) (b) CSA). Here, 
compliance with a technical standard that ultimately proves technically inadequate (for 
instance, because it is out of date) excludes breach of statutory duty as a ground of liability. 
More interesting, since it will no doubt be of greater importance in the future, is non-
mandatory reference to technical standards, for instance, pursuant to Section 1 (2) (c) CSA. 
  
  
For civil liability on grounds of breach of statutory duty, it must here suffice for the plantiff 
to show that there has been a breach of the relevant safety regulation, in other words, an 
unsafe product has been brought to market. Since action for breach of statutory duty does not 
require negligence, the defence that a relevant British Standard has been complied with is not 
admissible. The main defence open in breach of statutory duty cases is to show that the 
person suffering the damage is (largely) co-responsible. Compensation for damage is limited 
to personal injuries. Exclusion of liability or limitation of liability is null and void42. 
Whether the courts will maintain this line of interpretation in the sense of "strict liability" in 
England and Wales is 
at present completely uncertain. Firstly, no relevant decisions have been taken as yet. 
Secondly, with the Consumer Protection Act 1987, British legislation has in part taken a 
different course. Breach of the general safety requirement now introduced has been specified 
solely as the elements of an offence. The liability aspect has been left for British product 
liability law, which has to implement the Community product liability Directive. By contrast 
with the National Consumer Council's expectations expressed in 198443, the offence of 
breach of statutory duty does not extend to the "general safety duty". Breach of statutory duty 
remains confined to the safety regulations and comparable governmental regulatory acts. 
Most recently, there has been a noticeable general trend by courts in England and Wales to 
look at the political objectives lying behind individual-case statutory regulations in order to 
specify the content and extent of the statutory duty and the circumstances that define its 
violation44. Since it has, however, become clear since the 1980s that in the view of both 
Government and Parliament, "sound and modern standards of safety" ought to define the 
scope of the duty, it cannot be ruled out that if standards "approved" by the BSI45 are 




Liability under the common-law offence of negligence takes us outside the narrower context 
of consumer protection law. Entitlement may here arise - subject to any special provisions of 
accident insurance or labour law - for anyone harmed by a product: a worker in a production 
process; a businessman in connection with goods he uses in his trade; the final private 
consumer. Liability for damage lies primarily with the manufacturer of a product, who also 
has to answer for negligence by his employees, on the principles of vicarious liability. 
Offence-based manufacturer liability on grounds of negligence46 developed relatively late in 
English common law. Whereas in the US and in Germany the foundations had been laid by 
similar decisions at the highest judicial level at around the same time, 1915-1647, this did not 
come about in England until 1932. The landmark decision in re M'Alister (or Donoghue) v. 
Stevenson48 for the first time assumed positive duties of care between persons outside 
contractual relationships, which could be breached merely by being negligent ("not using 
reasonable care"). Subsequently, negligence liability by manufacturers of defective products 
was consolidated. The general duty of care was differentiated into manufacturing duties 
("production defects"), design duties ("design defects") and duties of instruction ("marketing 
defects"). Procedurally as well, it may now be taken as a basis in England and Wales - 
comparable in this respect with the FRG - that it is in principle sufficient for the injured party 
to show that interests protected under the law of tort have been injured during proper use of 
the product in question. By the res ipsa loquitur rule, the manufacturer's negligence is 
(refutably) presumed. 
As regards the law of evidence, it is in principle to be taken as a basis in English law that 
conformity with a standard or departure from one is not synonymous with conduct in 
accordance with or contrary to one's duty. Non-compliance with a British Standard engenders 
a strong presumption of negligence. Observance of relevant technical standards to which non-
binding reference has been made places the onus on the plaintiff to provide positive proof of 
the manufacturer's negligence. In cases of strict reference, compliance with the technical 
standard concerned should suffice to rule out negligence. 
At least since Walton v. British Leyland UK Ltd. (1978) a duty to monitor a product and 
respond accordingly seems to have been recognized. This is the counterpart in law of tort to 
the regulatory "notice to warn". In Walton v. British Leyland, the car manufacturer was 
condemned to make compensation for damages, on grounds of tortious breach of a duty of 
recall. English law has also developed duties of care and transaction under law of tort for the 
marketing stages. The doctrine of "strict liability", taken in by most US States since 196349, 
has not yet been accepted by English law of tort any more than by German producer liability 
law. 
  
2.7.3 The present legal policy situation (1987) 
The forthcoming implementation of the Community Product Liability Directive in British law 
and the British Government's undertaking to introduce a general safety duty into consumer 
protection law, in 1987 broke the ground for innovative developments. These included: (1) 
Introduction of a general safety duty into the Consumer Safety Act; raising criminal 
penalties; removal of the offence of breach of statutory duty from the CSA, with revised 
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provision for it in a special act on product liability; (2) Introduction of a general safety duty 
into the CSA, with retention of possibly raised criminal and civil sanctions; implementation 
of the Community Directive in a separate product liability act. 
The Consumer Protection Act 1987 largely implemented the second option. Accordingly, 
British product liability law will, as far as consumer goods are concerned, in the future be 
based on three principles: 
- Modified strict liability under the Product Liability Act (implementing the Community 
Directive); 
- Breach of statutory duty insofar as safety regulations or comparable measures have laid 
down specific duties as to conduct; 
- General liability in common law, specifically under law of tort (negligence). 
Infringement of the newly introduced general safety requirement remains irrelevant for 
purposes of civil law. only Only criminal sanctions are provided. 
  
2.8 Information 
As regards information on product hazards, two addressees should in principle be 
distinguished: (1) the regulatory authority and (2) potential purchasers of the unsafe product. 
  
2.8.1 Information of regulatory bodies 
  
As regards information to governmental agencies on damage-causing products, the 1976 
Green Paper referred to the following sources50: 
- individual Government departments; 
- complaints about product defects from MPs and the public; 
- local authorities; 
- consumer associations and the Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents; 
- the national and international press and specialized journals; 
- the BSI; 
- the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (OPCS). 
Most important by far is the HASS/HADD accident information system which has been 
extremely effective in reporting on non-fatal accidents in England and Wales. HASS and 
HADD are described above. 
  
2.8.2 Information to purchasers of products 
Purchaser information outside the market traditionally plays a major role in Britain. Three 
elements in particular should be stressed: comparative testing of goods, conformity marks 
and consumer education. 
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As in other countries reported on, comparative tests of goods have long been customary in 
Britain, too. A prominent role in this connection is played by the Consumer Association Ltd. 
This is a private-law non-profit-making organization founded in 1957, financed exclusively 
from membership dues. Membership at present amounts to some 700,000 persons. The 
Consumer Association carries out comparative tests on all types of consumer goods and 
relevant services. Test results are published in the magazine "Which?", directly available only 
to members. Since, however, test results are also reported on television and in the press and 
the magazine is available in public libraries, the Consumer Association and "Which?"51 have 
an importance in general for consumer education that cannot be much less than the German 
Stiftung Warentest and its magazine "test". 
In addition to general "brand names" (including various types of marks used by various firms 
or businesses), conformity marks or trade marks are of importance as conveyors of 
information to purchasers. Certification trade marks, above all the BSI kitemarks, are 
regulated in general in the Trade Marks Act 1938 (S 37). Authorized use of the conformity 
mark testifies to compliance with particular quality or safety requirements. 
One peculiar feature of the British situation is the importance attached to consumer 
protection, here primarily in connection with safety in the home, through consumer 
education, even in school. The Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents (ROSPA), 
maintained from public funds, is the main vehicle of the endeavour to get safety questions 
brought into syllabuses. The government's Press and Information Office supplies schools 
with film material for the purpose. Television stations broadcast corresponding "safety 
messages" in pauses between programmes. 
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Product safety policy in the Federal Republic of Germany 
The description of product safety policy in the Federal Republic of Germany will concentrate 
mainly on the Appliances Safety Act and its implementation in practice (3.3) and on technical 
standardisation of relevance to safety (3.4). A final section deals with liability for technical 
consumer products that cause damage (3.5). The account is introduced by notes on home and 
leisure accident research (3.1) and a discussion on some general questions on the German 
system of reference to technical standards (3.2). 
  
3.1 Research into home and leisure accidents 
While industrial accidents in particular have for years been fairly completely covered by the 
occupational accident insurance associations, as have road accidents and accidents in schools 
and nurseries1, the Federal Republic lacks comparable statistics for the area of home and 
leisure. The Federal Government did not take part2 in the Community pilot experiment 
relating to a Community system of information on accidents involving products outside the 
spheres of occupational activities and road traffic3, and was also reluctant about the 
demonstration project decided on in April 1986 with a view to introducing a Community 
system of information on accidents involving consumer products4. It based itself primarily on 
a study concerning home and leisure accidents, carried out by the Association of Liability 
Insurers, Accident Insurers, Automobile Insurers and Legal Costs Insurers (HUK-Verband 
e.V.)5; until then, findings on home and leisure accidents were available only for selected 
groups of people and types of accidents6. 
The HUK study treats as a home or leisure accident, an occurrence in which a person doing 
something involved with either road traffic, an occupation or school suffers an injury 
requiring medical treatment or leading to impairment for at least several days. An initial 
survey asked 89,393 representatively sampled households7 whether one or several household 
members had suffered a home or leisure accident in the last 12 months. The figures collected 
are not stated, though the projection based on them is. This estimates home and leisure 
accidents with personal injuries requiring medical treatment or at least leading to rather long-
time impairment at some 3 million for the Federal Republic; 15% of those injured will 
require hospital treatment. The number of trivial home and leisure accidents is estimated at 
over 100 million per year8. It is further stated that in 1982 approximately 11,000 fatal 
accidents occurred in road traffic, some 2,500 at work or school, and some 12,000 at home or 
in leisure time. More than 75% of the last group of victims are over 649. 
In methodological evaluation of the study, the extremely high forgetfulness curve should be 
noted. For in the period within a month of the survey, 5.3 times as many accidents are 
mentioned as in the period within 12 months of the survey; for accidents with hospital 
treatment, there was still a forgetfulness factor of 2.1 for the same period10. This rules out 
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comparison of the HUK study with accident survey systems that collect figures directly from 
accident stations immediately after the accident, and also arouses doubt as to the reliability of 
the detailed accounts of the circumstances of accidents. Doubts about the study's 
methodological grip arise also from the fact that not a single accident resulting in death was 
covered and that the proportion of accidents involving children was only 15%, whereas for 
instance in the Netherlands study it was 30%11. 
A second phase of survey asked for further details on the course and consequences of 
accidents, in telephone interviews on a total of 3,064 accidents12. The breakdown by 
individual category of accident is as follows13: 
Accidents in sport and games 44% 
Accidents in locomotion 24% 
Accidents in manipulation 17% 
Accidents involving motion on the spot 8% 
Passive accidents 8% 
Manipulation accidents are 12% with a machine and 32% with a tool. These two categories 
together make up 8% of all accidents surveyed; because of the relatively slight consequences 
of the accidents and the resulting higher forgetfulness rate, the proportion is probably to be 
estimated higher in reality14. 
The case studies did not from the outset provide any category for covering design-related 
causes of accidents, but made only the following behaviour-based assignments15: 
- Infringement of elementary safety rules 2% 
- Failure to observe a fairly obvious safety rule 15% 
- Everyday situation that "went wrong" 72% 
- Accident to child because of clumsiness, with  
adult unable to intervene 10% 
As a whole, the HUK study summarises to the effect that technical inadequacies in newly 
purchased machines, tools or appliances seem to play no part in the causation of home and 
leisure accidents. The Appliances Safety Act was supposed to have ensured that hardly any 
inadequate, dangerous to handle machines were still being sold. 99% of home and leisure 
accidents are seen as being the consequences of more or less serious mistaken actions16. 
In his politically ambitious account and assessment of the study, Mertens comes to the 
conclusion that accidents with appliances and machines as yet undamaged by wear and tear 
that have been used properly and safely, accounted for much less than 0.5% of all home and 
leisure accidents17. This supposedly obvious conclusion, that the major part of appliance and 
machine accidents are due to improper or unsafe use or to damage through wear and tear, can 
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derive support only from the "case studies"18 on the handling accidents, which are, however, 
full of very tendentious assessments. Mertens also presupposes that wear and tear and 
mistaken actions are negligible when it comes to setting technical standards. The Stiftung 
Warentest comes to a quite different estimate. It believes that many accidents today classed 
as user-caused could very quickly come to be seen as appliance caused if the necessary 
creativity were applied to thinking how foreseeable misuse could be avoided by suitable 
technical arrangements19. 
We do not wish here to go any further into the fact that in 1984, 24% of appliances tested by 
trade inspection offices in any case proved defective20 nor into the serious, widespread 
shortcomings in systematic market control by the North Rhine-Westphalia Central Office for 
safety technique that have come to light21. One observation of Mertens that remains 
convincing is that data collection on accidents must be made much more detailed if it is to be 
of use for technical standardisation. What he deduces from this, however, is not the need for 
intensive directed studies, for instance on handling accidents with appliances and tools, but 
instead the basic principle of "hazard analysis that has stood the test of decades" which makes 
it possible to prevent accidents beforehand by applying technical safety principles to 
removing danger spots and sources of risk. According to Mertens, the Community should 
"concentrate more on intensifying supranational work on technical safety regulations and 
standards"22, instead of focusing its accident prevention work on appliance and machine 
accidents that have already occurred. 
  
3.2 The reference technique in general 
A characteristic of German product safety law, as of German safety law in general, is the 
"interplay between governmental legal standards and private technical standards drawn up by 
technical and scientific associations, in a complex multilayered system of standards"23. The 
object of technical safety law is on the one hand, to protect life, health, property and the 
environment against damage from technical products and installations, and on the other, to 
provide legal guarantees in connection with economic activities bound up with certain 
technical risks. To this end, statutes and legal ordinances lay down binding safety objectives, 
vaguely defined using such formulae as "generally recognised rules of the art", "state of the 
art" or "state of science and technology". These indefinite legal concepts are amplified by 
references to technical rules or standards drawn up by public-law committees of experts or by 
private standardisation associations. Manufacturers or users of potentially dangerous 
technical products or installations are not legally bound by the technical rules or standards, 
but may choose other solutions if at least the same level of safety is achieved (deviation 
clause). This is intended to take account of the rapid development of modern technology and 
avoid hampering progress and producing rapid outdating. 
The choice among the expressions "generally recognised rules of the art", "state of the art" 
and "state of science and technology" determines the lag in adapting legal requirements to 
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technical or scientific advance24. The legally indefinite expression "generally recognised rules 
of the art" focuses on the prevailing view among technical practitioners, on what is generally 
regarded as tried and tested in professional practice. This criterion always lies behind further 
technical advance. The formula "state of the art" shifts the legal criterion for what is 
permitted or commanded to the front line of technical development; the decisive point is not 
what is generally recognised or established in practice, but what is technically necessary, 
appropriate and possible, even if commercial practice is not yet in line with it. If a 
requirement mentions the "state of science and technology", those precautionary measures 
regarded as necessary according to the latest scientific findings must be used. If this cannot 
yet be achieved technically, permission may not be issued, since the limit to the requirement 
is not set by what is currently technically achievable. Detailed technical rules have been 
displaced from the context of governmental law-making to the allegedly more flexible level 
of non-governmental regulation, so as to permit quicker adaptation to technical progress but 
above all to allow for representative collaboration by "interested circles" in industry and the 
economy, science, technical monitoring organisations and other interested and expert groups 
in society. P. Marburger speaks of the structural principles of flexibility and co-operation25. 
R. Wolf calls the standardisation logic of technical regulation a "self-regulatory mechanism 
in the shadow of regulative policy"26. Before dealing with the specific form of private 
technical standardisation and its controlled adoption by government in the area of safety of 
technical consumer goods in detail, we shall briefly summarise the German debate on the 
legal admissibility of reference to technical rules27, since the legal admissibility of the new 
approach to technical harmonisation and standards raises similar questions. 
There is no dispute as to the admissibility of rigid reference28 in which a law or regulation 
refers to a quite specific version of a technical rule. Here the legislator can verify the content 
of the technical standard, and the content of the standard referred to cannot be altered without 
assent by the legislator. Rigid reference to technical standards is nothing other than a drafting 
abbreviation in the text of the statute. It does not transfer any legislative powers to non-
legitimated non-governmental bodies, and it complies with the constitutional principle of 
certainty of law. Due to the amplitude of the reference, the content of the technical rule 
referred to is binding not only for the administration but the citizen as well. 
Since rigid reference bindingly prescribes a particular technical solution, it is a suitable 
method for linking legal standards with technical rules only where one or several technical 
standards can be referred to, where technical development has already reached some sort of 
end-point and major innovations are unlikely, or will remain irrelevant as far as the object of 
legal protection is concerned. By comparison with statutory regulation of individual technical 
questions, rigid reference means unburdening the legislative bodies and the statutory text of 
detailed technical questions, allowing more flexible adaptation to technical advance, since it 
is not the text of the statute or regulation that has to be reworked, but only a formal correction 
to the reference that is required. 
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The admissibility of sliding or dynamic reference, where reference is made to one or more 
technical standards in their most current form, was long disputed29. P. Marburger names four 
legislative functions of sliding reference30: 
- To free the legislator or regulator of a regulatory task for which they usually lack the 
necessary technical understanding31 (unburdening the legislator); 
- To keep the text of the statute or ordinance free of complicated and often very voluminous 
detailed technical provisions (unburdening the law); 
- To allow rapid adaptation of the content of the law to technical advance, by shifting the 
technical details of safety regulation out of the formal legislative procedure (flexibility); 
- To allow involvement of expert circles in law-making (co-operation). 
The involvement of "expert" circles may be a guarantee that technically practicable and also 
adequate safety solutions will be adopted if it can be made certain that the competent experts 
are in fact represented on the relevant standards committees. Involvement of those concerned 
in establishing technical standards ought to increase willingness to comply with the 
standards. This ought not, however, to be bought at the price of adopting objectively 
unsuitable regulations because of one-sided representation of interests - and "expert" circles 
are always also "interested" circles. The interests concerned must be represented truly 
comprehensively, including suppliers, consumers and representatives of the public interest32. 
The procedure of private technical regulation, and specifically the way it is actually done and 
not what it said on paper, decides whether sliding reference will lead to adoption of apposite 
regulations in the public interest or decisions in the particular interest of manufacturers33. 
Large constitutional objections have been raised against the admissibility of sliding reference 
to technical rules34. It has been seen as disguised transference of law-making power to private 
persons, as infringement of the democracy principle, of the constitutionality principle, 
specifically of the precept of certainty and clarity of law, of the requirement for proper 
publication of laws and of the principle of separation of powers. 
These objections are upheld against the admissibility of sliding reference in supplementation 
of standards, making reference directly and bindingly to technical standards in their 
successively current forms35. With this form of reference, in which the technical regulations 
referred to become binding law in their current version for both citizen and administration, 
the legislator or regulator refrains from determining the content of the law, or leaving it to 
private standardisation bodies. What this comes down to is a blanket law, a law whose 
content can be altered at the whim of the private regulator. 
Sliding reference in specifications of norms36 occurs always in connection with an indefinite 
term in the legal text, which it serves to specify. The law may, for instance, prescribe 
compliance with the "recognised rules of the art"; as a rider or in connection with this, it may 
then be stated that particular technical standards count as such recognised rules of the art. 
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What is legally binding on the manufacturer of a product or the operator of an installation is 
only compliance with the statutory safety standard, which thus conclusively determines the 
duties as to conduct. Often special procedures are being developed to control response to 
relevant technical rules. Thus, the Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs verifies 
DIN standards of relevance to safety before including them in list A of the General 
Administrative Regulation under the Appliances Safety Act37. The new approach to technical 
harmonisation and standards likewise creates, through administration of the list of standards, 
a possibility of checking the harmonised standards and the declared national equivalent ones 
for their compliance with the underlying safety requirements38. 
This additional reference to specific technical rules is intended on the one hand, to give 
addressees of the norm an indication of how to comply with the legal safety requirements, 
and on the other, to oblige the competent authorities to accept appliances or installations that 
meet the technical standards listed. Firms are free to choose solutions non complying with the 
technical rules provided that at least the same level of safety is attained. If they keep to the 
listed technical standards, there is a refutable presumption that the statutory safety duty has 
been met. Whether a technical regulation referred to in fact meets the statutory safety 
standard is subject to judicial verification. The competent administrative authorities remain 
free to act against a product manufactured or installation operated in accordance with the 
standards in cases of a concrete risk. Observance of technical standards acts merely as an 
indicator of compliance with the statutory safety obligation. 
  
3.3 The Appliances Safety Act and its application in practice 
The German law on technical appliances (the Gerätesicherheitsgesetz - Appliances Safety 
Act (GSG))39 is regarded as a model for both the Low Voltage Directive and the new 
approach to technical harmonisation and standards. The GSG, an offshoot of labour 
protection law, has developed into one of the most important German laws for preventive 
protection of consumers against defective products, and at the same time forms a link 
between governmental product safety policy and safety-related technical standardisation. In 
presenting the GSG, one must therefore immediately include technical standardisation of 
relevance to safety. 
  
3.3.1 Lines of development 
The 1929 Industrial Safety Bill already included the basic idea of guaranteeing safety for 
workers through quality requirements on appliances; the competent authorities themselves 
were to determine the requirements on machines needed to protect workers' life and health. In 
the same year, the ILO adopted a recommendation on responsibility for protective devices on 
mechanically driven machines. In 1963, it extended its earlier recommendation and decided 
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on Convention No. 119 on machine protection, with the supplementary recommendation No. 
118. This was the basis for the Machine Safety Bill (Maschinenschutzgesetz)40, which assumed the 
following guidelines: 
- All technical appliances should be covered, whether for use in factory, office, home or 
leisure; 
- Safety requirements on appliances should not be detailed in regulations, but emerge from 
safety rules developed by experts; 
- In principle, manufacturers or importers should be responsible for the perfect safety of 
products. 
This meant that three decisive steps had been taken: manufacturer responsibility was to aim 
at preventive hazard elimination through safety-minded development, design and 
manufacture of technical appliances. Until then, only the employer had been under an 
obligation, as part of a labour-law duty of care in accordance with the industrial safety and 
accident prevention regulations, to make only safe appliances and machines available to the 
employees on his premises. Even more than the businessman, the non-commercial final 
consumer is with advancing technical content, no longer in the position to verify the technical 
safety of appliances. Accordingly, the idea developed in the industrial safety context of 
preventive hazard protection is consistently extended to all technical utility goods, including 
those for home and leisure use41. With the rapid development of technology and the range of 
goods offered, the focus is placed not on administrative quality requirements but on 
the generally recognised rules of the art, to which special provisions and regulations are a 
guide. The supervisory authorities confine themselves to spot checks and to intervention in 
hazardous situations. 
Effective from January 198042, the law on technical work materials that had come into force 
in November 1968 with the brief title "Maschinenschutzgesetz" (Machine Safety Act) was 
amended. It was given a new brief title "Gerätesicherheitsgesetz" (Appliances Safety Act), 
more appropriate to its broadened scope; it assumed inspection of installations, provided legal 
guarantees for the safety mark "GS = geprüfte Sicherheit" (safety-tested) introduced by the 
Federal Minister of Labour, and its scope was, to some extent, extended to dealers43. 
  
3.3.2 Scope 
The GSG is addressed to manufacturers and importers in so far as they market or display 
technical work materials by way of trade, or independently in the context of a business 
undertaking (§ 1 (1) GSG). Although the Länder44, the consumer associations and the Trade 
Supervisory Offices45 had advocated bringing dealers fully under the GSG, they were 
covered only exceptionally46 on the grounds that retailers were not in a position to make 
technical safety assessments of products and that there were sufficient possibilities of fighting 
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the danger at source. § 1 (3) GSG explicitly states that the employer's responsibility under the 
industrial safety and accident prevention regulations remains unaffected. In this connection, 
particular importance is attached to § 5 of the Accident Prevention Regulations, "General 
Provisions" (VBG 1), which obliges the businessman to require suppliers to furnish only 
those technical work materials that are in line with the Accident Prevention Regulations and 
the generally accepted rules of the art in safety technique and industrial medicine. 
The GSG applies to all technical work materials for which there are no specific regulations. 
Accordingly, it does not apply to vehicles in so far as they are subject to road traffic 
regulations, nor to technical work materials which by nuclear safety provisions are subject to 
special requirements, or which are used exclusively by the Army, the Technisches Hilfswerk, 
the border guards or the police, nor where other provisions aimed at hazard prevention 
pursuant to § 3 GSG regulate the marketing or display of technical work materials (§ 1 (2) 
GSG). Accordingly, for instance, toys are governed by the Foodstuffs and Consumer Goods 
Act as regards any toxic properties, and by the GSG with respect to mechanical risks. 
Technical work materials are, according to § 2 (1) GSG, ready-for-use equipment such as 
tools, working equipment, working machinery, powered machinery, and lifting and 
conveying devices which can be used for their purpose without the addition of other parts. 
This work equipment is by § 2 (2) GSG placed on the same footing as protective equipment, 
lighting, heating, cooling, ventilating or air-conditioning equipment, household appliances, 
sports and do-it-yourself appliances and toys47. Appliances intended exclusively for export 
may be displayed on Federal territory even though they do not meet the requirements of the 
GSG, provided that it is clearly indicated that they are intended only for export48. 
  
3.3.3 General safety obligation - § 3 (1) GSG 
The core of the GSG is the general safety duty under § 3 (1) GSG: 
"A manufacturer or importer of technical work materials may market or display these only if 
they are, according to the generally recognised rules of the art and the industrial safety and 
accident prevention provisions, of such a nature that users or third parties are when properly 
using them, protected against dangers of all kinds to life or health as far as the nature of that 
proper use permits. Generally accepted rules of the art and the industrial safety and accident 
prevention provisions may be departed from where equal safety is guaranteed in another 
manner". 
Users and third parties are thus to be protected against dangers of all kind to life and health. 
By way of guaranteeing comprehensive hazard protection, § 2 (4) of the General 
Administrative Provisions on the GSG (AVV-GSG)49explicitly states that this concerns not 
only the classical technical aspects of safety such as protection against moving parts or pieces 
thrown off, stability or protection against touching current-carrying parts50, but also such 
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hazards as those resulting from noise, air pollution, heat emission or other effects of use. This 
means that ergonomic approaches have to be taken into account and all possible effects of 
working materials on their users are to be considered51. 
However comprehensively the object of protection may be defined, the other elements of the 
general safety duty on manufacturers and importers are defined restrictively. 
  
3.3.3.1 Proper use 
The GSG protects the user only in so far as he uses appliances "properly". § 2 (5) GSG 
contains a legal definition, naming two circumstances from which proper use emerges: (1) a 
subjective characteristic, namely the manufacturer's or importer's indications (particularly 
those contained in publicity) on ways of using the technical work materials; (2) an objective 
characteristic, namely the standard use deducible from the design and construction of the 
technical work materials. 
The manufacturer's or importer's indications as to application may contradict the normal use 
deducible from design and construction. In such cases of conflict, it is always, according to 
the Münster Administrative Appeals Tribunal52, always the normal use deducible from design 
and construction that applies. The appliance must take account of users' habits. The 
manufacturer cannot escape his responsibility through instructions for use that go against the 
uses predictable from the appliance's design. The objective criterion of normal use is not 
subordinate to subjective criteria of indications from the manufacturer, but in cases of conflict 
overrides them. Otherwise, the manufacturer could avoid necessary safety measures through 
indications of use. Since the decision cited has apparently remained isolated, it cannot be 
assumed that the dispute as to interpretation of proper use has ended. Laborious justifications 
continue to be used to play down the equal-value objective criterion of § 2 (5)(2) GSG and 
give priority in case of conflict to the manufacturer's instructions for use53. 
The standards underlying safety-related standardisation work, DIN 820, part 12 and DIN 
31000/VDE 1000, in part go beyond § 2 (5) GSG. Thus, DIN 820, part 12 states that: 
"Technical safety requirements should be specified in such a way that (when the product is 
properly used) it is unlikely that people, animals or things will be endangered. Ergonomic 
considerations should apply. Foreseeable mistakes should be taken into account54." 
This provision has wide-ranging importance, since DIN 820, in all its parts, is binding for the 
standardisation work of all specialised standard committees of the DIN55. At any rate, it 
provides consumer representatives on standardisation committees with arguments for basing 
the establishment of safety standards not on the manufacturers instructions but on usual 
habits, including mistaken ones. 
DIN 31000/VDE 1000 takes the following conceptual specification for proper use: 
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"Proper use within the meaning of this standard is the use for which the technical product is 
suitable according to the manufacturer's indications including those in publicity. In cases of 
doubt, it is a use that would be taken as usual from the design, construction and function of 
the technical product. Proper use also includes compliance with operating and maintenance 
conditions stated and the taking of foreseeable misuse into account56. 
DIN 3100/VDE 1000 starts from the basic idea that using technology brings hazards resulting 
in part from the technical products themselves, in part from the way people handle technical 
products57. Even hazards caused by foreseeable misuse should be combated by design 
measures, primarily those of direct safety technology, supported by those of indirect safety 
technology. In practical standardisation work, the three-stage method for safety design58, 
among the engineers that more or less monopolise standardisation work is likely to diminish 
the importance of the debate on proper, usual or foreseeably incorrect use. 
3.3.3.2 Generally recognised rules of the art and the industrial safety and accident prevention 
provisions 
§ 3 (1), the key provision of the GSG, refers in its definition of the safety criterion to the 
"generally accepted rules of the art" and to the industrial safety and accident prevention 
provisions. No lesser criterion could be conceived; the requirements clearly lag behind 
advancing technological development. Accordingly, when a technical rule is generally 
recognised, it is the experts that have to apply the rules of safety technology that are 
authoritative. They must primarily be convinced that the rules of the art are in line with the 
safety requirements to be placed on the technical work material. This technical safety solution 
need not be the one prevailing in practice, but must have been adequately tested in practice 
and have proved itself under operating conditions59. Even where the technical standards 
referred to follow higher requirements, and are for instance based on the "state of the art", 
this does not tighten the general safety duty under § 3 (1) GSG, since it is only compliance 
with generally accepted rules of the art that is made binding legally. 
Whether DIN standards ought to come up to the "state of the art" or merely reflect "generally 
accepted rules of the art" is not entirely clear in DIN's own mind. On the one hand, DIN 820, 
part 1, which lays down the basic principles for standardisation work, says that standards 
have to take account of the current state of science and technology and of economic 
circumstances60. In referring to the state of science and technology, DIN did not wish to 
anticipate the severest criterion in the conceptual triad of the Federal Constitutional Court's 
Kalkar Decision61/62. Along with the state of science and technology, economic 
circumstances are also to be "taken into account" at the same time. DIN 820, part 4, states 
that a standard must be reworked if it is no longer in line with the state of the art63. The 
guidelines for standardisation committees give the working groups the task of ensuring that 
standards are in line with the findings of science and the state of technology64. The principles 
for applying DIN standards state rather soothingly that while the rules for establishing DIN 
standards call for the consideration of the state of the art, it is nonetheless difficult to meet up 
with these demands due to the steady advance of technology65. Finally, the indications to 
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users of DIN standards indicate as an objective that DIN standards ought to be introduced as 
"accepted rules of the art". 
The clear impression one derives is that the formulations (of engineers) in the various DIN 
regulations are completely detached from the conceptual considerations of lawyers on 
technical safety law. 
The industrial safety and accident prevention regulations66 are not binding solely in so far as 
they reflect the generally recognised state of safety technology. They are binding not because 
of consensus by authoritative experts, but because of the autonomous legislative power given 
by Government to the agencies of legal accident insurance, or from their character as legal 
ordinances. Many industrial safety provisions are based on the enabling provisions of §§ 120 
e, 139 a GewO (industrial code); others on the Chemicals Act, the Nuclear Act, the Explosive 
Act or the Federal Mining Act. Important examples of mandatory industrial safety provisions 
include: 
- Verordnung über Acetylenanlagen und Calciumcarbidlager, 27.2.1980 (BGBl. I, 220) 
(Ordinance on Acetylene Plants and Calcium Carbide Stores), with a number of technical 
rules for Acetylene Plants and Calcium Carbide Stores, drawn up by the German Acetylene 
Committee; 
- Verordnung über Arbeitsstätten, 20.3.1975 (BGB1. I, 729) (Workplaces Ordinance), with 
around 30 directives on workplaces; 
- Verordnung über die Aufzugsanlagen, 27.2.1980 (BGBl. I. 205) (Ordinance on Lift 
Installations), with a number of technical rules for lifts drawn up by the German Committee 
for Lifts; 
- Verordnung für Anlagen zur Lagerung, Abfüllung und Beförderung brennbarer 
Flüssigkeiten zu Lande, 27.2.1980 (BGBl. I, 273 (Ordinance for Installations for Storing, 
Bottling or Transporting Combustible Fluids by Land), with some 40 technical rules for 
combustible liquids, drawn up by the German Committee for combustible liquids; 
- Verordnung über Dampfkesselanlagen, 27.2.1980 (BGBl. I, 173) (Steam Boilers 
Ordinance), with some 65 technical rules for steam boilers, drawn up by the German Steam 
Boilers Committee; 
- Verordnung über Druckbehälter, Druckgasbehälter und Füllanlagen, 27.2.1980 (BGBl. I, 
184) (Ordinance on Pressure Vessels, Pressurised Gas Containers and Filling Plants), with 
some 35 technical rules for pressure vessels, drawn up by the Technical Committee on 
Pressure Vessels under the Central Office for accident prevention and industrial medicine of 
the Association of Mutual Indemnity Associations, and 90 technical rules on pressurised 
gases drawn up by the German Pressure Vessels Committee; 
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- Verordnung über Gashochdruckleitungen, 17.12.1974 (BGBl. I, 3591) (Ordinance on High 
Pressure Gas Lines), with 40 technical rules on high pressure gas lines, drawn up by the 
Committee on High Pressure Gas Lines; 
- Verordnung über gefährliche Stoffe, 26.8.1986 (BGBl. I, 1470) (Ordinance on Hazardous 
Substances), with more than 50 technical rules for hazardous substances, drawn up by the 
former Committee for Hazardous Working Materials and by the Committee for Hazardous 
Materials. 
By § 708 (1) RVO, the Berufgenossenschaften (Mutual Indemnity Associations) are 
autonomously entitled to enact accident prevention provisions binding on their members, 
employers and employees. These are worked out by technical committees that include experts 
from the indemnity associations and also representatives of the Gewerbeausfsichtsämter 
(Factory Inspectorate Offices), of producers and users of technical work material, of the trade 
unions and of employers, and are adopted by the Assembly of Representatives, which has a 
parity-based composition. Before they can enter into force, they require approval by the 
Federal Minister for Labour. Quick response to new technical developments is out of the 
question, since this procedure for issuing rules takes 5 or 6 years67. 
The accident prevention regulations in general contain detailed indications only on rules of 
conduct for employees and the wearing of protective equipment68. Indications on safety 
design for machines and work equipment are by contrast formulated only very generally, in 
turn often referring to the "generally recognised state of the art". Accordingly, the hope of 
using the industrial safety and accident prevention regulations to bring safety requirements 
more in line with the present state of technology or science69 is illusory. In 1982, the DIN and 
the Indemnity Associations finally concluded an agreement whereby the latter would in 
principle - apart from instruction for actions - restrict themselves to formulating general 
safety objectives which the DIN would then specify70. This means that with regard to 
accident prevention, all technical regulatory material will, in the medium-term, rely on DIN 
standards. 
  
3.3.3.3 Deviation clause 
The deviation clause71 of § 3 (1) (2) GSG is intended to make progress in safety technology 
possible and also to allow the manufacturer to depart from the generally accepted rules of the 
art as long as the safety technology solution he chooses is at least equivalent. This provision 
for departure becomes relevant where a technical rule contains not only general objects of 
protection, but detailed technical model rules. In such a case the technical safety objective 
which is to be attained in some other way has first to be derived from them72. 
The deviation clause is of particular importance for foreign manufacturers and importers. In 
general, they, too, have under the GSG, to observe the "recognised rules of the art" on the 
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territory of The Federal Republic73. If the foreign rule of art is not identical with the domestic 
one but nevertheless provides the same level of safety, the product may not be objected to74. 
If the same safety level is attained, the deviation clause thus allows foreign manufacturers to 
continue large production runs without losing the German market for safety reasons75. It thus 
leads to the same outcome as the case law on Articles 30 et seq. EEC. For goods from 
Community countries, it follows from Art. 30 EEC that they are freely marketable in all 
Member States if they have been marketed legally in the country of origin, unless the 
importing country can refer to objects of protection under Art. 36 EEC or to binding 
requirements in the sense of the Cassis judgement76. If the same level of safety is maintained, 
any appeal to Art. 36 EEC in order to protect against dangers to life or health is ruled out. 
The bilateral agreements on mutual recognition of German and French standards77 make it 
easier to use the GSG deviation clause, since list C in the general administrative regulations 
for the GSG gives the French standards that are, until proof of the contrary, to be taken as 
equivalent in safety level to the German standards. At the same time, the bilateral agreement 
is an indication that neither using the GSG deviation clause nor following ECJ Case Law on 
Articles 30 et seq. EEC are enough to avoid obstacles to trade between Member States. 
The deviation clause applies in favour of manufacturers and importers even in respect of 
accident prevention regulations. Here distortions of competition may arise because an 
employer as user of work materials does not have a similar entitlement to deviate where the 
same safety is guaranteed78. As far as capital goods are concerned, a remedy could be found 
here if the various mutual indemnity associations declared a willingness to allow for 
corresponding departures in the accident prevention regulations79. The problem will lose 
practical importance as the accident prevention regulations come to specify only general 
objects of protection but not the technical details for meeting them80. 
It is controversial whether a manufacturer or importer who appeals to the deviation clause has 
to show that the same safety has been achieved in another way81, or whether the authority 
wishing to intervene must establish that the other technical safety solution is not equivalent82. 
Products are certainly freely marketable in principle without prior permission, even where the 
manufacturer takes advantage of the deviation clause. However, where the authorities 
intervene in the presence of a specific hazard, there is more to say for the idea of obliging a 
manufacturer or importer who departs from the regulation position to provide facts or proof 
of equal safety. 
The obligation to comply with generally accepted state of the art and the industrial safety and 
accident prevention regulations does not apply to manufacturers or importers where the 
technical work materials have, according to written statements by the proposed user, been 
manufactured to order (§3 (2) GSG)83. 
  
3.3.4 Incorporation of standards in the lists 
92
In Annexes A, B and C to the General Administrative Regulations on the GSG, the Federal 
Minister for Labour and Social Affairs indicates rules of the art, compliance with which leads 
to a presumption that work material is in line with the legally required level of safety. 
Through continual supplementation and corrective adjustment (at present, twice yearly), the 
latest results of standardisation work and technical practice in the area of accident prevention 
are taken into account. In October 1987 the individual lists included a total of 1,708 safety 
rules84, which break down as follows: 
List A (domestic technical standards) 
DIN standards or VDE definitions 1,277 
DVGW standards 3 
VDI rules 25 
  
List B (accident prevention regulations, etc.) 
Accident prevention regulations (UVV) 85 
Implementing instructions on the UVV 64 
Directives, safety rules and leaflets from the 
mutual indemnity associations 115 
Ordinances, administrative regulations, 
technical rules and directives for 
installations monitored under § 24 GewO 21 
  
List C (foreign technical standards) 
Standards of the French Standardisation 118 
Organisation AFNOR 
This breakdown brings out the overwhelming importance of DIN standards or VDE 
definitions, which account for some 3/4 of the safety rules indicated. Table 1 gives an 
overview of the numerical development of regulations under the GSG. Since 1970, the 
number of safety rules included in the lists has more than quintupled. The lists are subject to 
continuing review. For instance, the September 1986 update deleted 112 technical rules and 
included 169 new ones. 
In November 1984 list C was opened. On the basis of the bilateral agreement between France 
and the Federal Republic85, it contains standards from the French Standardisation 
Organisation AFNOR, notified by the Ministry for Foreign Trade and Industrial 
Development, on which the competent authorities in the Länder, the Committee on technical 
work materials, and interested circles have been heard. 
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Table 1: Development of regulation work under the Appliances Safety Act and number of 
recognised test centres(1) 
Year  Number of listed standars    Number of recognised test centres
 
 A and B C 
1970   287 -       - 
1971   529 -       2 
1973   623 -       21 
1975   679 -       49 
1977   823 -       62 
1979   925 -       69 
1981   983 -       69 
1983   1210 -       76 
1984   1210 118       76 
1986   1565 118       76 
 
(1) Compiled from the 1985 Annual Report of the Federal Institute for Industrial Safety, 23, 
and the first supplement to lists A, B and C of the General Administrative Regulations under 
the Act on Technical Work Materials, September 1986, Bundesarbeitsblatt 9 (1986, 63-70). 
If a manufacturer or importer refers to a standard in list C, the Trade Supervisory Office only 
then - unless safety is evidently guaranteed in another way, pursuant to the deviation clause in 
§ 3 (1) (2) GSG - asks for this standard to be submitted in German. If the work materials 
prove to comply with the French standard, equal safety counts as guaranteed86. 
The Federal Minister of Labour is, as a rule, involved in the issuing of implementing 
regulations on the accident prevention regulations and in bringing out technical safety rules 
and leaflets of the accident insurance agencies; indeed, accident prevention regulations 
require his approval. In general, accordingly, no additional technical testing is necessary for 
inclusion of these regulations in list B87. 
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3.3.5 Principles of safety standardisation 
In establishing the technical norms for inclusion in list A, the Appliances Safety Division of 
the Federal Institute for Industrial Safety88 and the DIN Committee on Safety Technology 
work closely together. 
The Commission on Safety Technology was set up in 1965 in connection with the 
preliminary work on the Act on Technical Work Materials, on the initiative of and with 
financial support from the Federal Minister of Labour89. Its tasks are, above all, to encourage 
safety standardisation work in the specialised DIN standardisation committees, co-ordinate 
safety standardisation in DIN, select suitable DIN standards for inclusion in the lists and 
propose them to the Federal Minister of Labour, and, acting on suggestions from the Federal 
Institute for Industrial Safety and the Trade Supervisory Offices, test whether standards with 
safety provisions are still in line with the current state of the art90. It co-ordinates involvement 
of safety experts from the Factory Inspectorate and the Federal Institute for Industrial Safety 
in the specialised standardisation committees, and in 1975 submitted a proposal, never 
discussed in detail, far less applied, to set up an accident information system also covering 
the home and leisure sectors91. It includes representatives of Federal Ministries and of the 
Länder labour authorities, of the Federal Institute for Industrial Safety, of the legal accident 
insurance agencies, of the trade unions, of employer associations, of the Federal Association 
of German Industry, of standards workers and of science. 
The Federal Institute for Industrial Safety delivers opinions on draft standards with safety 
relevance as part of the regular procedure for establishing standards, and tests the standards 
proposed by the Safety Technology Committee for inclusion in List A. In a kind of written 
soundings-taking procedure, it then gives expert circles interested a chance to comment on 
proposed changes or additions, though without going as far as a new round of discussion on 
the standards92. In order to secure the broadest possible consensus of all expert circles and to 
cover all reservations and all findings, umbrella associations in industry, trade and 
handicrafts, and the unions, standardisation workers, the DIN Safety Technology Committee, 
the Länder labour authorities and the members of the Committee on technical work materials 
are asked to participate93. 
At this stage, immediately before publication of the lists, the number of objections still being 
raised is very small. This is due, above all, to the fact that test criteria are laid down in detail 
for all standardisation work in DIN 31000/VDE 1000, "general guidelines for safety design 
of technical products"94 and DIN 820, part 12 "standardisation work, standards with technical 
safety provisions, design"95. 
DIN 820, part 12, published in May 1977, which brings together experience to date in the 
DIN Safety Technology Committee, the Federal Institute for Industrial Safety and the Federal 
Ministry of Labour, provides the structural criteria that safety standards must meet for 
inclusion in list A of the general administrative regulations under the GSG: safety 
requirements must be laid down concretely and unambiguously, and compliance must be 
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fully and unambiguously testable. Requirements must be specified so exactly that test results 
are reproducible. 
More important than these formal structural criteria are the substantive requirements that DIN 
31000/VDE 1000 lays down for the safety design of technical products. The eventual 
standard of March 1979 had been preceded as long ago as December 1971 by a preliminary 
standard based on preliminary work under the auspices of the Federal Ministry of Labour96. It 
was to act as the basis for the specification of safety standards or VDE definitions97 and allow 
initial assessment of technical products as regard safety, in so far as valid, specific and 
complete standards for this are not or not yet available98. Its provisions are to be specified in 
standards for individual types of technical product or in VDE definitions for individual types 
of electrical equipment, and supplemented by indications as to relevant tests99. 
The safety design of technical work materials is seen in the first place as a design task for 
engineers. In safety design the preferred solution should meet the safety objective in 
technically rational fashion as well as being economically the best, and in case of doubt, 
safety requirements take priority over economic considerations100. The following three-stage 
method applies: technical products should be so designed that no hazards are present (direct 
safety technology). If this is not or not fully possible, special safety devices that come into 
play automatically should be used (indirect safety technology). Only in third place come 
indications of the conditions under which hazardous use is possible (safety through 
instructions). The technique of safety through instructions is to be used in combination with 
direct and indirect safety technology even where hazards with products can be prevented only 
by particular actions on the part of the user101. This restriction can amount to excluding 
foreseeable misuse from design safety technology and allocating it to the technique of safety 
through instructions. 
To supplement and extend the general guidelines of DIN 31000/VDE 1000, technical safety 
provisions for particular areas that overlap specialities or safety objectives should be 
summarised in basic standards (infrastructure)102. Finally, in order to allow the DIN standards 
to have full product-specific effect, groups of products or individual products should be 
covered in standards for special fields or standards for components103. 
  
3.3.6 The safety mark "GS = geprüfte Sicherheit" (safety-tested) 
The GSG does not have an obligation to test technical work materials, but offers 
manufacturers and importers the possibility of securing confirmation from a recognised test 
centre, after a design test, that their appliances meet the provisions of § 3 (1) GSG or of a 
legal ordinance adopted pursuant to § 4 or § 8a. If the result is positive they secure the right 
to use the safety mark "GS = geprüfte Sicherheit", uniform for all types of appliance and 
accompanied by an identification of the test centre (§ 3 (4) GSG)104. It was introduced by the 
Federal Minister for Labour in 1977, after the Association for a Safety Mark had spent seven 
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years failing to agree on one. It is intended to provide the consumer with a simple and easy 
means for choosing safer products. The GS mark serves the marketing interests of 
manufacturers and is also a way of lessening the burden on supervisory authorities, who 
should refrain from testing appliances bearing the mark105, unless there are grounds to suspect 
its illegal use. 
The Federal Minister for Labour and Social Affairs, after consulting the Committee on 
Technical Work Materials and with agreement from the Upper House of the German 
Parliament, determines by legal ordinance the testing centres competent for the design test. 
These must be suitable in staff and equipment for the task, economically independent and 
able to offer guarantees of reliable testing. The list of test centres also lays down the fields for 
which a test centre is recognised. At present there are 78 recognised centres106, among them 
10 technical control boards, the Bavarian Provincial Institution for Trade, the Association of 
German Electrical Engineers, the German Vehicle Testing Association and three mail-order 
firms107, each with an intensive range of competences, plus 27 specialised committees of the 
Indemnity Associations, three DIN standards committees, the Federal Institute for Materials 
Testing and 32 other test centres with very specific areas of competence108. In the context of 
the bilateral agreement between France and the Federal Republic, the Laboratoire Nationale 
D'Essais was also recognised as a test centre in December 1985. Recognition is preceded by 
verification of the Federal Institute for Industrial Safety, relating inter alia to staffing and 
equipment and including a demonstration from some of the areas of coverage applied for109. 
In order to arrive at uniformity of testing practice, test centres must undertake to participate in 
the information clearing houses for test centres in their field attached to the Committee for 
technical work materials, and comply with agreements arrived at there. Apart from individual 
test contracts, the test centres have the following tasks. Should they find that technical work 
material for which they have given authorisation to use the safety mark has been supplied 
defectively, they have to cause the manufacturer or importer to provide a remedy. If the faults 
are not removed, or unsafe appliances continue to be marketed, the Trade Supervisory 
Offices are to be informed. They have to note accidents arising in using appliances tested by 
them and see to the removal of faulty goods still found. They have to transfer their experience 
from testing work into standardisation and regulatory work110. If an applicant for a test refers 
to a French standard contained in list C, the test centre has to apply the French standard 
where the technical work material is not in line with the relevant German standards and equal 
safety is not obviously guaranteed111. 
The GS mark has been widely used for many technical consumer goods. The total number of 
types of appliance or machine with valid GS marks amounted by 31 December 1985 to 
85,000112. Applicants for the GS mark have the chance to ask for the criteria related to their 
appliance so as to be able to take the safety requirements in force more reliably into account, 
even at the design stage of technical work materials. Since in the case of many technical 
consumer products there is competition between various test centres, one cannot ignore the 
danger that differing test criteria might be applied and that manufacturers and importers 
might choose test centres likely to give them more favourable test results than others. The 
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only remedy is extension of the information network among test centres, and the checks on 
test centres by the Federal Institute for Industrial Safety, active since 1984. 
In safety checks carried out by the Stiftung Warentest, appliances bearing the GS mark 
continually display serious safety shortcomings113. The reasons adduced are that particular 
identifiable test centres interpret the regulations in force less strictly than would be necessary, 
that products are altered after securing the mark, and that the safety regulations applied are 
inadequate. 
  
3.3.7 Monitoring by the Trade Supervisory Offices; banning orders 
The competent supervisory bodies for monitoring the Appliances Safety Act are the 71 
National Trade Supervisory Offices. These offices have a very wide range of tasks, with 
responsibilities for protection against nuisances, social industrial safety and, in the area of 
technical industrial safety, for workplaces, monitored installations, dangerous work 
substances, explosive materials, radiation protection, organisation of industrial safety in 
factories and, of course, for technical work materials114. 
An extensive empirical study in 1979 showed that they devoted only a fraction of their 
working time, some 2.2%, to application of the Appliances Safety Act115. The trade 
supervisory offices are not obliged to make systematic checks on all technical work materials 
or all manufacturers or importers. Since 180,000 types of technical work materials come 
newly on to the market each year116, this would be far beyond their resources. From 
considerations of effectiveness, the principle applied is that of directed monitoring activities. 
They have to check technical work materials where a competent authority for industrial 
safety or legal accident insurance agency, officer of policy or other authorities, user of 
technical work materials or centre dealing with hazards protection under the GSG (Stiftung 
Warentest, works councils, test centres) has submitted a report on a defective technical work 
material or on an accident in using a technical work material117. 
Because of time overloads on trade supervisory officers and on the Federal Institute for 
Industrial Safety, a unique possibility has been neglected. This would be the introduction of 
an accident information system which would, though not being representative, specifically 
examine cases where defective technical appliances had caused accidents or led to serious 
hazards. It is hard to understand why no resources have yet been found for systematic 
evaluations of defect reports passed on to the Länder, in which manufacturers or importers of 
products whose safety has been impugned have their headquarters118. 
Since the primary objective of the GSG consists in preventive hazard protection, trade 
supervisory offices might temporarily become active at fairs and exhibitions of more than 
local importance119 in order to test work materials on offer there, with an economical use of 
staff120. In 1984, 54% of all inspection in connection with the GSG took place at fairs and 
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Part 4: 
The US Consumer Product Safety Act and its implementation by the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission 
Adoption of the 1972 Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA) by the 92nd Congress was a 
success for the consumer movement and its legislative impact in the US. The CPSA and its 
implementation through the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) of 1973 are, 
however, important even outside the United States. The new legislation and its regulatory 
machinery has served as a model or at least a stimulus in all countries where product safety 
law has been further developed1. Moreover, the many amendments to the CPSA and the 
difficulties in applying it have been taken as an illustration of the inadvisability of increased 
government influence on product safety2,. 
Political controversies within the United States over the CPSA make an analysis aimed at 
deriving general conclusions for product safety law even more difficult. Whether the 
regulatory approach has "proved" itself, what supervisory machinery has been "successful" 
and what has "failed", what regulatory strategies ought therefore to be taken over at national 
and/or European level - all these points would be much easier to judge if implementation of 
the CPSA had taken a more peaceful course. But irregularities and constant amendments 
seem to be a typical feature of product safety policy and product safety law, and description 
and interpretation have to go along with them. These considerations are taken account of in 
the description below by presenting the CPSA not only in its current version, but in its 
original one as well (4.1), and by always referring to the constantly fluctuating conditions in 
which the CPSA had to operate (4.2-4.5). 
  
4.1 The original version of the CPSA and amendments to it 
The CPSA's adoption in 1972 was the conclusion to years of preliminary work. The most 
important preparatory step was the setting up of the National Commission on Product Safety3, 
proposed in 1967 by Senator Warren Magnuson, initiator of many consumer policy 
legislative acts. The fact that Senator Magnuson was not aiming directly at enactment of a 
general product safety act but leaving the development of suitable proposals to an 
independent commission did much to help make his initiative successful4. The Commission, 
appointed by President Johnson in 1968, was able to carry out its preliminary work and 
hearings unmolested by the usual antagonistic pressures. In 1970 the Commission presented 
its voluminous final report5. The report not only submitted the findings of broad-based 
surveys - on product hazards, accident information systems, voluntary product standards, 
consumer education, the state of product safety law, the relationship between Federal law and 
State law, product safety policy in other countries - but also contained proposals for general 




4.1.1 The CPSA 19727 
Two years after publication of the Commission's final report, the CPSA was passed by both 
Houses of Congress. On all major points, the Act followed the ideas of the preparatory 
Commission. This is all the more remarkable because the law, in both overall conception and 
regulatory machinery, broke new ground in many respects: 
- This firstly applies to the CPSC itself. There have long been independent commissions in 
the area of so-called economic regulation (the Securities and Exchange Commission, the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission8), but transfer of 
protection of consumer safety interests to an independent agency was an innovation9. The 
autonomy of the CPSC was shielded against both private and governmental interests. The 
five Commission Members are each appointed for seven years; budget appropriations need 
not be approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), but simply by Congress 
directly10. 
- It is also true of the broad range of tasks of the CPSC. The CPSA covers all consumer 
goods, except where other agencies are involved in monitoring safety hazards as part of their 
competence11. Additionally, the CPSC was handed the administration of specific existing 
acts12. The Commission thus has a kind of general catch-all competence that always applies 
wherever there are no more specific regulations that take priority. But even where such 
priority regulations affect particularly important goods (particularly automobiles and 
pharmaceuticals), the scope remains significant. The jurisdiction of the CPSC is reckoned to 
apply to 15,000 consumer products13; the often cited estimate by the National Commission on 
Product Safety that some 36 million consumer product accidents occur yearly14 relates to 
these products not covered by special regulations. 
- A further innovation was the attempt at making safety regulation "scientific". Section 5 
CPSA provides for systematic collection and analysis of accident data, and gives the 
Commission tasks and powers in the area of research15. 
- Another breakthrough is the introduction of a wide variety of regulatory machinery, ranging 
from information policy measures through standard setting and provisions for bans, up to an 
elaborate recall system16. This gamut of measures has greatly encouraged the international 
debate on product safety policy17 and may be regarded as exhaustive: there is probably no 
safety policy measure conceivable which has not already been tried out within the framework 
of the CPSA. 
The CPSA's overall conception can be reduced to the two not necessarily mutually 
compatible strategies of making product safety policy "scientific" and "democratic": product 
safety was declared a public goal, and entrusted to a relatively independent government 
agency that was to set its priorities, seek effective methods and in short pursue a "rational" 
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policy; at the same time, however, the new institution was to differ from traditional 
bureaucracies, to take up safety policy submissions from the general public and to promote 
participation by interest groups. 
  
4.1.2 Amendments 
The original consensus expressed in the National Commission on Product Safety's 1970 
Report had made enactment of the CPSA possible. This consensus, however, did not last. The 
controversies over the legal justification for a government product safety policy and its 
appropriate means, largely dormant during the preparatory phase of the Act, came to the fore 
at a later date and have never yet been settled. 
CPSC adverseries succeeded in bringing about severe budget cuts in the 1980's. The first 
budget for 1974, still solely based on recommendations from the Food and Drug 
Administration, amounted to some 30 million dollars18. When the Commission then asked for 
its own appropriations for 1975 and 1976, it managed to secure increases to some 37 and 42 
million dollars respectively from Congress19. Until 1981 the budget kept to this figure in 
nominal terms, and was then cut in 1982 to 33 million dollars20. It is still at this level today21. 
Staffing is one aspect that reflects this development. The Commission began in 1973 with 
579 workers, reached a peak of 914 in 197722, and then gradually shrank back to its original 
number. It should be kept in mind that the dollar has lost some 50% of its value by 
comparison with 197423 and that therefore a return in nominal terms to the 1974 budget 
means halving it de facto24. What suffered most from all these cuts were the technical and 
scientific divisions of CPSC and its "field offices", whose tasks lay particularly in the area of 
follow-up market control. Their numbers were cut from 13 to 525. 
  
4.1.2.1 Mandatory standards and product bans 
The most important amendments to the CPSA concerned regulations on the issue of product 
standards. Authoritative prescription of mandatory safety standards was, according to the 
National Commission on Product Safety's recommendations and the concepts behind the 
Act's procedures, to be the most important instrument of the new product safety policy26. 
Standards could according to Section 7 (a) (1) and (2) CPSA 1972 refer to performance, 
composition, contents, design and construction, finish or packaging. However, apart from 
informational requirements, the Commission was to confine itself to performance standards 
wherever possible. A procedure was introduced that would give consumer associations a say 
in developing standards: the so-called offeror procedure. This made standard setting open to 
tender, and the Commission had the possibility of financially supporting its development by 
the selected offeror (Section 7 (d) (2))27. 
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These provisions have undergone far-reaching changes. In 1978, the CPSC was given the 
possibility of refraining from the offeror procedure28; in 1981 the procedure was then 
completely abolished29. At the same time Congress fundamentally changed its originally 
critical attitude towards mandatory standards: the Commission was henceforth to aim 
exclusively at performance standards and duties of information, but no longer to prescribe the 
"design" of a product (Section 7 (a)). Still more important: "the Commission shall rely upon 
voluntary consumer product safety standards . . . whenever such voluntary standard would 
eliminate or adequately reduce the risk of injury addressed and it is likely that there will be 
substantial compliance with such voluntary standards" (cf. also Section 9 (b) (2) (B)). 
Additionally, the Commission was mandated to draw up a "final regulatory analysis", setting 
out in detail the costs and benefits of the regulation it had in mind and the alternatives it had 
considered (cf. Section 9 (c) (1) and (4), (f) (2) (A) and (B)). Also in 1981, the CPSC's quasi-
legislatory independence was considerably cut back. By the newly introduced Section 36, 
Congress can now veto a product safety rule desired by the Commission30. 
The amendments to Section 9 CPSA did not affect only the issuing of mandatory standards. 
They also concerned regulations on the banning of products. Such bans could be promulgated 
under Section 8 CPSA 1972, where products presented a disproportionate risk of injury, and 
this hazard could not be eliminated by a standard. Since Section 8 (2) requires a product ban 
to be promulgated "in accordance with Section 9", the possibility of "voluntary" standards 
must now be looked into before a ban is ordered , and above all, an exact cost-benefit 
analysis produced31. 
  
4.1.2.2 Right of petition and public information 
Among the regulatory innovations of the CPSA 1972 was the power for interested persons 
and organisations to call on the Commission to develop or change a product regulation, and 
even in some cases to compel it through the courts to take action (Section 10 CPSA 1972). 
This possibility of influence was abolished in 1981. All that now apply are the general (more 
restrictive) provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act32. The practical significance of 
this revocation seems, however, to be slight in the light of a silent transformation through the 
70's in function of the right of petition33. 
Considerable effects were however produced by corrections to the CPSC's information 
policy, first through the courts and then confirmed in legislation. The relevant provision of 
Section 6 CPSA distinguishes between information concerning business secrets (Section 6 
(a)) and other information on product hazards (Section 6 (b)). The first category of 
information was already according to Section 6 (a) CPSA 1972, to be treated confidentially. 
Other information was, however, pursuant to Section 6 (b) CPSA 1972, to be passed on. In so 
far as this made particular manufacturers identifiable, they had to be given a chance to state 
their position, and the Commission was bound to control the accuracy of information as far as 
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possible, and verify the fairness of any publication. A liberal information policy is in any case 
in line with the general objectives of the CPSA (Section 5 (a) (1)), as with those of the 
Freedom of Information Act 197234, which in principle obliges the American authorities to 
comply with a request for information where not explicitly prevented by specific laws. 
The CPSC thus had to face the difficulty of reconciling these rights to information with the 
restrictions contained in Section 6 (b) CPSA. It used the expedient of differentiating between 
a "passive" and an "active" way of passing on information. Whereas in the former case the 
Commission would merely refer to data it had received, in the latter it would verify this data 
prior to official promulgation. This practice led to some controversy35, and was then 
definitively overthrown by a Supreme Court decision36. In 1981, Section 6 CPSA was 
entirely recast. Since then, a manufacturer can, pursuant to Section 6 (a) (3), designate any 
information concerning him as confidential, and have recourse to the courts against its being 
made public, should the Commission find this designation unjustified (Section 6 (a) (6)). 
Even where business secrets are not involved, the Commission is to inform manufacturers 
before passing on any information, secure their opinion and verify the accuracy of all 
indications (Section 6 (b) (1)); here, too, the manufacturer can, in case of dispute, call for a 
decision by the courts (Section 6 (b) (4)). The Commission's possibilities of action through 
information policy have been severely restricted through these new requirements37. A 1983 
initiative38 by Senator H.A. Waxman to reverse these changes was unsuccessful39. 
  
4.1.3 The regulatory "philosophy" of the CPSA in 1972 and the American deregulation 
movement 
The legislative and statutory history of the CPSA has to be seen in the context of the rise of 
the consumer protection movement in the US during the 1960's, and the subsequent "revolt 
against regulation"40, which became official under the Reagan adminstration. This debate is 
so complex and at the same time so bound up with American traditions and conditions that it 
would be neither possible nor advisable to present it even in outline. However, in order to 
understand and assess the CPSA and its present significance, some indications as to the 
concrete repercussions of those developments on the CPSC's conceptual approach are 
necessary. These were partly encouraged by the general political "climate", partly mediated 
through the influence of individual politicians and partly brought about through the 
legislative interventions described. Yet a description merely explaining the Commission's 
conceptual approaches is admittedly risking crass simplification. By American standards, the 
CPSC is a very small agency, but it is not a monolithic block. Changes to its policies do not 
take place abruptly and uniformly, but in laborious, conflictual processes. With these 
reservations, three stages in the CPSC's history may be distinguished: 
- The initial phase, 1973-8: "[Chairman] Simpson and his staff have attempted to design their 
organisation from the beginning so that its goal is clear and its method of standard setting 
minimises arbitrariness. This is what political scientists have always asked heads of new 
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agencies to do. Now one has. It will be interesting to see what difference it makes". These 
sentences end one of the first reports on the CPSC41. Its generously optimistic verdict was 
founded above all on the endeavour to make product safety policy "scientific", and therefore, 
in particular, upon the efforts of the newly established Commission to arrive, on the basis of 
its data surveys, at rational debate and determination of priorities42. These initial hopes were 
later disappointed43. The Commission did not succeed in developing and effectively applying 
a convincing programme. It took four years before three product regulations could be adopted 
(on swimming pool slides, matchbooks and plate glass)44. Information policy instruments and 
recall possibilities were not fully used. Not only industry but consumer associations as well 
gave vent to severe criticisms45. During the 1977 Congressional Hearings, J.E. Moss, himself 
a major proponent of enactment of the CPSA, confirmed the general misgivings very 
clearly46. 
- The Commission's public image improved following the 1978 appointment of Susan King 
as its new chairman47. The Commission then trimmed down its overambitious standardisation 
programme, opened up an important new field of activity with its "chronic hazards 
program"48 and made a prudent use of its regulatory instruments - mainly by making the 
recall provisions of Section 15 (b) CPSA effective49. 
- Primarily due to its successes during the consolidation phase following 1978, the CPSC 
managed to survive the deregulation wave following President Reagan's assumption of office. 
Moves by the OMB under D. Stockman to take away the Commission's independence and 
integrate it into the Department of Trade were unsuccessful. However, the Commission had 
to accept the cuts to its budget described above as well as the legislative amendments 
between 1981 and 1983 and interventions in personnel policy50. All these corrections were, 
and still are, marked by a clearer orientation of the Commission towards criteria of economic 
efficiency and self-control of its activities through cost-benefit analyses. A memorandum 
drawn up by P.H. Rubin, Associate Executive Director of the Division for Economic 
Analysis51, documents this trend. The memorandum points to budget restrictions on the 
Commission, and recommends cost-benefit analysis as a way of using scarce resources more 
effectively52. But its ambitions go further: all regulatory machinery should be verified on 
cost-benefit-analysis criteria, and the assessment of safety hazards implicit in individual 
consumer decisions should be recognised as the ultimately binding rationality criterion of 
safety policy53. 
  
4.2 The accident information system and the CPSC's policy priorities 
Any product safety policy, whatever regulatory philosophy it may follow, is bound to set 
priorities. This need becomes all the more urgent, the more comprehensive is its scope and 
the greater the room for manoeuvre of the safety policy agency. The collection of data on 
accidents and accident risks is an obvious preparatory step towards a rational priority 
policy54. 
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The CPSC has various simple and more ambitious information sources available. It collects 
newspaper clippings; it accepts consumer complaints through a free telephone service 
("hotline")55; Section 15 (b) CPSA obliges manufacturers and traders to notify the 
Commission of product hazards56; also noteworthy in this connection is information from the 
Commission's "Field Services"; and a co-operation agreement was concluded with the 
Association of American Trial Lawyers, which systematically gathers information on product 
liability actions57. 
However, all these sources are of secondary importance. More significant is the systematic 
evaluation of death certificates, along with reports from the "Poison Control Centers" and 
especially the data from the "National Electronic Injury Surveillance System (NEISS)". 
  
4.2.1 The National Electronic Injury Surveillance System 
A system for collecting accident data (the "Hospital Emergency Room Injury Reporting 
System") had already been developed in 1969 by National Commission on Product Safety 
Executive Director William V. White, and was extended in 1970 by the Food and Drug 
Administration. The Commission was able to draw on this preliminary work when it began 
immediately building up its own accident information system58. 
The characteristic feature of this system is its orientation towards current accident data. These 
data are gathered from selected hospital emergency services; originally numbering 119, they 
were reduced to 74 in 1979 and to 64 after 1984. Especially trained personnel in these 
stations allocate accidents associated with the use of products to 19 general categories and 
some 900 more specific sub-categories, grade their severity (on a scale of originally 8, now 7 
grades), the nature of the injury (by allocating it to one of 250 categories of injury), and the 
age and sex of those involved. These figures are transferred on a daily basis to the CPSC's 
computers. In a Consumer Product Hazard Index, the frequency and severity of hazards 
associated with a product are determined, and additionally evaluated on an Age-Adjusted 
Frequency-Severity Index. 
Today the NEISS still supplies data on some 200,000 accidents per year. However, it allows 
only retrospective conclusions as to the involvement of products in causing accidents and/or 
the co-responsibility of product users. Accordingly, the NEISS data have always been treated 
as only a starting point for in-depth studies. Only these follow-up studies can and should 
determine typical accident patterns and, when appropriate, the dangers arising from a 
particular product59. 
  
4.2.2 Criticisms of the NEISS 
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The suitability of the NEISS as a source of data for determining priorities for action was 
always a controversial issue. Objections concern partly technical factors which can be 
corrected, such as the reliability of the data collection and the differentiation of product 
categories. Other decisions, such as the concentration on accident emergency services60, are 
difficult to alter. It seems even more difficult to respond to objections concerning the 
suitability of the data themselves; e.g., collection of accident figures is alleged to be 
demonstrative of the hazardousness of a product only if it can be related to the intensity of its 
use61; the scaling of the intensity of injury according to a hazard index is said to be 
arbitrary62; the precision of accident evaluation is said to vary according to the type of 
product involved, particularly because of geographical differences in product use, to such an 
extent that no conclusions as to priorities for action can be based on the NEISS data63. 
Some of these objections are unacceptable to the CPSC, for partly conceptual, partly 
pragmatic reasons; others have clearly influenced the development and evaluation of the data 
system. Here it must be remembered that the NEISS was oriented towards the original 
conception of the CPSA, and that later legislative amendments, budget restrictions and 
reorientations of the Commission's safety policy inevitably affected the structure of the 
accident information system. Thus, the decision in favour of an accident coverage system and 
against the time-consuming evaluation of general investigations of accidents was a result of 
the endeavour to secure data on product-related hazards as rapidly as possible; the 
concentration on hospital casualty departments took account (among other things) of the 
recognition that, for instance, doctors in private practice could hardly be induced to draw up 
accident reports64. Original ideas about the Commission's possibilities of opposing recognised 
hazards by producing mandatory standards was certainly too optimistic. But the reasons for 
changes in its orientation were manifold. On the one hand, the Commission felt that priorities 
- notably the "chronic hazards program"65 - had at times to be determined by a conscious 
policy. Furthermore, the Commission, responding to both its own experience and to external 
restrictions, moved towards co-operation with private standardisation organisations in 
working out standards and shifted part of its activities into the area of follow-up market 
control. NEISS, in turn, was forced to adapt to all of these changes. On the other hand, while 
budget restrictions did not exclude refinements to assessment methods, they did de facto rule 
out adoption of proposed cost-intensive improvements66. Thus, in 1985 the CPSC tried out 
survey methods aimed at integrating data on accident causes, in particular on product defects 
or mistakes by product users, into the NEISS67. This study was aimed primarily at saving 
costs on the in-depth investigations. Likewise, the call for the Commission's safety policy to 
be oriented towards economic rationality criteria was taken into account only in connection 
with the evaluation of accident data68. 
  
4.3 Mandatory standards and bans 
The original expectation that hazards arising from consumer products might primarily be 
combated by adopting mandatory product standards is particularly striking to a German 
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observer. In Germany, the legislative restraint on issuing general clauses in safety law and the 
shifting of regulation and monitoring tasks to privately organised institutions had already 
taken place in the 19th century69. The ramification of institutions of "private-governing" is so 
firmly established and their professional competence so undisputed that consumer policy 
initiatives aim only at reorganisation of the co-operative relationships between government 
agencies and non-governmental self-regulatory bodies and at some pluralisation of standard-
setting procedures70. From a German viewpoint, the CPSA appears as an extraordinarily 
ambitious project: the private sector's technological and scientific capability lead was to be 
compensated for by the setting-up of an independent agency, while at the same time the 
standard-setting process was to be opened up pluralistically and all those involved were to be 
offered comprehensive legal protection. 
The regulations embodying the original conception of standard setting concern firstly, the 
involvement of the public in determining action priorities through petitions under Section 10 
CPSA 1972 and tendering for standardisation contracts by the offeror process under Section 7 
(d)-(e) CPSA 1972, and secondly, the verification and development of regulations within the 
Commission pursuant to Section 9 CPSA 1972. 
  
4.3.1 Public participation 
Section 10 (a) CPSA 1972 gave all interested parties, i.e. individual consumers and consumer 
organisations, and firms, the right to call upon the Commission to enact, amend or withdraw a 
product safety regulation. By Section 10 (d), such petitions have to be responded to within 
120 days. Section 10 (e) further provided for enforcement actions in the event of rejection of 
petitions - though this right was to become available only three years after the CPSA's entry 
into force (Section 10 (e)). The draftsmen of the bill hoped that these provisions would both 
cope with the phenomenon of organisational "inertia" and promote the Commission's 
readiness to pay attention to publicly expressed safety interests. 
In the first three years, the number of petitions as well as the Commission's readiness to take 
all motions seriously into account - e.g. regulations on earrings, umbrellas and platform shoes 
- was considerable. The petition process proved to be extremely resource-intensive, yet 
petitioners were usually disappointed71. Under the impact of the petitions and of the declared 
objective of Section 10 CPSA, the Commission was in four cases prepared to opt for the 
setting of standards, although the products concerned would not, according to the NEISS 
data, have deserved this attention72. This led to the Commission's first spectacular failure73. 
Under the second chairman, S.J. Byington, the petition procedure was tightened up in 1977. 
By that time the difficulties of working out mandatory product standards had become 
apparent. The petition process had therefore lost its attractiveness, especially to the consumer 
side. Only business remained active; it used the procedure to secure amendments to and 
exceptions from regulations in force74. The legislative reaction in 1981 was inevitable: 
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Section 10 CPSA was deleted. Since it was now the general provisions of the Administrative 
Procedure Act that applied, abolition of the special right of petition meant only formal 
ratification of a change that had already come about75. 
The same fate was in store for the offeror process pursuant to Section 7 CPSA 1972. 
According to the ideas of the National Commission on Product Safety, incorporated in the 
Senate bill, the danger that the Commission might be captured by business interests in 
working out regulations was to be averted by granting groups (not economically interested 
themselves) the opportunity to develop a product standard. Section 7 (b) (4) CPSA 1972 
complied with these ideas by obliging the Commission to make its intention to adopt a 
product standard public and call upon "any person" to present suitable proposals. Section 7 
(d) (2) further provided for the possibility of supporting such work financially. 
In four cases, the offeror process led to product regulations (swimming-pool slides, 
matchbooks, plate glass materials, motor lawn-mowers). In only one of these cases, namely 
lawn-mowers, was a consumer organisation (the Consumer's Union) active; in two other 
cases (televisions, Christmas-tree lights) in which non-industrial organisations (the 
Underwriters Laboratories and the National Consumers' League respectively) were involved, 
the procedures ended with improved voluntary standards, so that in the Commission's view, 
adoption of a binding rule became superfluous76. 
The offeror process proved extraordinarily time-consuming, costly and frustrating for all 
concerned. Commissioner R.D. Pittle openly admitted all these shortcomings in the 1977 
Congressional hearings77. Nonetheless, he did see ways of making the procedure effective: 
through more precise guidelines from the Commission, improved co-operation with the 
offeror in working out standards, and adequate financial support for the work of non-
commercial organisations. According to the testimony of D.A. Swankin, who headed 
standardisation work on Christmas-tree lights for the National Consumers' League, Pittle's 
ideas were in this case largely realised, with great practical success78. However, no further 
testing of these improvements was carried out. The provisions on the offeror process were 
withdrawn in 198179. 
  
4.3.2 Individual standards and typical regulatory problems 
In the years 1973-1984, the CPSC issued only 22 binding product regulations. These included 
7 based on the CPSA, 3 concerning regulations on informational requirements and some 7 
product bans80. These figures appear rather modest. Whether they in fact reveal the 
Commission's inefficiency and/or the inadequacy of the Act itself could be decided only from 
a comparison with the cost and time incurred by private standardisation organisations, and a 
qualitative comparison of results. Account would further have to be taken of the fact that 
since standards are part of the public (though not purely governmental) system, additional 
potential for conflict arises, which may then be taken up again in judicial review of 
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administratively approved standards. A generalised evaluation of CPSA provisions is made 
still more difficult by the fact that every standard was a response to specific regulatory 
problems, and that patterns of conflict also varied. There would be no point in repeating the 
history of every individual standardisation process, since any attempt to derive general 
evaluations from this would inevitably fail. That notwithstanding, the description below 
should illustrate some problems in setting mandatory standards, on the basis of two well-
known cases81. 
  
4.3.2.1 The pool slide debacle and the CPSC's product safety philosophy 
The legal conditions on which a product rule may be laid down and the criteria it has to meet 
follow from Section 9 (b) and (c) CPSA. In their original version, these provisions referred to 
"unreasonable risk of injury" and "reasonable necessity" for a standard (Section 9 (c) (2) and 
(7) CPSA 1972); before issuing a product rule, the Commission was additionally to consider 
its likely effect on the utility, cost and availability of the products concerned (Section 9 (f) (1) 
(C) CPSA). On the basis of these vague expressions, the Commission first of all sought 
legitimation for its decisions essentially in hazard analyses, rejecting a legal obligation to 
quantify risks and costs82. In Aqua Slide 'N Dive Corp. v. CPSC83, the leeway claimed by the 
Commission was significantly reduced. The Aqua Slide decision concerned the first product 
standard put through by the Commission, following a particularly painful experience. The 
initiatives for regulating swimming-pool slides had been begun by the National Swimming 
Pool Institute (NSPI, an industry group concerned) and the plaintiff itself (by far the biggest 
producer) using the petition proced84. Although according to NEISS survey data, the slides 
were far from being among the riskiest groups of products, the Commission decided to 
embark on a regulatory procedure, in view of the severity of accidents that did occasionally 
occur. It was at the same time revealing what its product safety philosophy was: accidents 
were attributable to clumsy or incautious but foreseeable types of use. In the offeror process, 
the NSPI was mandated to work out a standard. Only after three years was it finally 
promulgated85. In relation to slide design, the Commission, doubting its own competence, 
refrained from mandatory provisions and merely made recommendations. All that was 
bindingly required was a ladder chain and warning notice: "careless slides can cause 
paralysis", "careless slides can cause injury". The Aqua Slide 'N Dive Corp. opposed these 
requirements, fearing marketing disadvantages due especially to the indication of the nature 
of possible, though improbable, injuries86. 
The key legal question in judicial review of the standard was the interpretation of the 
provisions just cited of Section 9 CPSA 1972. The Court accepted that the Commission had 
to assume an "unreasonable risk" even in the case of extremely unlikely but severe injuries; 
but it reproached it for not having shown "reasonable necessity" for the regulation adopted. 
The Commission had not, it said, ascertained the economic effects of its regulation87, nor 
tested the effectiveness of chain and warning88. Judge Wisdom's concurring opinion treated 
the relationship between economic cost and benefit much more decidedly: he agreed with the 
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Commission that the warning signs helped to reduce risks; but these benefits were out of 
proportion relative to the costs they would incur89. In other respects, the effects on 
competition had proved considerable, contributing to a monopoly position which was, 
ironically, now held by the plaintiff itself90. 
The differences in style between the majority opinion and Judge Wisdom's arguments show 
how problematic it is to infer from the Aqua Slide decision that the implementation of the 
CPSA should be guided by economic rationality criteria. In practice, though, the decision did 
have this effect91, contributing to the 1982 amendment to Section 9 CPSA92. 
  
4.3.2.2 Lawn-mowers and the indefiniteness of cost-benefit analyses 
The regulation of "walk-behind power mowers" was also taken up on petition from an 
industry group (Outdoor Power Equipment Institute, OPEI) in 1973. In this case, the initiative 
was aimed at securing official blessing for an already worked out voluntary standard93. The 
Commission, however, took the chance to then bring in a consumer organisation that had 
distinguished itself by its activities in this area (the Consumers' Union, CU). CU finished its 
work in July, 1975. The outcome was controversial: the OPEI criticised all the major 
technical proposals, as well as the cost-benefit analysis added by the CU. 
This essentially explains the duration and intensity of verification of the proposals by the 
CPSC: the standardisation work was practically repeated yet again, with renewed official 
involvement, and not completed until 15 February 197994. In the "findings" justifying the 
regulations95, the effects of the Aqua Slide judgment are clearly recognisable. They contain a 
review of estimated numbers and costs of accidents with lawn-mowers, an analysis of the 
effects of the regulation on product costs and an account of the likely effects on accident 
figures and product costs of the most important safety requirements. This regulation has stood 
up to judicial review, with one marginal exception96. What is remarkable here is that the 
Commission's "safety philosophy", in showing its readiness for "paternalistic" protection of 
the consumer against his own foreseeable mistakes, was explicitly confirmed, while at the 
same time cost-benefit analyses acquired more importance. 
The risks bound up with lawn-mowers are widely known. Accordingly, use leading to injury 
can be treated as misuse, and the existing safety level taken as a "proper" outcome of 
consumer demand97. However, the Court of Appeals, when it was called in, did not accept 
this argumentation: "Congress intended for injuries resulting from foreseeable misuse of a 
product to be counted in assessing risks . . . There is no evidence . . . that (consumers') 
presumed willingness to defeat protective measures is reasonable"98. This safety philosophy 
effects the bases for cost-benefit analysis. If consumer behaviour were declared to be the 
criterion for justifying regulatory intervention, then economic analysis as such would be 
superfluous; the willingness to take risks may then appear "unreasonably" high, only with 
regard to accident insurance and health protection provisions99. But leaving these difficulties 
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aside, and comparing merely the (estimated) increase in product cost with the (estimated) 
effects of the standard on accident figures and the (estimated) savings (though here delaying 
the purchase of a new mower and the concomitant use of old, hazardous machines would be 
particularly hard to estimate100); the fact remains that broad room for discretion in decision 
arises. The CPSC thus saw itself confronted with divergent cost-benefit analyses from the CU 
and the OPEI. It did a study of its own, which was revised once more following criticisms by 
the Standard Research Institute, called in by the OPEI101. The Court of Appeals declared 
itself satisfied with these efforts102. Since according to CPSC estimates, the cost-benefit 
analysis came out in favour of adopting the regulation, its legal significance ultimately 
remained undetermined; and the question remained unanswered as to whether measures were 
no longer "reasonably necessary" when their effects on product costs exceeded savings on 
treating accident victims. Admittedly, the CPSC success before the courts was wiped out on 
one important point through a legislative amendment to the regulation by Congress103. 
  
4.3.3 Product bans 
According to Section 8 CPSA 1972, products giving rise to an "unreasonable risk of injury" 
could be "banned" unless some product standard promised appropriate protection. The 
banning procedure came under the provisions of Section 9 CPSA 1972 applying to standard 
setting, but not those of Sections 7, 10 CPSA 1972 on petitioning and the offeror process. 
The possibility of putting through regulations on its own account does much to explain the 
Commission's inclination, once the standard-setting procedure had proved unexpectedly 
complex and conflictual, to opt for the banning procedure. In fact, in at least two cases where 
issuing or tightening up a standard might have been conceivable, the Commission decided on 
product bans104. 
The most important field of application of Section 8 CPSA, however, became the hazards 
analysed under the "chronic hazards" program, from health-threatening, especially 
carcinogenic, chemicals, a case where recourse to Section 8 CPSA 1972 immediately lends 
itself105. The expectation that product bans might become an important regulatory instrument 
has however since been disappointed, an outcome foreshadowed by both the formaldehyde 
controversy and the 1981 legislative amendments. 
The formaldehyde controversy began in 1976 with initial reports on health complaints from 
people living in houses treated with urea formaldehyde (UF) foam insulation for energy 
conservation. A true consumer movement developed against UF dangers, further stimulated 
by medical studies on the possible carcinogenicity of the product106. The CPSC initiated 
wide-ranging additional scientific studies, and initially suggested a regulation to oblige 
manufacturers to provide information on general (not carcinogenic) hazards107. It was not 
until 1981 that the Commission threatened to ban urea formaldehyde108. The proposal for a 
regulation, which takes up 23 closely printed pages, first describes the state of the medical 
studies and goes on to discuss the economic consequences of a ban. The avoidance of 23 
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cancer deaths yearly and other major health risks was said to be in line with the requirements 
emerging from the Aqua Slide and Southland Mower decisions, and to be in "reasonable 
proportion" with the economic drawbacks of a ban109. On 2 April 1982 the definitive ban was 
issued110. It was praised for its scientific justifications, once again spelled out, while the 
Commission's economic analysis was found to be heavily flawed111. 
The Court of Appeals, called in by a number of manufacturers concerned112, did not go into 
calculations of the economic benefit of preventing cancer deaths against the cost of banning 
urea formaldehyde. The Court was able to avoid taking a position on this regulatory aspect 
because it already regarded "unreasonable risk of injury" as not proven. Measurements of UF 
burdens had not been effected by random sampling, and where this had been the case, they 
were often due to installation errors and therefore controllable by a standard. The 
experimental scientific basis for the assumption of carcinogenic effects was on the whole too 
narrow, and could not justify the Commission's risk estimates. The Commission's 1983 
Annual Report113 has a brief note on the outcome of the trial, which is very illuminating for 
its present position: "the Commission voted 3-2 to seek an appeal in the Supreme Court, but 
the US Solicitor General decided not to ask the Supreme Court to take the case". But it is not 
only the outcome of the formaldehyde controversy and the resulting requirements to 
demonstrate product risks that lessened the attractiveness of product bans become 
unattractive. Legal amendments in connection with the 1981 re-authorisation worked in the 
same direction: product bans could henceforth be issued only under the conditions introduced 
in Section 9 CPSA for the setting of mandatory standards. 
  
4.4 Updating of "voluntary" standards 
The explicitly critical attitude towards "voluntary" standards that characterised the NCPS 
Report ("chronically inadequate, both in scope and permissible levels of risk")114 and was to 
have determined the regulatory approach in the CPSA 1972, had already changed by the mid-
70's; it was finally reversed with the legislative amendments of 1981115. To understand this 
development and the CPSC's present support for voluntary standard setting, a few indications 
as to the structures of private standard setting in the US might be of assistance. 
  
4.4.1 Standardisation organisations and procedures116 
There are no less than 580 groups in the US concerned with developing standards, but the 
number of organisations of national importance is very small. For some influential agencies, 
standardisation activities are part of a general representation of professional or economic 
interests. This is true of the engineering societies ("American Society of Civil Engineers"; 
"American Society of Mechanical Engineers"; "Institute of Electrical Electronics Engineers"; 
"Society of Automotive Engineers"); they are "non-profit" organisations with individual 
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memberships, though their standardisation activities are supported and influenced by 
contributions from industry. By contrast, the trade associations represent manufacturers in 
individual industries. Both the engineering societies and the trade associations not only 
develop standards themselves but additionally participate in the activities of the most 
important standardisation organisations: the American Society for Testing and Materials 
(ASTM) and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). In view of its particular 
reputation, special mention should be made of Underwriters Laboratories (UL), an institution 
promoted by American insurers, dealing with, among other things, electrical hazards, fire 
protection and the development of test procedures. The activities of all these organisations are 
coordinated - which often means stimulated - by the American National Standards Institute 
(ANSI), which also represents the US in international contexts. 
The standardisation organisations reacted to public criticism of the quality of voluntary 
standards in the 1970's by reviewing their procedural arrangements. Thus, standards brought 
before the ANSI must go through a procedure before being recognised as an "American 
National Standard". The ANSI must ascertain whether all those primarily involved have had 
a chance to express views and raise objections on whether the standard is "unfair" or ignores 
"the public interest"; additionally, all standardisation proposals are published and, where of 
direct relevance to consumers, passed on to a "Standards Screening and Revision Committee 
of the Consumer Council"117. The ANSI's procedural rules are more specific, and stricter, 
when it comes to organisation of standardisation procedures. For safety standards, inclusion 
of workers, authorities, insurers, consumers, and other groups is supposed to guarantee a 
balanced representation of interests, ("A consensus does not necessarily mean unanimous 
acceptance. Votes are weighted rather than counted"118), and guarantee that standards will 
actually be applied. All large standardisation organisations have similar procedural 
guarantees. This is the case in particular for the ASTM, which develops detailed "due 
process" requirements, and has, like the NFPA and the UL, set up "consumer sounding 
boards"119. 
  
4.4.2 The CPSC attitude 
Running parallel to these reorganisation efforts of private standardisation associations, 
attitudes changed towards "self-regulatory" measures in general120, as did the CPSC's position 
on voluntary standards in particular. In 1975, the CPSC was already developing forms of co-
operation with private standardisation organisations121 and regulating "employee membership 
and participation in voluntary standards organisations"122. In the statement concerning the 
1978 Regulation on "Commission involvement in voluntary standard activities", the 
Commission explicitly dissociated itself from the National Commission on Product Safety's 
critical observations on voluntary standards123; at the 1981 Congressional hearings this 
attitude was confirmed by then Commission Chairman Stuart Statler, who pointed out that in 
83 cases, the Commission had already collaborated on developing or revising voluntary 
standards124. The Underwriters Laboratory additionally stressed that the passing on of 
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accident figures by the Commission had already often led to private standardisation 
activities125. 
The 1978 Regulation just mentioned distinguishes between two forms of official 
involvement. "Monitoring" of the development of voluntary product standards involves 
observing the process and influencing it through directed questions, and providing accident 
figures and the results of in-depth studies. In the case of "participation", a Commission 
worker takes part in sessions of the private Standardisation Committee, and technical 
assistance is sometimes provided. The first form of involvement requires approval from only 
the Commission Executive Director; the second requires approval from the Commissioners 
themselves126. The object of both forms, and the type of support that the Commission can 
provide127, is fully in line with the CSPA's general safety policy objectives. Support is 
accordingly also bound up with particular conditions on the standardisation procedure: it 
should be open to all interested parties and guarantee genuine involvement of consumers 
and/or small businesses; it must provide for revisions of standards; actual compliance is 
important; certification provisions should be worked out and standards themselves confined 
to "performance" regulations128. The Commission always keeps its option to issue a 
mandatory product regulation open, whether to make a voluntary standard generally 
mandatory or because a voluntary standard is inadequate from a safety policy viewpoint129. 
The 1981 legislative amendments did not formally cancel this policy statement, but they did 
reduce its practical significance, for many reasons. By the new version of Section 9 (b) 
CPSA, the Commission must always give preference to voluntary standards where they 
eliminate or "adequately reduce" the hazards concerned and "substantial" compliance is to be 
expected. This already guarantees that the Commission will await efforts toward voluntary 
solutions and cannot without further action ignore their outcome. Additionally, the new 
version of Section 9 (c) and (f) CPSA links announcement, and above all enactment, of 
binding rules with additional requirements. The Commission has not only to show that a 
product hazard will not be adequately reduced or that observance of a standard would be 
inadequate; it has further to provide a detailed "regulatory analysis" that must contain cost-
benefit analyses of its regulatory proposal and of all alternatives contemplated. The 
Commission initially responded in 1984 to this change in conditions for co-operation with 
standardisation organisations, through a proposal to supplement the 1978 regulations on 
involvement in developing voluntary standards; it suggested a new procedure that would 
require special recognition of voluntary standards already being applied130. The declared aim 
of this proposal was to encourage application of safety standards and improve consumer 
orientation towards safety aspects of consumer products. But response to the proposal was 
discordant, and mainly negative. Industry feared distortions of competition and restrictions on 
innovation; standardisation organisations recalled the Commission's limited resources for 
implementing recognition procedures; the Consumer Federation of America protested against 
the Commission being converted into a sales promotion agency. The Commission decided to 
withdraw its proposal131. But this did not end efforts to further develop standardisation 
policy. A memorandum of 22 April 1985132 incorporating suggestions from Commission 
departments and from public hearings describes and discusses a series of options ranging 
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from voting rights in setting voluntary standards via systematic announcements of regulatory 
procedures pursuant to Section 9 CPSA, up to the conclusion of co-operation agreements 
with standardisation organisations. The Commission decided to consider only three of these 
possibilities: to intensify its involvement in standardisation work on products particularly 
important in its view; to make direct contact with individual manufacturers before producing 
or amending standards; to refer to standards in its public information133. The practical 
importance of all these activities is hard for the outsider to estimate. However, thanks to its 
accident information system and its own technical competence, the Commission should 
continue to have considerable possibilities of influencing the production and promotion of 
standards of relevance to safety134. 
  
4.4.3 Standards and product liability 
The intensification of "voluntary" standardisation in the US cannot be explained solely on the 
basis of the CPSC's original powers and its current encouragement of voluntary standards, 
but is to be attributed essentially to the influence of American liability law. American case 
law punishes neglect of a mandatory standard, but also non-compliance with a safety level 
laid down in a voluntary standard, as in principle "negligence per se"135. This sanction 
manifestly explains industry's willingness to follow voluntary standards136; it likewise 
explains the interest in having standards recognised by ANSI and making the standardisation 
procedure itself "fair"137. 
On the other hand, compliance with a standard in no way rules out product liability. Section 
25 CPSA explicitly confirms this principle for mandatory standards: "Compliance with 
consumer product safety rules . . . shall not relieve any person from liability at common law 
. . ." However clear this position, court practice nevertheless responds in different ways when 
manufacturers appeal to their compliance with voluntary or with mandatory standards in 
product liability actions. Standards may, for instance, be adduced to establish the "state of the 
art" in product safety, or to support or confute expert testimony138. All these forms of 
observance of standards, however, depart from the principle that the courts autonomously 
determine the level of product safety intact; this principle is not questioned either by efforts at 
legislative channelling of product liability law139. 
  
4.5 Recalls 
The recall provisions in the CPSA initially stood in the shadow of preventive standard 
setting, but soon developed into an important instrument for the CPSC, taking on additional 
importance after the 1981 restrictions. In the context of European product safety policy, the 
American example deserves particular attention not only because the new approach to 
technical harmonisation and standards delegates preventive product safety policy very largely 
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to private standardisation organisations, but also because the need for European framework 
legislation on follow-up market control seems irrefutable140. 
  
4.5.1 The CPSA legislative framework 
Two provisions in the CPSA deal with response to hazards arising from already marketed 
products. By Section 12, the Commission may order seizure and/or public warnings, recalls, 
repairs, exchange or replacement of "imminently hazardous consumer products". However, 
the significance of this provision remained marginal141. The Commission has developed its 
follow-up market policy entirely on the basis of Section 15. This preference is not surprising: 
the criteria for intervention in Section 15 are broadly formulated, the potential for sanctions is 
rich in alternatives and can be treated flexibly. 
Section 15 (a) CPSA provides sanctions against all "substantial product hazards" arising 
either from failure to comply with a binding rule or from product defect. Every manufacturer, 
distributor and retailer must by Section 15 (b) immediately inform the Commission if they 
obtain information that reasonably supports the conclusion that such hazard is present. On the 
basis of such reports and/or other sources of information (NEISS accident figures, consumer 
complaints, in-depth studies etc.), a hearing is held to which all interested circles, including 
consumers, are invited (see Section 15 (c) and (d)). 
Should the Commission determine after such consultation that a "substantial product hazard" 
is proven, two measures are possible: 
- "Notification" under Section 15 (c), whereby a manufacturer, distributor or retailer may be 
ordered to inform the general public, notify all manufacturers, distributors or retailers, or mail 
notice to every person who has purchased or received the product; 
- The further-reaching possibilities of Section 15 (d), where it seems necessary in the public 
interest to repair a product, make it fit applicable standards, exchange it or replace it. 
Additionally, a "corrective action plan", showing how the order is to be implemented, may be 
required. 
  
4.5.2 Application of Section 15 CPSA 
The administration of this legal framework has been interpreted and refined by the 
Commission in its rules on "substantial product hazard reports"142 and in a number of internal 
(though publicly accessible) documents. Some elements of this policy have already been 
emphasised: (1) the general clause of Section 15 (a) (2) on defects that lead to "substantial 
product hazards" has been clarified by the Commission using exhaustive circumlocutions ("a 
defect is a fault, flaw, or irregularity that causes weakness, failure, or inadequacy in form or 
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function"), differentiations (design, manufacture, instructions), examples ("a knife does not 
contain a defect insofar as the sharpness of its blade is concerned") and assessment criteria 
(". . . the Commission and staff will consider: the utility of the product involved; the nature of 
the risk of injury which the product presents; the population exposed to the product and its 
risk of injury; the Commission's own experience and expertise; the case law interpreting 
Federal and State public health and safety statutes; the case law in the area of product 
liability; and other factors . . .")143. 
(2) The obligation laid down in Section 15 (b) on manufacturers, distributors and retailers to 
report product hazards is regarded by the Commission as an indispensable precondition for its 
recall policy. It exhaustively commented on this obligation in 1978, defending it against 
criticism from firms involved144. The objections are quite understandable. Fears exist with 
regard to the negative effects of such reports on product liability suits, and also with regard to 
deterioration of image and hence of competitive position. The rule dating from 1978 sought 
to allay these doubts by explicitly treating the report itself as not constituting admission of a 
product defect145. In 1981 the legislator came to meet the interests of firms involved by 
making the new version of Section 6 (b) (5) CPSA provide that in principle information 
secured under Section 15 (b) be no longer published146. This legislative amendment, and 
probably also the Commission's budget difficulties147, led in 1980-2 to a notable decline in 
the number of reports received. But the Commission's position was not lastingly affected. In 
1984 it once more gave detailed justifications for the importance of the reporting duty148, and 
managed to reverse the trend of the years 1980-2 again149. 
This strictness cannot be explained by the information function of the reports alone. 
Procedures under Section 15 CPSA were inevitably always largely based on other 
informational sources150. Assuredly, closer observance of the reporting duty would facilitate 
the identification of hazards. But the importance of the reporting duty also seems to lie in its 
compensating for the indefiniteness of the general clause in Section 15 (a) (2). The 
Commission's interprative leeway seems to strengthen its position vis-à-vis firms involved 
when negotiating a recall plan. 
(3) As with all product safety policy instruments, priority setting is essential in follow-up 
market control. An instructive 1981 document151 differentiates three types of injury and 
likelihood; it relates the severity of injury to the likelihood of occurrence, and thereby sets up 
three types of urgency to which cases arising can be allocated. These classifications show that 
the Commission sees follow-up market control as implementation of the statute, and orients 
use of its resources towards the objective of preventing hazards; consistent orientation of its 
policy towards cost-benefit-analysis criteria152 would lead to another scale of priorities. 
(4) The great flexibility that Section 15 (c) and (d) allow the Commission in its response to 
product hazards is exploited both in notification and in recalls and the drawing up of a 
"corrective action plan". The intensity of response, its specific shape and its monitoring 
correspond to the type of product and the urgency of the hazard153. A noteworthy point is the 
high rate of mutual agreement in the resolution of recalls154. This can be explained by 
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industry's interest in avoiding adverse publicity and product liability actions, and the 
Commission's interest in rapidly eliminating product hazards ("safety delayed is safety 
denied"). Willingness to compromise manifestly did not suffer from the 1981 legislative 
amendments. 
  
4.5.3 The function of follow-up market control 
The history of implementation of follow-up market control under Section 15 (b) CPSA is one 
of success. The figures are indeed impressive. Former Commission Chairman S. King reports 
that between 1973 and 1980 some 2,500 recall actions were carried out, concerning some 100 
million products155. At the 1983 Congressional hearings, Chairman N.H. Steorts was able to 
point to 3,174 actions on 293 million products156. Commissioner Stuart M. Statler in 1980 
called the provisions of Section 15 CPSA one of the Commission's most effective 
instruments, that could be used even to solve general product safety problems157 - e.g. for an 
industry-wide recall because of a universally occurring design defect158. But there are limits 
to this kind of remodelling of Section 15 CPSA. The primary safety objective of recalls, 
namely to eliminate hazards arising from already marketed products, can never be fully 
achieved. The CPSC's implementation studies show this very clearly. Though the success or 
failure of a recall action cannot simply be read off from the percentage of returned 
products159, it is nevertheless indisputable that the effectiveness of such actions calls for hard 
strategic decisions. The type of consumer information must depend on whether manufacturers 
or retailers have customer lists available; where necessary, suitable public media must be 
used. The intensity of information must take account of the hazards of the product concerned, 
but also of the attitudes, inhibitions and efforts of the final consumer. For all the doubts about 
the feasibility of recalls arising from these problems, it should nevertheless be borne in mind 
that recall actions can be used both to raise standards and to improve safety controls within 
firms. These feedback effects are also to be taken into account in assessing the "success" of 
recall arrangements. 
  
4.6 Evaluation of the CPSC 
Assessments of the CPSC's performance are as controversial as product safety policy itself. 
The analyses presented by consumer organisations arrive at positive results. According to 
calculations by A.K. Lower/A. Averyt/D. Greenberg160, the falling trend in home and leisure 
accidents has been speeded up (twofold) by the Commission's activities; in the years from 
1978 to 1983 alone, the CPSC is said to have prevented 1.25 million serious injuries and 
deaths, and saved some 3.5 billion dollars in consumer costs. W.K. Viscusi161 arrives at a 
contradictory finding: the falling accident figures merely continued (even though more 
strongly), a trend that has not been significantly influenced by the CPSC. It is hardly 
surprising that there are also studies with findings fluctuating between the two results cited162. 
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Problems with evaluations like these arise because they have to identify and quantify factors, 
which explain the trend in accident figures and how they are influenced by the CPSC's 
activities. All the studies mentioned use simplifying, if not speculative, assumptions for this. 
More illuminating, though controversial as well, are analyses of individual measures and of 
their aggregated impact. The Commission itself undertakes analyses, which estimate effects 
after a measure has been fully implemented. Thus, for instance, the rule on children's cots is 
supposed to have prevented 50 deaths per year, the ban on TRIS in children's nightclothes to 
have averted 500 possible cancer cases, and the lawn-mower regulation to have reduced 
annual injuries by 60,000163. For the CPSC's co-operation with standardisation organisations 
and for recall actions164, there are similarly impressive figures165. Critics of the Commission 
have questioned these success claims in individual studies. The careful analysis of the 
Mattress Flammability Standard 1973166 by P. Linneman167 finds that a reliable 
pronouncement on the standard's effects is impossible. He points out, however, that the 
Commission's regulation standard had simply adopted a voluntary standard, which had 
already been adhered to by industry to 80% Moreover, the Commission seems to have been 
prevented from adopting a stricter solution to the problem (namely promulgation of a 
standard on self-extinguishing cigarettes)168. W.K. Viscusi has checked all mandatory 
standards, in detail and overall, for their effects. His analysis of the 1973 Poison Preventive 
Packaging Regulation169 concentrates on figures for child poisoning by aspirin. He disputes 
the success claimed by the Commission for compulsory child-proof containers; the poisoning 
rate, he says, fell generally, and the relatively better figures for the product covered by the 
regulation should be measured against possible counterproductive side effects of the 
regulation in other areas (such as "lulling" effects in non-regulated areas170). The phenomena 
mentioned by Viscusi certainly exist; however, it seems speculative to use them as evidence 
in an argument like his. The Commission's positive findings are, at any rate, supported by 
studies of the American Academy of Pediatrics171. In the case of the standard for children's 
cots172, even Viscusi concedes an improvement in accident figures by 10%173; a 
demonstration that this improvement can be attributed to some general trend can hardly be 
provided. 
These conflicting analyses cannot and will not be definitively assessed here. The 
controversies, at any rate, show how ambitiously research on effects must be designed if it is 
not only to determine involvement of the regulated products in accidents, but also clarify 
other possible influencing factors taking side effects of regulation into account. The CPSC 
can at any rate claim that its many critics have so far failed to undertake analyses which 
would conclusively question the benefits of standard-setting. And there can hardly be any 
doubt that the Commission's recall activities serve an extremely useful function - although 
they merit further evalution and improvement. 
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The "traditional" harmonisation policy approaches to removing technical barriers to trade and 
efforts at a "horizontal" European product safety policy 
The process of European integration affects the laws of product safety in many ways. Every 
law approximation policy measure, whereby the Community harmonises its legal and 
administrative provisions in the interest of the "functioning of the Common Market" (Art. 
100 EEC, 1st paragraph), that also relates to the conditions for marketing products, 
necessarily contains substantive provisions that may in Member States act to promote or else 
to place restraints on product safety policy. These restraints may be preempted decisions at 
the choice of regulatory instruments and substantive definitions of the safety level to be 
aimed at. As well as law approximation policy, primary Community law restricts the Member 
States' field of action. While ECJ case law on Arts. 30 and 36 EEC has confirmed Member 
States' responsibility for product safety, it also subjects this responsibility to checks against 
principles of Community law. Finally, the Community has, following adoption of its 
Consumer Policy Programmes, developed approaches towards a "horizontal" European 
product safety policy of its own. 
It nevertheless remains difficult to specify the nature of the Community's influence on 
product safety law more exactly, to recognise the consequences of the integration process for 
law in Member States and to find answers to the questions of what product safety policy tasks 
the Community should be responsible for and which instruments it ought to employ in so 
doing. Jurists are accustomed to approaching such questions by seeking to clarify and 
demarcate the competencies of the Community and Member States. However apparent and 
inevitable this delineation of competencies may be, it rapidly emerges that the legal 
framework set by the EEC Treaty leaves the Community with enormous latitude, and can 
hardly define the priorities of Community policy (1.1 infra). Since Community law 
determines the process of Europeanisation of product safety policy only to a very limited 
extent, it is tempting to fall back on economic and politicalscience theories in explaining the 
actual course of this process. But attempts to date to reconstruct the process of European 
integration using economic models or political structural analyses have scarcely gone beyond 
the development of relatively abstract hypotheses on the effects of the general European 
policy framework conditions (1.2 infra). In view of this ambiguity not only in the law but also 
in sociological integration research, it is presumably justified in analysing Community 
practice to begin with long-term political programmes that the Community has taken as a 
guide in influencing product safety law: the 1969 General Programme on removing technical 
barriers to trade, and the programmes to protect and inform consumers (2 and 3 infra). It is 
the fate of political programmes, and not only where the Community is concerned, to never 
fully realise their original objectives. But the Community's responses to discrepancies 
between its original programmatic conceptions and the actual course of the integration 
process will be further analyzed in Chapters III and IV. 
  
1. Framework conditions for the Europeanisation of product safety policy 
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The Community's competencies are by no means comprehensive. Its legislative acts in 
principle operate indirectly in Member States. The Community has genuine administrative 
powers in only a few policy areas. All this influences both the orientation and the 
implementation of Community policy. All the same, these general framework conditions do 
not constitute insuperable legal barriers to the Community's possibilities of influencing 
product safety law. 
  
1.1 The openness of the legal framework 
A first indirect possibility for the Community to intervene in Member States' product safety 
law is offered by Art. 30 EEC. Alhough the ban on discriminatory import restrictions and all 
measures having an equivalent effect is by Art. 36 EEC for measures which, among other 
things, serve "the protection of health and life of humans", this has not prevented the ECJ 
from subjecting non-discriminatory marketing regulations to substantive verification1. Hopes 
or fears that the ECJ would use this supervisory possibility in order to "deregulate" product 
safety law in Member States have however not been realised2. 
Accordingly, the provisions of Arts. 100 et seq. EEC on approximation of laws remain the 
most important basis for Community policy. Art. 101 EEC even provides the possibility of 
adopting directives by qualified majority where legal differences are "distorting the 
conditions of competition in the Common Market". Significantly, the Community has 
refrained from attempting to clarify the conditions for applying this provision, which are 
controversial in the literature3, thereby circumventing the difficulties of reaching consensus 
on law approximation measures under Art. 100 EEC. This cautiousness is hardly surprising. 
It is one of the indications that the limits to Community action in fact cannot be determined 
purely "legally"4. 
The Community's powers to take measures to approximate laws on product safety under Art. 
100 EEC cannot de facto be limited by binding the Commission to particular integration 
policy objectives. There have of course been repeated attempts to derive the limits to 
Community competence specifically in areas of "social regulation" (chiefly health, consumer 
protection and the environment) from the requirement in Art. 100 EEC, stating that law 
approximation measures should have to do with the market5. But it cannot be denied that 
differences in product safety law constitute non-tariff barriers to trade and therefore "directly 
affect the establishment or functioning of the Common Market". This realisation leads 
directly to the position that in order to avert emergent regulatory differences the Community 
can exert a shaping influence "even in anticipation of the development of new legal areas"6. If 
as is the prevailing view today, the law-making competencies of Art. 100 EEC are taken in 
connection with the preamble and Art. 2 EEC7, and further bearing in mind that in drafting 
directives the Community can lay claim to very wide discretion8, then it is hard to identify 
any definitive legal bounds to product safety policy harmonisation at all. Moreover, in 
addition to the instrument of the directive, the Community has by Art. 235 EEC a second and 
likewise very far-reaching power to act. This provision may, as the ECJ has confirmed9, be 
taken advantage of where directives do not offer an "adequately effective means" to attain 
treaty objectives. 
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The demonstration that no clear limits to the Europeanisation of product safety law can be 
derived from the new Art. 100 a, Arts. 100 and 235 EEC does not explicitly respond to the 
questions of "dynamic" interpretation of these provisions. It may be very hard to derive clear 
criteria for the delimitation and control of European law-making activity from differences 
between the Community legal system and Member States' constitutions. But one indirect 
consequence, which is hard to grasp in formal legal terms, is definitely irrefutable: entry by 
the Community into areas of social regulation will lead to a conflict of 
objectives between a law approximation policy oriented merely towards market integration as 
such and a legislative policy oriented towards the substantive quality of regulations10. 
The Community's powers under Arts. 100, 100 a and 235 EEC compensate for the absence of 
genuine powers of direct action and administration by the Community. The most obvious 
way to reach uniform administrative practice is to harmonise the conditions for recognising 
national administrative acts11. The objective connection between approximation of laws and 
harmonisation of administrative practice is undeniable, particularly in the area of product 
safety law. Admittedly, such co-ordination is enormously complicated in practice, especially 
since, as M. Seidel rightly stresses12, it affects the political "quality" of the integration 
process: it means an "approfondissement" of the integration process, legal reservations 
against which are not justified, but can at the same time be perceived by Member States as a 
threat to their sovereignty, and by national administrations as a restriction on their powers. 
  
1.2 Excursus into integration theory 
In practice, the potentially enormously broad legal framework for Community policy in 
product safety law could be used only extremely selectively and incompletely. The 
discrepancy between what is legally possible and what is politically feasible is a central 
theme of sociological integration research, which not only explains the difficulties of the 
integration process but looks to guide the choice of integration policy strategies. Recently in 
this area, the American economic theory of federalism has been taken up, and efforts at a 
political interpretation of the Community's legal order have been renewed. 
  
1.2.1 The economic theory of federalism and conflicting economic interests in connection 
with the Europeanisation of product safety law 
The economic theory of federalism seeks, in its normative part, to answer the question of 
what regulatory tasks can more rationally be handled ("economically") at a central level, and 
which better at a decentralised level. "Positive" federalism theory then tries to identify the 
factors that actually determine the actions of those involved in politics, and bases 
recommendations for political strategies on this positive analysis13. Normative arguments for 
centralisation (federalisation) of regulatory activities apply where the costs and advantages of 
a measure cannot be confined to a particular jurisdiction ("externalities"), where regulatory 
differences can be strategically exploited by economic actors, starting off a regulatory "race 
to the bottom" ("prisoner's dilemma"), where duplication of administrative tasks (e.g. in the 
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area of research) causes superfluous costs ("diseconomies of scale"), where the scale 
advantages of uniform regulation outweigh the chances of innovative product design and 
where federalisation weakens the influence of interest groups14. While such normative 
considerations can, cum grano salis, be transferred to the European situation notwithstanding 
the institutional differences between the Community and the US, this is much less true of the 
positive analysis. The current federalism debate presupposes an already economically 
integrated market, a parliamentary democratic constitution for the "central government" and 
the existence of a federal administration with a wide range of tasks and powers. It is on this 
institutional framework that the assumptions about interests and about the behaviour of 
industry, unions, consumers, and State and federal political actors are based, which in turn 
underlie hypotheses about the chances for a federal take-over of regulatory tasks from 
individual States or about the - at present more topical15 - efforts at decentralisation. The 
Community situation differs from that of the US in several respects. This is primarily true as 
regards the process of political opinion-forming and decision-making. Political actors, who 
are according to the assumptions of economic theory oriented either to the expectations of a 
particular clientele ("constituency politics"), or to more general regulatory attitudes and 
programmes ("electoral politics") lose part of their possibilities of self-presentation and 
influence, which are guaranteed only nationally, if they involve themselves in dealing with 
regulatory task at the European level16. European business maintains different interests and 
possibilites of influence . It has a degree of integration comparable with the US in only a few 
areas and therefore finds it enormously hard to develop a consistent position on 
uniformisation of product safety requirements. The two aspects mentioned are also connected 
with the different underlying assumptions of American federalism and of European 
integration. Explanations for the emergence of American federalism largely relate to 
situations concerning the introduction of new regulations or their generalisation, whereas the 
Community as a rule finds itself facing firmly established regulations that tend to differ in 
nature and intensity17. 
The differences between the American and European situations mentioned make it hard to 
transfer "positive" theorems of federalism theory. They do not, however, a priori preclude 
their adaptation to the specific conditions of European integration. For the area of 
environmental policy, which is related to the issue of Europeanising product safety law, E. 
Rehbinder and R. Stewart18 have tried just that. In their modelling of the integration process, 
they conceive the Nation States as the sole political actors. For the integration policy 
behaviour of the States they assume on the one hand identification with the interests of the 
domestic economy, and on the other a loyalty towards protective standards valid in their own 
legal system. This hypothesis states that faced with a Europeanisation of legal standards the 
States will weigh up its advantages and drawbacks for the competitive position of their own 
industries, but that they cannot simply offer domestic comprises between economic and 
social interests. For so-called product regulation19, the interest position for "protection States" 
and "risk States"20 appears as such: as long as the protection States can exclude imports from 
risk States using Art. 36 EEC, the chances for harmonisation are good. The protection States 
will support it if the production costs caused by their domestic standards are higher, if setting 
up different production lines would not be economically sound and if foreign market 
opportunities are foreseen; the risk States will agree to the tightening up of standards where 
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they expect advantages from access to markets in the protection States; finally, for pure 
"import States" the decision depends only on their own political calculations of the costs and 
benefits of a raised level of protection. Admittedly, the initial position changes where and to 
the extent that the restrictions of Art. 36 EEC have been lifted in favour of the principle of 
free market access in the protection State and/or products from the risk State merely need to 
be specifically marked. On such conditions, a risk State has in principle no longer any reason 
to agree to the tightening up of product regulations. 
E. Rehbinder and R. Stewart themselves stress the limits to the explanatory capacity of their 
model21. These limits arise from the complexity of the economic interest situation, and are as 
a rule, not even homogeneous within the economy of a single Member State. The effects of 
harmonisation measure on firms involved in each case depend on the internationalisation of 
the economy, the size of the domestic market, their own competitive position, the costs 
involved in changing their output and expectations of the economic prospects - and it may, as 
the car industry shows, even pay to exploit different product standards in order to seal off 
regional sub-markets, and set up a sectorially differentiated price policy22. But not only the 
complexity of economic interests but also the "intrinsic logic" of political opinion-forming 
processes makes it hard to develop general hypotheses. In their negotiations at a European 
level, States need not concentrate on a particular product regulation, but can try to purchase 
gains in one sector through concessions in another. Political objectives within a government 
are just as unhomogeneous as business interests. The conduct of negotiations often depends 
on what department is responsible, how "high" the political value of the subject involved is 
rated and what influences the negotiators are exposed to. Awareness that a new regulation 
can, in any case, not be strictly monitored may facilitate acceptance. And last but not least, in 
agreements on product regulations, the object is often a uniformisation of regulatory methods, 
and therefore wishes for change have to deal with administrative inertia even apart from their 
political and ideological content. 
Up to now, integration of these viewpoints referred into a more differentiated economic 
model23. But this finding is not a merely negative statement. Bearing in mind the economic 
interest situation and political opinion forming processes in the Community it means that 
uniform behaviour patterns cannot be expected and the chances of carrying through broadly 
based integration strategies are slight. As regards the economic and political starting 
conditions, adapted fragmentary advance and pragmatism in negotiation, are to be expected. 
The difficult conditions of integration policy encourage an incrementalism which has a 
tendency to obstruct the development of a coherent European safety law24. 
  
1.2.2 Legal structures and political decision-making processes 
Political research into integration has an ambitious past to consider. Looking back it is 
evident that the expectation of functionalism (and of neo-functionalism, too), i.e. that the 
political integration process would involve objective, functional interdependences and 
gradually extend to increasingly wider sectors, underestimated the contingencies of political 
developments25. The centre of interest in political research on Europe therefore shifted to the 
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Community's decision-making structures26 and analyses of individual policy areas27. A 
repeatedly confirmed finding of political analysis is, as Joseph 
Weiler has shown28, in striking contrast with the developments of the Community's legal 
structure: whereas in political decision-making processes a replacement of supranational 
elements by intergovernmental bargaining processes is inevitable, the supranational legal 
structures have developed into a European constitution which finds its expression specifically 
in the doctrines of direct effect, primacy and prior effect of European directives. The 
originality of Weiler's analysis is that he sees the presumed contradictions between the 
patterns of political decision-making and the legal structures as two characteristics of the 
European integration process that mutually determine each other. The discrepancies between 
the political and legal structures have not acted centrifugally, but rather as a balancing force 
that maintains the Community29. 
Weiler's theses are of equal importance for an understanding of the Community's legal 
structure and for advancing its policy programmes. They state that in order to stabilise and 
extend supranational legal structures, involvement of national political actors in the 
Community's political decision-making process is always necessary : the Community's 
precarious dual structure would be endangered by either neglecting Member States' political 
interests in making Community law or by neglecting principles of Community law in the 
Member States. These warnings coincide with the reservations against a purely formal legal 
treatment of the Community's powers under Arts. 100, 100 a or 235 EEC30. They have 
considerable practical implications for the connection between internal market policy and 
product 
safety policy that is of interest here. For if it is true that the adoption and implementation of 
Community legal acts must not, at any rate de facto, neglect to include political actors from 
the Member States, then a harmonisation policy oriented towards the objectives of realising 
the internal market must also bear in mind the effects of its measures in other policy areas, 
and cannot overextend the political consensus that underpins it. We shall return in more detail 
below to the consequences of these theses for the relationship between internal market policy 
and product safety policy in general, and to the legal significance of the "internal market to 
technical harmonisation and standards" in particular31. 
  
2. Traditional policy of approximating laws in order to break down technical barriers to trade 
The manifestations and consequences of technical barriers to trade will be discussed in (2.1), 
the general programme for their removal in (2.2) and the methods of harmonisation it 
provides in (2.3). Analysis of selected directives and proposals for directives shows that 
while this programme is primarily aimed at removing obstacles on the path to a common 
internal market, by way of negative integration, it also partly contains detailed regulations on 
product safety (2.4). Safeguard clauses are responses to reservations by Member States (2.5). 
With the proposal for a directive on construction products, the attempt to delegate powers to 
the Commission failed (2.6). Criticism of the production of directives overloaded with 
technical details (2.7) and the considerable difficulties in converting them into law in 
Member States (2.8) prepared the ground for a reorientation of integration policy; a policy 
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that seeks in other ways to pursue the goals of free movement of goods on the one hand, and 
safety and health for the consumer along with industrial safety and environmental protection 
on the other (3). 
  
2.1 Manifestations of technical barriers to trade and their consequences 
Following the abolition of customs duties and quantitative restrictions between Member 
States, technical barriers to trade32 attracted public attention. The General Programme to 
remove technical barriers to trade in goods was aimed at removing obstacles arising from 
differences in legal and administrative provisions in Member States relevant to product 
quality. 
For many goods, special requirements on production, import, marketing or use exist that may, 
because of different national characteristics, hamper free movement of goods. Among these 
are all administrative measures by Member State authorities that ensure compliance with 
these regulations. Of particular importance economically are the numerous, often very 
detailed, intercompany technical standards, aimed at both raising the safety level of technical 
products, and especially at rationalising business processes and increasing productivity 
through mass production. Technical legal regulations are often based on decades of tradition; 
it is often not easy to separate the objective of protecting particular legal values on grounds of 
public safety and order from attempts to fence off markets. This is, however, not the place to 
examine attempts by particular industries to take advantage of industrial property rights and 
technical standards thereby avoiding price and quality competition33. 
Technical standards and trade regulations for a product that differ from one country to 
another may also unintentionally hamper trade. These standards and regulations may have 
been deliberately created for protectionist reasons, but rather out of a desire to create 
uniformity, raise the safety of appliances or protect consumers, the environment or workers. 
Those particularly affected are foreign suppliers without enough economic strength to 
produce separate product lines to meet each set of national requirements. They are alleged to 
have their international competitivity notably cramped, in particular through insufficient 
possibility of exploiting the advantages of larger-scale mass production. Additionally, the 
price effects of non-tariff barriers and therefore the degree of protection for domestic 
suppliers are allegedly harder to estimate than for customs duties. The impenetrability and 
complexity of technical barriers to trade and the possibility of changing them rapidly are said 
to create considerable information costs and to hinder planning of production and investment. 
Domestic industrial firms are said to unavoidably have considerable influence on the shaping 
of technical standards. 
A number of additional factors influence the extent to which differing technical standards and 
trade regulations lead to economic problems34. Flexibility in adaptation is greater in 
expanding markets and also in the early stages of a product cycle. Differences in standards hit 
harder as modificaton costs increase. Suppliers with the highest turnover on given markets 
play more or less the role of "standards leaders". 
The economic effects of protectionist measures in general, including duties, levies, quotas 
and technical or administrative barriers to trades35 have 
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frequently been discussed36. Among those repeatedly mentioned are higher prices for 
consumers, restriction of quality competition, loss of economic adaptability and medium- to 
long-term risks for jobs safeguarded in the short-term by protectionist measures. 
  
2.2 The General Programme for the elimination of technical barriers to trade: a survey 
The General Programme of 28 May 1969 for the elimination of technical barriers to trade 
resulting from disparities between the provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in Member States37 aims at harmonising national regulations regarding 
marketing and the use of particular important selected products, through directives under Art. 
100 EEC. The mutual recognition of national regulations was out of the question as a 
procedure in principle, since it can be considered only for cases where regulations are more 
or less equivalent, particularly as regards objects of legal protection and production costs38. 
The programme consists of four Resolutions and a gentlemen's agreement. Two Council 
Resolutions contain a timetable for eliminating barriers to trade in the industrial sector39 and 
in foodstuffs40; the latter area will not further be discussed. According to this very ambitious 
but utterly 
unrealistic programme, the Council was to decide on 114 harmonisation directives for 
industrial products in three six-month periods between mid-1969 and the end of 197041; the 
decisions were each to be taken within six months of presentation of the draft. Regulations 
were planned above all for motor vehicles, agricultural tractors and machinery, measuring 
instruments, electrical machinery and equipment, pressure vessels, fertilizers, dangerous 
preparations, lifting equipment and lifts, and other miscellaneous goods. 
A further resolution42 provided for the mutual recognition of national inspections, which are 
conditions for the marketing of many products. The principle of mutual recognition, applies, 
however, only in so far as national rules for marketing are equivalent or have been rendered 
so by Community harmonisation measures. 
To adapt directives to technical progress, two simplified procedures are provided for43: in 
cases of particular importance, the Council will decide on a Commission proposal, by 
qualified majority. Otherwise the Commission will be empowered to enact amending 
provisions, but in doing so must call in a committee on which Member States are represented. 
Should the committee support the Commission's proposed regulation by qualified majority, 
then it may be enacted; otherwise the Council will decide by qualified majority within three-
months time. Should it not do so, the Commission itself may decide44. 
Finally, the Member State government representatives meeting in the Council agreed, by way 
of a "gentlemen's agreement", on standstill 
arrangements45. Governments were required for a particular period, in principle, to refrain 
from taking national legal or administrative measures for products covered by the 
programme, and to supply the Commission drafts of national legal and administrative 
measures. National measures "urgently required on ground of safety or of health" are 
excluded. This standstill arrangement has since been replaced by the directive laying down a 
procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and 
regulations46. 
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The Council Resolution of 21 May 197347 supplemented the General Programme for the 
elimination of technical barriers to trade in industrial products, because of the intensification 
of internal Community trade and the increasingly more pressing (or publicised) problems 
connected with environmental and health protection, adding such sectors as motorcycles, 
packaging, toys, equipment and machinery for building sites, petrol additives and fuel oil. 
Finally, in its Resolution of 17 December 1973 on industrial policy48, the Council presented a 
thoroughly revised timetable for the elimination of technical barriers to trade in the field of 
industrial products. More than 100 additional directives were to be adopted in the four-year 
period which terminated at the end of 197749. 
  
2.3 The methods of harmonisation provided for in the General Programme 
In an annex to its original proposal for the General Programme, the Commission gave some 
fundamental indications on the harmonisation solutions still useful for understanding the new 
approach today. It distinguished the following five solutions50: 
a) "Complete" solution: in this procedure, also known as total harmonisation, national 
regulations are completely replaced by Community ones. In complete harmonisation, only 
products that fully conform with directives may be marketed in the Community. The full 
harmonisation approach means the biggest loss of sovereignty for Member States, places 
particular requirements on political consensus formation and requires comprehensive detailed 
regulations at the Community level, but in the long-run results in the furthest-reaching 
harmonisation. This approach has so far been chosen, apart from the foodstuffs sector, in 
directives on hazardous substances and preparations, cosmetics and pharmaceuticals. 
b) "Alternative solution": this procedure, better known as optional harmonisation51, leaves to 
suppliers, the freedom to choose between orienting their products to national law or to 
Community-law requirements. Products meeting the Community requirements cannot be 
refused access to the market in any Member State. This approach, the prevailing one in the 
area of industrial products, does ease political agreement, but has drawbacks from the 
viewpoints of harmonisation and also of product safety. The number of recognised rules is 
increased, so that it is harder to compare what is offered. Where safety standards differ, a 
manufacturer that avoids higher standards which in general mean higher costs, can secure 
competitive advantages52. Optional harmonisation thus tends, given significant differences in 
safety and a sizeable volume of cross-border trade in the products concerned, to promote a 
reduction in the safety level. The reasons adduced in favour of the Community regulation in 
cases of optional harmonisation - longer manufacturing series, better use of output, greater 
rationalisation - do not apply to many small- and medium-size firms that market their goods 
only domestically. In favour of optional harmonisation, it may be said that Member States 
have more leeway to take national peculiarities into account, and that national adaptation to 
technical progress is possible without amending the directive. Because the market is opened 
up for products that meet the Community standard, consumer choice is increased and 
competition among manufacturers stepped up. 
c) "Reference to technical standards": On this method, directives refer, in order to specify 
safety requirements, to harmonised technical standards worked out by standardisation 
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bodies53. This method of harmonisation has so far been applied only in the Low Voltage 
Directive54, though the European Parliament55 and the ESC56 had selected it in their opinions 
on the draft general programme as the most promising of solutions. The Economic and Social 
Committee stressed that reference to technical standards was particularly suitable for sectors 
where there was experience in harmonising technical standards, and offered the greatest 
possibilities for 
elastic adaptation to the demands of technical progress and for the introduction of new 
technical ideas. Almost pre-empting the new approach to technical harmonisation and 
standards, the ESC states: 
"It would thus be conceivable for a Community directive first to list the safety objectives to 
be attained and then to state that these will be taken as having been attained where a 
particular standard, initially harmonised at Member State level, has been complied with. This 
provides an opportunity to demonstrate that the safety objectives can be met even without 
complying with the standard concerned"57. 
The legal literature had further defined this method of harmonisation by the early 70's, setting 
forth fairly clearly the outline of the new approach58. While sliding reference to the 
successively newest version of a standard was rejected as inadmissible59, conferring law-
making powers to privately organised standardisation organisations, the preferred model was, 
for directives, only to prescribe compliance with basic requirements, with technical standards 
merely being cited to determine these basic requirements. Accordingly, manufacturers are not 
bound by the technical standards, but can show compliance with the basic requirements 
otherwise than by meeting standards60. The directive should lay down the basic requirements 
in a general clause embodying a rebuttable presumption that these requirements have been 
met by anyone who has complied with a particular technical standard in its latest version61. 
Where a manufacturer departs from the general clause, the onus is on him to prove that the 
generally formulated requirements of the general clause, which alone is legally binding, have 
nevertheless been met. Conversely, the authorities have the onus of showing that though 
technical standards referred to have been complied with, basic requirements set out in the 
general clause are not met62. In order that technical standards should not remain "merely a 
non-binding indication and aid to interpretation showing the specific content of the basic 
requirements in the individual case"63 thereby bringing the success of harmonisation into 
question, Member States should "take all necessary measures to ensure that administrative 
authorities recognise goods as meeting the basic requirements if they comply with the 
standards decided on by the Commission following consultation of the Standards Testing 
Committee"64. 
While its proponents presented as an advantage that standardisation in this procedure in 
principle remains a matter for industry65, critics adduce constitutional reservations, 
complaining that 
"in view of the existential importance of environmental and consumer protection for our 
society today, a regulation can be tenable that leads to industrial organisations' wide-ranging 
powers of decision in determining the level of safety in manufacturing and utilising technical 
products"66. 
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d) "Conditional mutual recognition of tests": Where harmonisation fails because Member 
States hold to their own safety regulations, products from one Member State should be 
exportable to another on the following two conditions: 
- that the exported product complies with manufacturing provisions applying in the country 
of import; 
- that competent authorities in the country of export carry out checks according to the 
methods applying in the country of import67. 
e) "Mutual recognition of tests": Here, checks carried out in one 
Member State are automatically recognised as valid by all Member States. This solution can 
be considered where in a given branch of industry there is very far-reaching correspondence 
between technical and administrative regulations in force, so that prior harmonisation of 
national legal provisions seems superfluous68. 
  
2.4 Conversion into national law of the General Programme on elimination of technical 
barriers to trade 
2.4.1 General survey 
The programme to eliminate technical barriers to trade has to date been converted into law in 
only fragmentary fashion and with considerable delays69. Table 1 gives a picture of the 
number of Commission proposals for directives, Council directives and Commission 
directives on adjustment to technical progress for the years from 1968 to 1986. 
  
Table 1: Programme to eliminate technical barriers to trade in industrial products - number of 
Commission proposals for directives, Council directives and Commission directives on 
























1968 18 18 - - 18 - - 
1969 13 31 1 1 30 - - 
1970 5 36 9 10 26 - - 
1971 7 43 11 21 22 - - 
1972 12 55 3 24 31 - - 
1973 12 67 11 35 32 1 1 
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1974 33 100 14 49 51 2 3 
1975 15 115 12 61 54 1 4 
1976 13 128 21 82 46 4 8 
1977 6 134 15 97 37 1 9 
1978 11 145 15 112 33 5 14 
1979 8 153 11 123 30 9 23 
1980 25 178 10 133 45 1 24 
1981 22 200 7 140 60 5 29 
1982 5 205 7 147 58 14 43 
1983 6 211 8 155 56 7 50 
1984 8 219 16 171 48 7 57 
1985 5 224 4 175 49 12 69 
1986 11 235 19 194 41 5 74 
  
(1) Determined from data on elimination of technical barriers in Community trade in the 
annual general reports, especially the tables in the annexes. 
2. Including four Commission directives on methods of analysis for verifying the 
composition of cosmetics and the Commission directives on sampling and analysis 
methods for fertilizers of 22 June 1977 (OJ L 213, 22 August 1977, 1) and on 
procedures for verifying the characteristics, threshold values and explosion resistance 
of ammonia fertilizers with high nitrogen content of 8 December 1986; OJ L 38, 7 
February 1987, 1. 
  
By the end of 1986 the Council had adopted 194 directives on the adaptation of Member 
States' legal and administrative provisions on trade of industrial products. Since 1974 it has 
had average "arrears" of some 50 Commission proposals for directives. By the end of 1970 
only 10 directives had been adopted. According to the original 1969 Programme, the figure 
should have been over 100. It was not till June 1978 that adoption of the hundredth directive 
on elimination of technical barriers to trade in industrial products could be hailed70. The 
directives adopted as a "package" in September 198471 had been awaiting decision before the 
Council for nine and a half years. 
Most directives contain minutely detailed technically regulations72 and do not differ 
significantly in content from technical standards. This entails long preparatory periods, 
considerable possibilities of external influence by the expert industrial circles involved, on 
overloading of the high-level political decision-making procedure in the Council with 
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technical details and a pressing compulsion to adapt the directives to technical progress (or 
sometimes to advances in knowledge). By the end of 1986 the Commission had already 
adopted 74 directives on adaptation to technical progress73. 
Table 2 gives a survey of the sectors covered by the Council directives and the Commission 
directives on adaptation to technical progress. 
  
Table 2: Programme to eliminate technical barriers to trade in industrial products - Number of 
Council directives and of Commission directives on adaptation to technical progress in 
individual areas (as at 31 December 1986)(1) 
Area Council directives Commission adaptation 
directives 
Vehicles 58 23 
Chemical products (2) 33 16 (3) 
Measuring devices 30 10 




Electical appliances 8 5 
Textile products 5 1 
Pressure vessels 5 0 
Motor cycles 4 0 
Lifts and lifting devices 3 2 
Cosmetics 3 10 (4) 








1. Derived from data on elimination of technical barriers in Community trade in the 
annual general reports, especially the tables in the annexes. 
2. Hazardous substances, lacquers and paints, pharmaceuticals, plant-health products, 
fertilizers, detergents; except for cosmetics. 
3. Including Commission directives on sampling and analysis methods for fertilizers of 
22 June 1977 (OJ L 213, 22 August 1977, 1) and on procedures for verifying the 
characteristics, threshold values and explosion resistance of ammonia fertilizers with 
high nitrogen content of 8 December 1986; OJ L 38, 7 February 1987, 1. 
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4. Including four Commission directives on methods of analysis for verifying the 
composition of cosmetics . 
Of 192 directives, 145 are in the four areas of motor vehicles, agricultural and forestry 
vehicles, measuring devices and chemical products. The first three sectors mentioned are 
particularly favourable for approximation of laws. In the area of measuring devices, the 
Community can in its harmonisation work, call upon far-reaching international agreement 
regarding weights and measurement74. In the vehicle sector, it can largely refer back to 
technical directives from the ECE in Geneva - the Economic Commission for Europe, a 
United Nations regional organisation. This not only signifies a saving of time for the 
Commission but a possibility for European vehicle manufacturers to offer their products on 
extra-Community market without special costly adaptations75. 
  
2.4.2 Total harmonisation - directives on hazardous substances 
A special place is occupied by the directives that follow the principle of total harmonisation, 
hazardous substances with regard to fertilizers, and cosmetics. By contrast with most of the 
directives, they concern areas not normally regulated by technical standards. The directives in 
the area of classification, packaging and labelling of dangerous substances and 
preparations76 were based on preliminary work done by the ILO, the Council of Europe and 
the OECD but not yet reflected in national legislation. Here the Community has given 
Member States a lead77. This is true particularly of the sixth amendment to Directive 
67/548/EEC78, which is the basis for chemicals laws in the Member States. 
In contrast, the regulations restricting marketing and use of certain dangerous substances and 
preparations79, much more detailed in application, almost always go back to initiatives by 
Member States barring dangerous substances on grounds of health protection or public safety, 
or introducing restrictions on their use. Quite clearly, these are ad hoc regulations, though 
adopted with considerable delays80: The underlying Directive 76/779 contains no criteria for 
including substances in the annex to the Directive. If hazards appear (and bans or restrictions 
are issued in Member States), a unanimous Council resolution, based on a Commission 
proposal, and following opinions from the European Parliament and the Economic and Social 
Committee, must be adopted. However, speedy mandatory measures should be required to 
avoid severe health risks81. A ban issued by one Member State and a Commission proposal 
for a ban give manufacturers and traders enough time to quickly sell off the dangerous 
substances in countries that have not yet applied the protective clause82. 
  
2.4.3 Optional harmonisation - Directives in the automotive sector 
The most detailed regulations at Community level are for the vehicle market83, which is also 
of paramount economic importance for internal trade84. All directives are based on the 
principle of optional harmonisation. In 1982, the Commission checked the extent to which 
Member States had bindingly prescribed compliance with Community standards domestically 
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and to which manufacturers voluntarily followed Community provisions85. The finding was 
that except in Italy and The Netherlands, where Community standards are mandatory, 
manufacturers still largely have a choice between domestic provisions and Community 
directives. Manufacturers largely apply about half the directives, especially those on 
environmental protection and active safety. Otherwise, they apparently prefer national 
provisions. The Community standards have practically no effect where technical 
specifications are not legally regulated by national standards. Accordingly, manufacturers are 
only partly exploiting the oft- proclaimed advantages of longer production runs. The differing 
national provisions are apparently advantageous for dividing up and separating markets and 
preventing parallel imports86. 
Harmonisation directives in the vehicles sector are summarised in Table 3. 
Even with the revised programme, considerable delays clearly emerge. The large number of 
directives can be explained by the fact that directives have been issued for practically all 
vehicle components. This concerns all the technical provisions that vehicles must meet, after 
securing EEC type approval in one Member State, in order to be marketed without further 
checks in other Community countries87. As Table 3 shows, since October 1978 all that 
remains to be done in order for EEC type approval to come into force is to produce directives 
for windscreens, tyres and the weights and dimensions of particular vehicle components. 
The delays are attributed to the so-called "Third-Country" problem88; the fear that goods from 
third countries might take advantage of EEC-type approval to catch on easier to the Common 
Market. In the Council, even after adoption of 15 directives long-blocked because of this 
problem89, and after adoption of the regulation on the strengthening of the common 
commercial policy (in particular, on protection against prohibited commercial practices90), it 
was not possible, in the same day, to overcome differences of opinion in the vehicle sector as 
to whether third-country products should secure access to the Community type-approval 
systems introduced by the harmonisation directives. By its international undertakings, the 
Community is obliged where reciprocity is guaranteed to give imported products equally 
favourable treatment with Community products91. 
While harmonisation work in the vehicle sector was initially and primarily aimed at the 
advantages of long-production runs, other aspects have become apparent for some time, since 
new production techniques allow flexible adaptation to different technical requirements. 
These aspects include noise levels, air pollution, fuel consumption and passenger safety. On 
30 March 1984 the European Parliament adopted a resolution introducing a programme of 
Community measures to promote road traffic safety, and also called for an integrated 
programme including measures regarding vehicle construction and equipment, road 
construction and road signs, and road traffic regulations92. Among proposals are the 
obligatory equipping of all private cars with laminated windscreens, headrests and fog glass, 
anti-lock braking systems in all lorries and other safety devices, and the laying down of 
minimum standards on a large number of safety aspects. These includes the quality of car 
tyres and rigidity of the passenger compartment, mandatory technical checks by independent 
test centres, and measures to remove vehicles with design faults from the market. It is clear 
that the originally largely commercially oriented policy to guarantee free movement of goods 
is gradually being overshadowed by an integrated policy on road traffic safety and aspects of 
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environmental and consumer protection, even though the Council still remains closed to the 
idea of an integrated programme to promote road traffic safety93. 
  







Adoption of directive Lag in months (3) 
    Planned 
(2) 
month/year 
achieved   
Type Approval 7/68 1/70 2/70 1 
Admissible noise 
level and exhaust 
equipment 
7/68 1/70 2/70 1 
Measures against 
air pollution by 
petrol engines 
10/69 7/70 3/70 0 
Containers for 
liquid fuel and its 
safe transport 
7/68 1/70 3/70 3 
Licence plate 
fixtures 
unpublished 1/70 3/70 3 
Steering 
equipment 
2/69 7/70 6/70 0 




8/68 1/70 7/70 7 
Rear-view 
mirrors 
8/68 1/70 3/71 14 






unpublished 1/70 6/72 29 
Measures against 12/71 7/0 8/72 25 
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7/72 new 12/73 - 
Behaviour of 
steering gear in 
collisions 




5/73 1/75 7/74 0 




8/74 1/76 (1/70) 6/75 0 (66) 
Licence plates 8/74 1/76 12/75 0 
Safety belt 
anchorage 




6/74 1/75 (1/70) 7/76 19 (79) 
Rear lamps 1/74 1/75 7/76 19 
Contour lights, 
side lights, rear 
lights and 
brakelights 
12/74 1/75 7/76 19 
Direction 
indicators 




12/74 1/75 7/76 19 
Main-beam and 
dipped headlights 
12/74 1/75 7/76 19 
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Fog lights 12/74 1/75 7/76 19 
Towing 
equipment 
12/74 1/77 (7/70) 5/77 5 (83) 
Rear fog lamps 12/76 1/75 6/77 30 
Reversing lights 12/76 1/77 6/77 6 
Parking lights 12/76 1/77 6/77 6 
Safety belts and 
restraints 
12/74 1/76 6/77 18 




telltale lights and 
indications 









11/76 1/77 (1/70) 12/77 12 (96) 
Internal heating 12/76 1/77 6/78 18 
Wheel covers 12/76 1/77 6/78 18 
Headrests 12/74 1/76 10/78 34 
Fuel 
consumption 
1/80 new 12/80 - 
Engine 
performance 
1/80 new 12/80 - 
Safety 
windscreens(4) 

















Notes to Table 3: 
1. Sometimes a directive was preceded by several drafts; the date here is that of the last 
draft. 
2. Determined from the timetables in the General Programme to eliminate technical 
obstacles to trade of 28 May 1969 (OJ L 76, 17 June 1969, 1) and the Council 
Resolution of 17 December 1973 on industrial policy (OJ C 117, 31 December 1973, 
1). Figures in brackets are the earlier dates sometimes specified in the 1969 General 
Programme. In every case the implication is either 1 January or 1 July. 
( 
3. Figures in brackets indicate the lag behind the original date in the 1969 General 
Programme. 
4. Commission proposal of 20 September 1971, OJ C 119, 16 November 1972, 21. 
5. Commission proposal of 31 December 1976, OJ C 37, 14 February 1977, 1. 
6. Commission proposal of 31 December 1976, OJ C 15, 20 January 1977, 4. This 
proposal relating to private cars should not be confused with the directive on the 
weights, dimensions and certain other technical characteristics of particular goods 
vehicles, OJ L 2, 3 January 1985, 14. 
2.5 Safeguard clauses - response to Member States reservations 
A number of directives contain safeguard clauses94 allowing Member States to intervene 
should, despite compliance with Community standards, a hazardous situation suddenly arise 
calling for immediate action. Such safeguard clauses are essential to the extent that the 
Community provisions lay down rules for marketing and handling products Community-wide 
that take the right to appeal to Art. 36 EEC from Member States and adopt measures to 
protect the health and safety of persons95. The relevant provision usually runs: 
1. Where a Member State has good grounds for believing that an EEC product, although 
satisfying the requirements of this Directive and the relevant implementing 
Directives, presents a hazard to safety or health, it may temporarily prohibit, or attach 
special conditions to, the marketing and use of that product. It shall immediately 
inform the Commission and other Member States thereof, giving the reasons for its 
decisions. 
2. The Commission shall consult the Member States concerned within six weeks, then 
deliver its opinion without delay and take appropriate measures. 
3. If the Commission considers that amendments to the relevant implementing 
Directives are needed, such amendments shall be adopted in accordance with the 
prodecure laid down in Art. 28; in this event the Member State which took the 
safeguard measures may retain them until these amendments come into force.96 
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The safeguard clauses are thus designed for cases where, after a Community provision has 
been enacted, a hitherto unknown or unrecognised hazard appears. The Member State, as 
responsible for the safety and health of its citizens and for other objects of legal protection, is 
allowed to take the necessary immediate action. At the same time, the notification of the 
Commission and other Member States and the involvement of the Committees to adapt the 
relevant directives to technical progress is aimed at securing amendment of the latter to cope 
with the hazard situation : this is to update Community law with regard to the hazardous 
situation that has emerged, so as to avoid obstacles to trade. A Member State that reacts more 
critically than others to hazardous situations can thus provide an impetus for the tightening up 
of Community standards. However, it must supply justification for temporary departure from 
Community law, and accept the fact that its intervention may not be lastingly confirmed by 
the Commission or in the committee procedure. Where, despite contrary decision by the 
relevant Community bodies, a Member State maintains its special measures, the Commission 
may bring it before the ECJ for infringement of Art. 30 EEC. Those who doubt that exercise 
of national police intervention powers is accessible to subsequent co-ordination through 
a binding Community procedure97 have been refuted; Member States, in agreeing to the 
directive, have also agreed to verification of any further-reaching protective measures that 
may be necessary in accordance with the procedure laid down in the safeguard clause, so as 
to maintain already existing Community law. There is much to suggest that this question of 
principle remains obscured and that the safeguard clause procedure can be used pragmatically 
in a political negotiating process to adapt Community law to new hazard situations. 
  
2.6 Proposal for a directive on construction products a failed attempt to delegate powers to 
the Commission 
With its proposal for a directive on construction products98, the Commission embarked in 
1978 on the since abandoned attempt to develop an alternative to the cumbersome policy of 
harmonisation through vertical, product-related Council directives99. A framework directive 
from the Council was to contain common definitions for all construction products and lay 
down general rules on the form of implementing directives; these implementing directives 
were, pursuant to Art. 155 EEC, fourth indent, to be enacted by the Commission, with 
feedback through a committee made up of Member State representatives (regulatory 
committee procedure). Implementing directives were to lay down more specific requirements 
for individual products or types of product, and guarantee that buildings produced using 
materials complying with the implementing directives would meet the generally recognised 
requirements, including safety requirements. These requirements relate to reliability, safety, 
hygiene, comfort and economy of buildings, and to specific properties of products100. 
Conformity of construction products with implementing directives was to be verified and 
established through an EEC-type approval certificate (Art. 8-12), an EEC-type examination 
certificate (Art. 13-17), EEC-type conformity checks (Art. 18-21) or through EEC self-
certification (Art. 22-26); procedures were to be laid down in the individual implementing 
directives101. 
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The reasons for the failure of this ambitious project are not entirely clear. Besides Member 
States' reservations at such far-reaching transfer of powers to the Commission102 and 
Parliament's mistrust of the excessive influence for Government representatives in the 
committee procedure103, rejection of central bureaucratic detailed regulation by industrial 
circles involved was important, as well as special features of the construction industry which, 
by comparison with other technical areas, was and is relatively localised and characterised by 
special local and regional traditions. As well as these political reasons, there were legal 
reservations regarding the proposed delegation arrangements, since all essential basic 
decisions were not left to the Council, but would be given over to the Commission without 
its having any specific, detailed framework104. It is noteworthy that the Commission did not 
seek to follow the model of the Low Voltage Directive105, but wanted to lay down the 
specific products standards itself in implementing directives. Here, however, it can always 
point to the fact, in contrast with the electrical sector, that only a few construction products 
are covered by international or European technical standards106. 
Aside from its failed attempt to secure far-reaching powers in implementing directives, the 
Commission is working on bringing out Eurocodes for the construction industry; these would 
be a set of European regulations based on the result of work by major international technical 
and scientific associations for the design, dimensioning and construction of buildings and 
engineering structures107. By contrast with the failed proposal for a directive on construction 
products of 1978, the 1987 proposal for a directive on construction products, with its 
strengthening of standardisation committees and the procedure of conformity certification, 
implies, above all, a strengthening of industrial circles involved. Because of the 
comprehensive competence of the proposed Standing Committee for the construction 
industry, the position of Member States ought, if anything, to be strengthened, even though 
from the purely legal point of view, they can assert their influence only through an advisory 
committee rather than a regulatory committee. 
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The new approach to technical harmonisation and standards, its preparation through ECJ case 
law on Articles 30, 36 EEC and the Low Voltage Directive, and the clarification of its 
operating environment by the Single European Act 
Following several declarations by the European Council since 1982, achievement of a single 
European internal market has become the focus of the Commission's efforts towards 
integration1. The general economic and social policy consequences of achievement of an 
integrated internal market can hardly be overestimated, and the issues of the relationship 
between internal market and product safety policies, on which this study concentrates, cover 
only a small range of the questions that will have to be thought through in order to "complete 
the internal market". But even this range is wide enough. The far-reaching integration policy 
expectations bound up with internal market policy presuppose the overcoming of technical 
barriers to trade arising particularly from differences in product safety law in Member States: 
the European Internal Market cannot be achieved without the Europeanisation of product 
safety law. 
The description of law approximation policy under the 1969 General Programme to remove 
technical barriers to trade2 has repeatedly confirmed the notion that internal market policy 
must always include coverage of product safety policy implications of legal harmonisation 
measures. Let us only recall the broad use of escape clauses in relevant Community 
directives3, the collapse of initiatives in the area of construction materials4, the lack of 
success in efforts to supplement harmonised product standards in the automotive sector with 
an integrated safety policy programme5 and the general resistance to a "horizontal" European 
product safety policy6. The problems with internal market policy can clearly not be explained 
exclusively by the fact that Member States seek to assert their own economic interests in 
negotiations on legal approximation measures; they point at the same time to the fact that the 
issue of product safety is felt as a politically sensitive area where political actors resist 
delegating powers of action and decision to the Community. 
The documents in which the Commission explained its interpretation of the stagnation of 
legal harmonisation policy and the need for a new approach to harmonisation did not clearly 
address the connections between internal market policy and product safety policy. Instead, 
the Commission points primarily to the general difficulties of the European legislative 
process: the hurdles of the unanimity principle, the multiplicity of technical provisions in 
need of harmonisation and the quantity of national standardisation material and the need for 
flexible adaptation of harmonised provisions to technical developments7. This diagnosis is in 
line with the therapy recommended by the White Paper on completion of the Internal 
Market8: the Community should in the future base itself as far as possible on mutual 
recognition of the equivalence of national provisions or standards, confining itself in legal 
approximation policy to harmonising binding safety and health requirements, to be specified 
by the European standardisation organisations, supplemented by mutual recognition of 
national standards. The following description begins with the Commission's diagnosis and 
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view of the problems. It therefore initially ignores the connections between internal market 
policy and product safety policy, to concentrate on analysing the pre-conditions stated by the 
Commission and the new harmonisation policy elements so far discernible. But this 
procedure should in no way be regarded as uncritical acceptance of the White Paper's 
premises and expectations. The principle of equivalence and mutual recognition of national 
provisions referred to by the Commission will instead be considered in the light of an 
analysis of relevant ECJ case law and Articles 30 and 36 EEC regarding its scope; it will 
emerge that this case law already largely respects safety policy interests of Member States 
(Section 1 below). But the Commission's second premise, namely that the regulatory model 
of the Low Voltage Directive of 19 February 19739, the first to apply the technique of 
harmonisation of safety objectives and reference to standards at Community level, can be 
generalised, will likewise be shown to be highly problematic, since the regulatory technique 
of the Low Voltage Directive presupposed specific conditions in the electrical sector, and the 
safety policy and legal problems arising out of the Directive are by no means entirely solved 
(2 below). We shall then return to describing the new approach to technical harmonisation 
and standards (3 below). A further point to be clarified will be how the Single European Act, 
in particular Art. 100 a (4), will affect the applicability of the new approach (4 below). 
Finally, the new harmonisation policy will be considered in terms of its compatibility with 
the EEC Treaty (5 below). 
  
1. Mutual tension between marketability of goods and product safety in the light of Articles 
30 and 36 EEC 
The relationship between marketability of goods and product safety requirements is 
fundamentally regulated in Articles 30 and 36 EEC. In recent years extensive ECJ case law 
has developed here, meeting with an extremely strong response in the literature10. As Table 
1 shows, of 140 judgments delivered by the ECJ by 31 March 1987 on free movement of 
goods, only a little over a quarter (42) were based on an action for breach of treaty brought by 
the Commission; such actions occurred in significant quantity only with the case law 
following-up the Cassis judgment. 

















From 1968 8 1 9 1.8 
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65 38 103 12.7 
Total 98 42 140 7.8 
  
(1) Calculated from the European Court reports and communications regarding the ECJ's 
work. 
(2) Case 7/68, Judgment of 10 December 1968, ECR [1968] 634. 
(3) Case 8/74, Judgment of 11 July 1974, ECR [1974] 834 (Dassonville). 
(4) Case 120/78, Judgment of 20 February 1979, ECR [1979] 649 (Cassis de Dijon). 
5. Case 178/84, Judgment of 12 March 1987, published in NJW 1987, 1133 (Beer Purity 
Ordinance). 
  
In the period after the Dassonville judgment the number of judgments handed down triples 
annually, and after the Cassis Judgment doubles again. Quantitatively, the most important 
group of cases relates to health protection, industrial property rights, regulations for the 
prescribing, designation and presentation of products and price regulation measures. The 
decisions relate mainly to the foodstuffs sector, with alcoholic drinks continually presenting 
the ECJ with an opportunity to develop its case law on free movement of goods. Outside the 
foodstuffs sector, there is a strikingly high proportion of judgments concerning medicines, 
and a small one for technical products. The following survey shows the product groups 
covered by judgments on free movement of goods handed down by the ECJ up to 31 March 
1987: 
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Alcoholic drinks 20 
Other foodstuffs 41 
Pharmaceuticals 17 
Technical products 8 
Publications 7 






Other products 12 
Not product-specific 9 
We shall now review the development of the case law on free movement of goods to the 
extent that it is of importance for the development of the new approach to technical 
harmonisation and standards and to the need for a horizontal Community product safety 
policy. The case law on Art. 30 EEC and its impact on harmonisation policy will first be dealt 
with (1.1), then the case law on Art. 36 EEC and Member States' possibilities of action (1.2). 
  
1.1 Development of the case law on Art. 30 EEC and conclusions for harmonisation policy 
Art. 30 EEC prohibits quantitative restrictions on imports and measures having an equivalent 
effect between Member States; Art. 34 does the same for exports; Art. 36 allows Member 
States, under specific severely restricted conditions, to make exceptions to these prohibitions. 
  
1.1.1 The concept of measures having equivalent effect and the Cassis de Dijon Judgment 
It was first with the "Dassonville" judgment11 that the ECJ undertook a comprehensive 
definition of the central concept of measures having equivalent effect. This basic rule has 
been repeated by the Court in large numbers of later judgments, and continues to be the basis 
for the case law; the Commission, too, observes it in bringing actions for breach of treaty 
against Member States. It says: 
"Any trade regulations of Member States likely to obstruct Community internal trade directly 
or indirectly, actually or potentially, is to be regarded as a measure having equivalent effect 
to a quantitative restriction"12. 
With this, the ECJ has in the interest of free movement of goods gone far beyond the 
statement made by the Commission in Directive 70/50/EEC13. There it had distinguished 
between measures applicable without distinction to domestic and imported goods (Art. 3) and 
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those applicable other than without distinction (Art. 2). The latter group of discriminatory 
measures, of such a nature as to restrict imports, should without exception come under the 
prohibition of Art. 30 EEC. Measures applicable without distinction would by contrast 
conflict with Art. 30 EEC, only where "the restrictive effects on the movement of goods 
exceed the limits of the typical effects of such commercial regulations" (Art. 3 (1)). This is 
said to be the case notably where "the restrictive effect on free movement of goods is 
disproportionate to the object aimed at" or "where the same objective can be attained by 
another means hindering trade as little as possible" (Art. 3 (2)). The broad interpretation of 
the concept of measures having equivalent effect is also expressed by the fact that mere 
likelihood of a trade-restrictive effect is sufficient, so that the effect of restricting trade need 
not have actually occurred or have reached a particular intensity. Any sovereign measure, 
likely even only indirectly, to negatively affect the flow of goods between States is here in 
principle, a prohibited measure having equivalent effect. The "broad, catch-all criterion" for 
measures having equivalent effect opens up for the Community "wide-ranging possibilities 
for control of national measures"14. 
On general interpretive principles, Art. 36 EEC, which allows Member States to evade the 
prohibition in principle on quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect, for 
the sake of particular objects of legal protection, is to be interpreted narrowly, and the list of 
objects of legal protection contained in it is to be treated as comprehensive15. With this as a 
starting point, the ECJ faced a dilemma if it did not want to subject the general power of 
Member States to regulate production and marketing or to control economic policy 
completely to the verdict of Art. 30 EEC. Either it could give an expansive interpretation to 
the object of legal protection in Art. 36 EEC or it could restrict the concept of measures 
having equivalent effect, at any rate for the area of measures applicable without distinction, 
by contrast with the Dassonville formulation16. With the well-known judgment in the "Cassis 
de Dijon" case of 20 February 197917, the Court of Justice took the latter path, thereby laying 
the foundations for a new approach to harmonisation policy in the area of free movement of 
goods and for systematic monitoring by the Commission of Member States' compliance with 
the Treaty in this area. 
In this case, the ECJ dealt for the first time with a measure applicable without distinction. It 
explicitly stressed that in the absence of Community regulations on manufacture and 
marketing, it was a matter for Member States to enact the relevant regulations for their 
territory, and continued: 
"Barriers to Community internal trade arising from the differences in national regulations on 
the marketing of its products must be accepted as long as these provisions are necessary in 
order to meet binding requirements, notably the requirements of effective tax control, public 
health protection, the integrity of trade and consumer protection"18. 
This makes it clear that restrictions on Community internal trade arising from regulations 
applicable equally to domestic and foreign products do not automatically fall under the 
prohibition of Art. 30 EEC, but may be justified, however, always requiring justification, 
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where there is no relevant Community regulation. The binding requirements do not constitute 
additional grounds of justification besides the objects of legal protection listed in Art. 36 
EEC; instead, their presence makes a regulation or proceeding no longer describable as a 
measure having equivalent effect19. 
The list of binding requirements is not exhaustive: others that enter in are environmental 
protection and measures to improve working and living conditions20. This must, though, 
involve a non-economic objectives in the general interest, which take precedence over the 
requirements of free movement of goods. The Court of Justice does not rely here on the 
external justification for a measure, but seeks to disclose the "true reasons", to prevent, say, 
protectionist industrial policy objectives of Member States being pursued under the cloak of 
consumer protection21. 
Member States' measures must be necessary, and also proportionate in nature and 
implementation; they must be the means that restrict free movement of goods as little as 
possible22. Accordingly, for instance, marketing bans are not in general justified in order to 
protect consumers against confusion and deception; as a rule, indications on the packaging 
will suffice23. In testing the binding requirements, the principle of the second sentence of Art. 
36 EEC should be applied, with the result that no primacy can be assigned to national 
regulatory powers when these are used as a means of arbitrary discrimination or as a 
disguised restriction on trade between Member States. Altogether, the ECJ has developed a 
carefully graded scheme for balancing between the Community objective of free movement 
of goods and particular regulatory interests of Member States, not a rigid scheme of rules and 
exceptions24. 
  
1.1.2 The consequences of the Cassis Case Law for legal approximation 
In view of an increasing number of restrictions on free movement of goods and against the 
background of the evident bottlenecks resulting from the classical harmonisation concept, the 
Commission took the Cassis case law as a basis for explaining the scope of the Cassis 
judgment to Member States, the European Parliament and the Council in a communication, 
and for drawing some conclusions and guidelines for verifying treaty compliance and 
reorienting legal approximation policy25. It summarises the case law as follows, underlining 
the principle of mutual recognition: 
"The principles deduced by the Court imply that a Member State may not in principle 
prohibit the sale in its territory of a product lawfully produced and marketed in another 
Member State even if the product is produced according to technical or quality requirements 
which differ from those imposed on its domestic products. Where a product Errore. 
L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata. fulfills the legitimate objectives of a Member 
State's own rules (public safety, protection of the consumer or the environment, etc.), the 
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importing country cannot justify prohibiting its sale in its territory by claiming that the way it 
fulfills the objectives is different from that imposed on domestic products"26. 
It draws the conclusion that many barriers to trade can be removed merely by strictly 
applying the prohibition of Art. 30 EEC, where they are not justified by Art. 36 EEC or as 
mandatory requirements within the meaning of the ECJ case law. It announces that it intends 
to tackle commercial rules covering the composition, designation, presentation and packaging 
of products or requiring compliance with certain technical standards. For preventive control 
of potentially trade-restricting measures by Member States, it announces its proposal for an 
information procedure in the area of standards and technical provisions27. Above all, 
however, efforts at harmonisation are to be concentrated in areas "where barriers to trade to 
be removed arise from national provisions which are admissible under the criteria set by the 
Court"28. 
The case law on Art. 30 and 36 EEC means a demarcation between the principle of the 
country of destination, according to which all goods or services must meet the standards of 
the respective country of destination, and the contrary principle of the country of origin, 
whereby import of all goods legally marketed in the country of origin is unrestricted. With 
this demarcation, it simultaneously determines the extent to which measures on 
approximation of laws are necessary in order to eliminate barriers to trade29. 
The Cassis judgment (and the Commission communication) were on the one hand welcomed 
as, in principle, allowing marketing of the most diverse local specialties throghout the 
Community, thereby increasing consumer choice30, but on the other hand criticised as facing 
the national legislature with the dilemma of either discriminating against domestic industry or 
giving up higher quality standards in favour of adaptation to the lowest common 
denominator31. The latter standpoint was represented particularly strongly by the government 
of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Cassis case: 
"Ultimately, the regulation binding in all Member States would be that of the country setting 
the lowest requirements; since this legal conclusion would be based on the directly applicable 
provision of Art. 30, these legal changes will have to have been effected already, at latest by 
1 January 1970. Because of the automatic effect of Art. 30, in the future further amendments 
to national legal provisions could be adopted continually as soon as only one Member State 
adopted a new regulation with lower requirements. In the extreme case, then, one Member 
State could, without any co-operation or information of other Member States, determine 
legislation for the whole Community. The outcome would be that the minimum requirements 
would, without the harmonisation provided for in Art. 100 EEC, requiring consensus by 
Member States, be reduced to the lowest level to be found in the regulations of any one of the 
Member States"32. 
To date, the fear that the new jurisprudence will lead to a levelling down to the lowest 
common denominator has proved unwarrented33. This is partly because Member States can 
defend themselves against undermining of standards by appealing to mandatory 
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requirements, where a legitimately pursued general object of protection of a non-economic 
nature is endangered34. Above all, however, it goes much farther to meet Member States 
interests in protection, especially as regards the very frequently mentioned protection of 
health35, than the Commission with its rigid scheme of rule and exception and its stress on 
"very strict criteria" and on the possibility of non-compliance "only under very restrictive 
conditions" tries to make out. In its endeavour to bring in a change to its policy on 
eliminating technical barriers to trade, the Commission has enthusiastically had recourse to 
the Cassis case law, but has one-sidedly generalised the interpretive principles, which the 
ECJ, particularly in its subsequent case law, has still more finely differentiated36. 
It is plain that harmonisation remains indispensable only in areas where Member States can 
base themselves on objects of protection under Art. 36 EEC or on mandatory requirements37. 
However, a few restrictions should be mentioned: the Commission's rigid scheme of rules 
and exceptions between free movement of goods and Member States' interests in protection is 
not appropriate; the circumstances in which a Member State can appeal to mandatory 
requirements depend on the balancing out of many considerations, which can be done only 
from case to case. The principle of mutual recognition operates bilaterally between the States 
involved in the trade concerned but not uniformly at Community level38. Elimination of 
barriers to trade through Art. 30 EEC presupposes unless Member States voluntarily refrain 
from asserting particular domestic standards for imported products, an initiative by 
manufacturers, importers or the Commission, and can come about only reactively and case by 
case; law approximation can act preventively and much more comprehensively39. 
Furthermore, pronouncements of the Court of Justice can act only by way of quashing, in the 
sense that rules may be abolished without substitution, but not replaced by new requirements 
under the Community Treaty40. Finally, overstressing negative harmonisation through Art. 30 
EEC would mean transferring to the Court evaluative tasks that normally fall within the 
province of the legislator41. 
There is agreement that application of Art. 30 EEC cannot be made dependent on prior 
harmonisation of laws. This was unmistakably stated by the Court of Justice in case 193/8042, 
when it also stressed the different objectives of Articles 30 and 100 EEC43: 
"The fundamental principle of a unified market and its corollary, the free movement of 
goods, may not under any circumstances be made subject to the condition that there should 
first be an approximation of national laws, for if that condition had to be fulfilled, the 
principle would be reduced to a mere cipher. Moreover, it is apparent that the purposes of 
Articles 30 and 100 are different. The purpose of Article 30 is, save for certain specific 
exceptions, to abolish in the immediate future all quantitative restrictions on the imports of 
goods and all measures having an equivalent effect, whereas the general purpose of Article 
100 is, by approximating the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member 
States, to enable obstacles of whatever kind arising from disparities between them to be 
reduced. The elimination of quantitative restrictions and measures having an equivalent 
effect, which is . . . carried into effect by Article 30, may not therefore be made dependent on 
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measures which, although capable of promoting the free movement of goods, cannot be 
considered to be a necessary condition for the application of that fundamental principle". 
Art. 30 EEC offers citizens of the Common Market the possibility through the preliminary-
ruling procedure of securing the application of Community law in the national sphere, 
especially since they do not have to bear political aspects in mind to the same extent as the 
Commission44. 
Technical standards drawn up by private institutions and therefore not legally binding, do not 
count as measures having equivalent effect within the meaning of Art. 30 EEC. There is a 
different case, however, where compliance with them is mandatorily prescribed de jure or de 
facto by government action45. To date, the Court of Justice has found a measure of equivalent 
effect in only one case where the measure was neither a sovereign one nor binding on its 
addresses. It arrived at this conclusion, against the Advocate General's opinion, in the case of 
the "Buy Irish" publicity campaign by the Irish Goods Council, an association of leading 
representatives of the business world set up as a company limited by guarantee, without 
investment of capital, to promote the sale of Irish products. It attributed the campaign as a 
whole to the Government, which had established the programme, made the major staffing 
decisions and borne the overwhelming share of the financing46. Comparable circumstances 
are not present in the case of technical standardisation by private standardisation bodies47. 
  
1.2. Development of the case law on Art. 36 EEC 
On the conditions set out in Art. 36, Member States may break the prohibition in principle on 
quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect and maintain or introduce 
regulations or practices restricting free movement of goods, in order to protect the objects of 
legal protection listed. These measures may not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States (Art. 36 EEC, 
second sentence). 
With its underlying pro-integration approach, the Court has given this exceptional provision a 
narrow interpretation in several respects. Among the principles that can be taken as 
established are: Art. 36 covers only situations of a non-economic nature and cannot be 
understood as an escape clause against the economic effects of the opening up of markets48; 
the list of objects of protection in Art. 36 EEC is exhaustive and cannot be extended by 
conclusions from analogy, Art. 36 EEC is not intended to reserve particular fields for the 
exclusive competence of Member States49. 
  
1.2.1 Art. 36 EEC and Member States' room for manoeuvre 
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Only where Community directives provide for complete harmonisation of all measures 
necessary to safeguard the objects of legal protection mentioned in Art. 36 EEC and there are 
Community procedures to secure compliance, are Member States no longer able to appeal to 
Art. 36 EEC and take individual measures. Instead, they must press for amplification or 
amendment of the Community regulation, or take advantage of escape clause procedures 
contained in the Community regulation50. Here verification is required as to whether a 
Community provision constitutes a definitive regulation or was introduced only as a 
minimum measure, not ruling out additional national provisions51. Moreover, the content of 
the individual Community regulations and harmonisation programmes must be looked at to 
see whether all relevant objects of protection under Art. 36 EEC are already covered52. In 
other words, Community regulations have a blocking effect on Member States only to the 
extent that they actually meet the individual interests in protection under Art. 36 EEC. 
Should, for instance, a Community regulation take account of the mechanical hazards of a 
product but not the toxic ones, to that extent Member States' competence will remain. 
This applies, too, where hitherto unrecognised hazards become manifest in an area that has 
been definitively regulated by the Community. Here the widespread escape clause procedures 
should ensure that the stage of harmonisation reached is not endangered by the need for 
additional action to guarantee protection of the objects of Art. 36 EEC; the desire of a 
Member State for additional safety measures will either prove unfounded following testing by 
the Commission or in breach-of-treaty proceedings before the ECJ, or else be incorporated in 
the Community regulation with effect for all Member States, where it proves justified and the 
necessary majority for an adaptation is secured. 
  
1.2.2 Proportionality controls by the ECJ 
The Court of Justice subjects measures justified in principle under Art. 36 EEC to strict 
proportionality control, refusing approval for a measure where the same objective could be 
secured by measures that less restrict internal Community trade. The Court of Justice has 
concluded from this that, for instance, Member States "may not needlessly require technical 
or chemical analyses or laboratory tests where the same analyses and tests have already been 
carried out in another member country and these findings are available to their authorities or 
can be made available on request"53. Admissibility in one Member State does not 
automatically justify admissibility in another unless a directive explicitly lays down mutual 
recognition of permits and certification. However, an importing Member State must for 
purposes of permits take similar tests and analyses already done in another Member State into 
account. Administrations of Member States must provide each other with administrative 
assistance in making test results available54. The Court of Justice has frequently stressed that 
it is in the interest of free movement of goods to carry out sanitary controls in the country of 
manufacture, and that it is appropriate for the sanitary authorities of the Member States 
concerned to co-operate in order to avoid duplication of checks55. This leaves untouched the 
power to carry out random checks. The Court has also concluded from the proportionality 
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principle that the aim of reducing the burden on the administration or reducing public 
expenditure does not justify any stronger intervention, and that administrations are bound to 
make reasonable efforts to secure the necessary indications by active administrative efforts56. 
  
1.2.3 Member States' leeway in evaluating questions of health protection and safety design 
In recent years voluminous case law has developed on the question of health protection 
within the meaning of Art. 36 EEC57. It amounts to allowing Member States to engage in 
preventive health policies of their own where a Community regulation is absent, with the 
objective of keeping foodstuffs as free as possible from hazardous substances. National 
regulations may take account of climatic conditions, the population's eating habits and their 
state of health, and therefore differ from one country to another. Continuing uncertainties 
over scientific findings may also be taken into account. 
On the basis of Art. 36 EEC, the Dutch prohibition on nisin as a conservation additive for 
processed cheese intended for the Dutch market, was found to be justified: 
"If these studies have not yet reached unambiguous conclusions regarding the maximum 
quantity of nisin that a person can consume without serious danger to health, this is mainly 
because of the fact that evaluation of the risk bound up with consumption of this additive 
depends on a number of variable factors, in particular on eating habits in the country 
concerned and on whether, in determining the maximum quantity of nisin to be set for every 
product, not only the level to be set for a particular product, for instance processed cheese, is 
to be taken into account, but also those to be set for all other products to be rendered 
imperishable"58. 
When complete harmonisation has not been achieved, Member States remain free to take 
action if uncertainties still exist at a given stage of research. Both the eating habits of their 
population and the needs of free movement of goods must be taken into account to determine 
the extent to which they wish to guarantee protection of the health and life of people59. 
Accordingly, the Dutch ban on adding vitamins was declared to be compatible with 
Community law on the grounds that, although an health-endangering effect was not proven, it 
could not be ruled out given excessive consumption in the whole diet in its unforeseeable, 
unverifiable composition; the Court added, however, that marketing is to be permitted where 
the addition of vitamins corresponded to a genuine need, in particular in regard to technology 
or nutrition60. 
A particularly illuminating judgment regarding the far-reaching powers that the Court allows 
Member States in the area of preventive health protection was given in Case 97/8361. The 
Court held that Member States are free to set threshold values for microbiological substances 
in milk, to protect particularly sensitive consumers that may be well below the endangerment 
levels for normal consumers discussed by scientists, but not established with certainty. 
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Account may also be taken here of national usage regarding the storage of milk products 
between the moment of purchase and consumption. 
Member States may also prohibit pesticide residues in foodstuffs entirely, leading to a trade 
block in treated food and vegetables. In this connection, they may adopt regulations which 
may be different according to the country, climatic conditions and the population's eating 
habits and state of health, and set different rates for the same pesticides in different 
foodstuffs62. While this judgment found a policy for preventing pesticide residues in 
foodstuffs to be compatible with Community law, another judgment found a policy to limit 
additives in food preparation to be permissible. Imported foodstuffs can accordingly be 
subjected to national licensing procedures which test not only whether the colouring agent 
used may be dangerous to human health, but also whether there is a technological, economic 
or psychological need for colouring the foodstuffs concerned. In assessing hazards, Member 
States must here take account of the findings of international scientific research, especially 
the work of the Community's Scientific Committee on Foodstuffs, but may in evaluating 
them into account take specific eating habits in the importing Member State63. 
In judgments on food additives and pesticide residues, the Court of Justice deduced from the 
proportionality principle of Art. 36 EEC, second sentence, the requirement that marketing 
bans be restricted to the extent actually necessary for the protection of health. A marketing 
ban will have to be lifted where according to the state of international scientific research, a 
substance presents no danger to health and meets a genuine need, notably one of a 
technological nature. Moreover, parties concerned should be allowed the possibility of 
applying, in an easily accessible procedure which must be completable within an appropriate 
time, to have use of particular additives made admissible through a legal act of general 
effect64. On the basis of these criteria, the German beer purity law proved incompatible with 
Community law, on the grounds that it was disproportionate to rule out all additives 
admissible in other Member States on grounds of preventive health protection, instead of 
adducing proof of health risk for each substance65. The submission of the German 
government, the defendant, stating that beer was a foodstuff consumed in considerable 
quantities by the German people and that on general preventive health protection grounds, it 
was advisable to restrict the quantity of additives consumed as far as possible66, was rejected 
as insufficient. It was necessary to justify the exclusion of particular substances on grounds of 
specific hazards. 
A judgment of direct relevance for technical safety law is the one in case 188/84 on the 
licensing of woodworking machines in France67. The French conception of industrial safety 
starts from the idea that users of machinery must be protected against their own mistakes, so 
that machines must be designed in such a way that they can be used, mounted and maintained 
without risk (design safety)68. In Germany, by contrast, the principle is that the worker must, 
through thorough vocational training and further education, learn to handle any problem that 
might arise in machine operations. The Commission expressed the view that Member States 
ought not to block the import of machines based on other conceptions of industrial safety, but 
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that have proven to be just as safe as appliances in accordance with the national regulation69. 
The Court of Justice accepted this principle but arrived at a different conclusion: 
"Moreover, it may not prevent the marketing of products originating in another Member State 
which, in respect of the level of protection of safety and human life, are in line with what is 
aimed at in the national regulation. Accordingly, it would be contrary to the principle of 
proportionality for a national regulation to require that imported products should comply with 
every detail of the provisions and technical requirements applying to products manufactured 
in the Member State concerned, though they provide the same level of safety to users. By 
contrast, Community law in its present state does not oblige Member States to permit 
hazardous machines on their territory where these do not demonstrably guarantee the same 
level of protection to users on that territory"70. 
The Court of Justice ruled in favour of France, since the Commission, which was bringing the 
action, had not shown that the conception of industrial safety underlying the German safety 
provisions guaranteed the same safety for users of the machines as the French conception. It 
would even be irrelevant if it were statistically shown that machines manufactured according 
to the industrial safety conceptions of other Member States cause no more accidents than 
machines in accord with the French regulation, since mere consideration of statistics left out 
other factors such as the differing levels of employee training71. 
Lacking a Community regulation, accordingly, Member States are free to pursue their own 
safety conceptions and reject appliances and machines that cannot be shown to offer the same 
degree of safety, taking differing habits of use into account. The establishment of essential 
safety requirements according to the new approach is aimed at getting Member States to 
agree to a unitary safety conception or to several safety conceptions recognised as equivalent, 
so as to exclude in the harmonised area the sealing-off of markets by appeals to different 
ones. 
  
2. From special case to model the harmonisation method of the Low Voltage Directive 
Directive 73/23/EEC of 19 February 1973 on the harmonisation of the laws of Member States 
relating to electrical equipment designed for use within certain voltage limits - the Low 
Voltage Directive72 - with its new harmonisation technique of sliding reference to harmonised 
standards, became the model for the new approach to technical harmonisation and 
standards73. For many years it had been regarded by many officials in governments and the 
Commission as an original sin that ought not to be repeated74. With annual output worth some 
80,000 million ECU in 1981, Community internal trade in electrical appliances amounted to 
some 35,000 million ECU; an estimated 70% of turnover in the electrical sector comes under 
the Low Voltage Directive75. 
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2.1 Peculiarities of the electrical sector 
There are good reasons why, for many years, it was specifically only in the electrical sector 
that the general-clause method of reference to the European state of safety technology was 
applied76. These reasons also indicate that experience with the Low Voltage Directive can be 
transferred only to a limited extent to other areas of industry77. Electrical standardisation has 
for decades occupied a special place in all industrial countries. The rapid pace of 
development in the electrical field would have been inconceivable without a highly 
developed regulatory apparatus for technical safety, containing comprehensive provisions for 
the hazards arising from electricity, which is not directly perceptible by the senses. By 
comparison with other manufacturing sectors, safety standards have in electrical engineering 
by far the greatest importance within the whole set of relevant standards. Electrical standards 
are more highly systematised and intermeshed than in other areas. This is because despite an 
almost limitless variety of products, there are comparable modes of operation and sources of 
hazards, but also because electrical products are almost without exception, dependent on 
particular supply and transmission systems. This means that very often appliances and 
installations from the most diverse manufacturers are connected with each other. 
Accordingly, comprehensive, and in view of the very high international trade in this sector, at 
least internationally compatible provisions are essential for the numerous points of 
intersection, and in order to guarantee interchangeability of parts. This has meant that with 
electrical standards, by comparison with other industrial sectors, there is wide-spread 
technical consensus both nationally and internationally, a very high density of regulation and 
a particularly high degree of application and bindingness of standards78. 
The particularly rapid technical development here calls for correspondingly quick and 
independent possibilities of action and a flexible organisational structure in standardisation 
work. Due to the overall postive experience with private standardisation organisations, there 
are in most countries no special national provisions in the electrical area. Table 2 gives a 
picture of the set of electrical standards and other standards in 1986 worldwide, in Europe 
and in Western Germany, bringing out the particularly strong position of electrical 
standardisation and its autonomy in standardisation as a whole. 
Table 2: Numbers of electrical and other technical standards at national, regional and 
international levels in 1986(1) 
Level of 
standardisation 
Electrical All other sectors 
Worldwide IEC: 2,325 ISO: 6,401 
Europe CENELEC: 501 CEN: 159 
Federal Republic 
of Germany 
DKE in DIN: 6,792 DIN: 13,145 
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(1) Source: DIN-Geschäftsbericht 1986/87, 24-33. 
  
2.2 A conspectus of the Low Voltage Directive 
The Low Voltage Directive applies to all electrical equipment for use with a voltage rating of 
between 50 and 1,000 volts for alternating current and between 75 and 1,500 volts for direct 
current (Art. 1). It covers in particular household electrical appliances, portable tools, lighting 
equipment, wires, cables and transmission lines and installation equipment. The Directive 
does not apply to particular groups of appliances in which there is great public interest, 
covered by specific directives (electrical equipment for use in an explosive atmosphere79, 
electrical equipment for radiology and medical purposes, electrical parts for goods and 
passenger lifts, electricity meters) nor to electric fence controls nor radio electrical 
interference (see the list of exceptions in Annex II to the Directive). It is particularly 
important that even domestic plugs and socket outlets are also explicitly excluded80. 
Art. 2 lays down the basic requirements for marketable electrical products. Electrical 
equipment may be marketed only if "having been constructed in accordance with good 
engineering practice in safety matters in force in the Community, it does not endanger the 
safety of persons, domestic animals or property when properly installed and maintained and 
used in applications for which it was made". The reference to the state of the art - good 
engineering practice - means that what applies is technical development at a given point in 
time, not widespread recognition and a proof in practice of particular rules - which would 
mean that the rule would always lag behind steadily advancing technical development, as 
with the reference to "generally recognised rules of art" in the German Appliances Safety 
Act81. The affirmative statement that in the event of a differing level of safety technology in 
individual Member States, all ought to apply the highest level82, does not fully bring out the 
graded harmonisation machinery of the Directive, developed because the desired success in 
harmonisation at an enhanced safety level could not be ensured simply by having product 
requirements follow directly from such a formulaic prescription. 
Firstly, the principal elements of the safety objectives are listed in Annex I. This list of eleven 
safety objectives, kept extremely general in its terms, is a compromise between the countries 
that wished to content themselves with the general reference to good engineering practice in 
safety matters (the general clause method in pure form), and those that called for the safety 
objectives to be specified more exactly83. The safety objectives contain, among others, the 
following statements: 
- Instructions on proper, risk-free use must appear on the electrical equipment. 
- Manufacturers' or brand-names or trademarks should appear on the electrical equipment. 
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- The electrical equipment should be made in such a way as to ensure that it can be safety and 
properly assembled and connected. 
- For protection against hazards that might arise from the electrical equipment, technical 
measures are to be prescribed, so that if the equipment is used in applications for which it was 
made and is adequately maintained, then protection against direct and indirect electrical 
contact is guaranteed, no dangerous temperatures, arcs or radiation are produced, there is 
adequate protection against non-electrical dangers and the insulation is suitable for 
foreseeable conditions. 
- Technical measures are to be laid down to ensure that the electrical equipment meets 
expected mechanical requirements, is resistant to non-mechanical influences and stands up to 
foreseeable conditions of overload. 
It is presumed that electrical products meet these safety objectives when the equipment: 
- complies with harmonised standards (Art. 5), i.e. those produced by CENELEC; 
- where harmonised standards within the meaning of Art. 5 have not yet been drawn up and 
published, complies with the safety provisions of the International Commission on the Rules 
for the Approval of Electrical Equipment (CEE) or of the International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC) (Art. 6); 
- where no harmonised standards within the meaning of Art. 5 or international standards 
pursuant to Art. 6 exist, has been manufactured in accordance with the safety provisions of 
the Member State of manufacture, if it ensures equivalent safety to that required in the 
country of destination (Art. 7). 
In order not to block technical innovations, which are in general followed only after a certain 
lapse of time by technical standards84, products not complying with the technical standards 
mentioned but meeting the general safety objectives are also admitted to free movement (Art. 
8 (1)). Conformity with the safety objectives may be shown by an expert report (Art. 8 (2)). 
The free movement of electrical products meeting the safety objectives on the terms just set 
out may not be impeded on safety grounds (Art. 3). 
The presumed conformity of products with technical standards within the meaning of Articles 
5, 6 and 7 is attested by a conformity mark issued by an accepted national body85, or by a 
"certificate of conformity", or in the absence thereof, in particular in the case of industrial 
equipment, the manufacturer's "declaration of conformity" (Art. 10). Measures to restrict 
marketing or free movement may be taken by Member States only through the safeguard 
clause procedure (Art. 9). 
  
2.3 Individual questions on the Low Voltage Directive and its application 
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For years there was considerable uncertainty as to the interpretation of the Low Voltage 
Directive. This resulted not least from the regulatory technique, which was unusual for many 
Member States, and was not cleared up until the ECJ ruling of 2 December 1980 in 
preliminary ruling procedure 815/79-Cremonini v. Vrankovich86. On the basis of this ruling, 
the Commission once again summarised the legal framework of the Directive and its 
application in a explanatory communication to all concerned87. Further clarifications emerged 
from the meeting of the working group on elimination of technical obstacles to trade in the 
electrical sector held on 20 December 1983, on application of the Low Voltage Directive88. 
The following observations on individual provisions of the Low Voltage Directive are based 
essentially on the Commission communication and the findings of that working session. 
  
2.3.1 Harmonised standards 
The pillars of the Low Voltage Directive are the harmonised standards within the meaning of 
Art. 5. They definitively replace other categories of technical standards mentioned in the 
Directive. They are to be laid down by the standards organisations joined together in 
CENELEC by mutual agreement, and should be brought up to the latest state of technological 
advance and of development of the rules of art of safety technology (Art. 5 (5), second 
sentence). To date, CENELEC has in connection with the Low Voltage Directive, produced 
well over 100 harmonised standards. Harmonised standards may be arrived at by 
- drawing up a European standard, published by all national committees of CENELEC 
unchanged as a national standard, or by 
- use of a harmonisation document to be incorporated verbatim, without change, in their 
national standards by all national committees of CENELEC89. 
The Commission publishes the harmonised standards in the Official Journal; this publication 
is for purposes of information and thus has a purely declarative function90. The list published 
in September 1984 summarised harmonised standards agreed on up to that date91. The 94 
harmonisation documents92 covered extend to the following areas: 
Household appliances 43 
Electricity lines 15 
Work appliances and tools 13 
Lamps 7 
General safety provisions 6 
Measuring devices 5 
Miscellaneous 5 
The results of CENELEC's work may be adopted by majority vote, effective for outvoted 
committees too, though in principle unanimity is aimed at and almost always obtained93. This 
procedure of unanimous voting by the national committees accords with Art. 5 of the 
172
Directive, which says that harmonised standards are to be drawn up by "common 
agreement"94. This is justified on the basis that the Community legislator has left the method 
of reaching mutual agreement within the discretion of the standardisation bodies. Moreover, 
compliance with harmonised standards could not be mandatorily prescribed, but is merely a 
presumption that the safety objectives, the only decisive things, have been complied with. 
Finally, adoption and updating of the harmonised standards constitute a continuous process 
which in its effects is very similar to the procedure for adjusting directives to technical 
progress, which also operates by qualified majority. It should be added that the comparison 
between CEN and CENELEC specifically shows how much the adoption of harmonised 
standards and their adaptation to technical progress required on safety grounds is hampered if 
majority decisions do not also bind outvoted committees. Where there are serious 
reservations as to safety, the Member State, not the standardisation committee, has the 
safeguard clause procedure of Art. 9 open to it. 
In the case of many harmonisation documents, various types of national divergence were 
provided for, namely 
- mandatory departures of type "A" on the basis of differing legally prescribed requirements 
as to the extent of safety; 
- mandatory departures of type "A" on the basis of the conditions of the electricity supply 
system; 
- departures of type "B" on the basis of particular technical circumstances, elimination of 
which is a matter for the standardisation bodies95. 
Following the ruling in the Cremonini v. Vrankovich case, it was clarified96 that type B 
departures are not admissible, since no discrepant national standards apply alongside the 
harmonised standards. Nor could type A divergences continue to claim any validity alongside 
a harmonised standard, since compliance with discrepant national safety provisions operates 
as a presumption of compliance with the general safety objectives only where no harmonised 
standards pursuant to Art. 5 or no safety requirements published pursuant to Art. 6 exist. 
They can be adduced only in connection with the safeguard clause procedure of Art. 9. 
In this explosive conflict of interests, the Commission seeks as far as possible to ensure that 
the safeguard procedure of Art. 9 is not opted for, but solutions are found in informal ways by 
removing national discrepancies or incorporating them in the standard concerned97. Indeed, it 
explicitly notifies Member States of the possibility of affecting the production of harmonised 
standards through the various standardisation bodies98. K. Fitting has the following to say 
about a remarkable practice by the German authorities of securing for themselves a right of 
participation in European standards99: 
"Following adoption of a harmonisation document by CENELEC" . . . "the DKE sends the 
competent German government department" . . . "initial copies of the drafts for incorporation 
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into national standards. The German government department, on the basis of the safeguard 
clause contained in the Low Voltage Directive, tests the substantive content of the standard to 
see whether there are serious technical safety objections to its adoption. If there are no 
grounds for applying the safeguard clause, a communication is sent to the DKE to the effect 
that publication in the relevant VDE publications can proceed. Following this publication the 
standard is finally also published in the Federal Gazette" . . . "with the consequence that a 
harmonised standard can now come about if the procedure in other Member States has 
likewise come to a positive outcome" . . . "Where the Federal Government has severe 
technical safety objections, it informs the DKE of these. There is no publication in the 
Federal Gazette, so that there can be no harmonised standard. Since the Federal Government 
is now applying the safeguard clause, it notifies the Commission of this fact, pursuant to Art. 
9 of the Low Voltage Directive". 
The safeguard clause, really intended as a remedy against the marketing of electrical 
equipment that complies with standards but is unsafe, is here being used so that the German 
authorities can check compliance of the intended harmonised norms with the general safety 
objectives. The new approach provides for a procedure of its own, though a Community one, 
in order to test harmonised standards adopted by the European standardisation bodies, or else 
the national standards that for the moment continue to apply, for compliance with the 
essential safety requirements100. 
National requirements arising from differences in climate, electricity network, voltages, types 
of plug and socket etc., which cannot be changed for a fairly long time, are incorporated into 
the text of the European standard as "special national conditions"101. 
Publication of safety requirements of international standardisation bodies pursuant to Art. 6 
of the Directive has remained of no importance in practice. Consistently, this possibility of 
reference is no longer taken up in the new approach. If even the standards organisations 
cannot manage to agree on harmonised standards pursuant to Art. 5, it is very probable that 
the objections raised are so weighty that Member States will oppose planned publication in 
the consultation procedure provided for by Art. 6 (3)102. Note should, however, above all be 
taken of the CENELEC mode of procedure: it takes up work of its own only when no 
international standards are likely to be available in a reasonable time, but otherwise bases 
itself on IEC standards and confines joint amendments to these to a minimum103. 
  
2.3.2 Equivalence of safety level 
Art. 7 has raised severe problems of interpretation. It says that where harmonised standards 
do not exist and no international safety provisions have been published, electrical equipment 
is admitted to free movement where it meets the safety requirements of the manufacturing 
country and offers the same safety as required in the country of destination. Following the 
Cremonini v. Vrankovich ruling, it may be taken as clarified that Art. 7 is transitional in 
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nature, applying only to the period where harmonised standards have not yet been established 
for the whole area of application of the Low Voltage Directive104. It is conceivable that in this 
transitional period national standards which lag behind the requirements of Art. 2 taken 
together with Annex I, that is, the general safety objectives, will in one Member State or 
another continue to apply. In this case, it should be ensured that the safety level prescribed in 
the importing Member State is not reduced. The importing country cannot however require 
the same safety also to be achieved by the same means, nor can it call for any higher degree 
of safety than that required by Art. 2 and Annex I105. 
Art. 7 also makes it clear that Member States may not link the marketing of electrical 
equipment that meets the prescribed safety objectives, to the condition of complying with 
particular provisions regarding quality or performance106. 
  
2.3.3 Safeguard clause procedure 
A Member State which for safety reasons prohibits the marketing of electrical equipment or 
restricts its free movement, need only, but must always, employ the safeguard clause 
procedure of Art. 9, if conformity with the general safety objectives is to be presumed 
because a conformity mark, certificate of conformity from an authorised office, declaration of 
conformity from the manufacturer or expert report pursuant to Art. 8 (2) is available. It has to 
inform the Commission and all Member States on measures taken, since all are - at least 
possibly - "involved", and has to indicate the ground for its decision. If a measures has been 
taken because of a shortcoming in a technical standard, the Commission sees itself as obliged 
to act in order to maintain a uniform safety standard in the Community even where other 
Member States have no objections to the national measures107, though the Directive does not 
provide for any action in this case. In its details, the safeguard clause procedure is rather 
unclearly and awkwardly constructed as regards its conditions, course and consequences. Its 
main function is in preventing Member States from unilaterally interfering with movement of 
electrical equipment meeting the general safety objectives, and in setting up a mechanism for 
mutual consultation and opinion. The Commission takes the role of a moderator here; it may 
secure opinions and pass them on, formulate recommendations or statements. 
  
2.3.4 The CENELEC certification agreement 
The application of a conformity mark to electrical equipment or the issue of a certificate of 
conformity by the authorised centers in Member States must, as the Cremonini v. Vrankovich 
judgment explicitly states, be recognised by all Member States as a rebuttable presumption of 
compliance with the technical standards pursuant to Articles 5, 6 or 7 and thus also with the 
safety objectives laid down in the Directive. This conformity mark or certificate thus gives 
entitlement to marketing and to free movement, subject to the safeguard clause procedure, in 
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the whole Community. Conformity marks are not only proof of conformity, but in countries 
where they have been issued by the competent centres in that country, additionally mean an 
indisputable commercial advantage. Accordingly, it is in the interest of manufacturers to 
secure the national mark of every Member State in which they wish to market their products. 
The CENELEC certification agreement of 11 September 1973 in the version of 29 March 
1983108 (CCA) facilitates the acquisition of such marks without needless repetition of tests. A 
manufacturer who has already secured a conformity mark on the basis of the prescribed tests 
may, by submitting the tests result on a form, secure the mark of another office too, in a 
rapid, informal procedure109. There are agreements between the test centres on initial 
inspection of the place of manufacture and on monitoring of the manufacturing process and 
of marketing. Where a manufacturer so desires, he can on the basis of one test acquire 
national conformity marks for all Member States more or less automatically. The 
Commission energetically supports this agreement, which it regards as an advance on the 
system of mutual recognition of conformity marks and certification in the Low Voltage 
Directive and as making introduction of a Community mark practically superfluous110. What 
is ultimately decisive is the initial test which does not necessarily have to be done in the 
manufacturer's country. 
The HAR agreement describes a procedure for issuing and using a jointly agreed marking for 
cables and insulated wires meeting the harmonised standards111. National test centres mark 
the cables and wires not only with the national test mark but also with the CENELEC test 
mark HAR. Accordingly, in the area of cables and wires, a European test mark does exist 
which all certification centres have to recognise. A further special procedure exists for 
construction components in electronics, regulated by the CENELEC Committee for 
Electronic Components (CECC)112.  
Internationally, however with a restriction mainly to Europe, the certification of electrical 
products is organised by the International Commission for Conformity Certification of 
Electrical Products (CEE), recently integrated into the IEC113. Since 1963, its predecessor 
organisation114, which until 1981 had also issued standards in the electrical sphere, had 
provided a system of certification, the CB procedure115. Under this system, tests by any 
member organisation are mutually recognised. The CB certificate as such does not give 
entitlement to application of a test mark, but merely facilitates the securing of other national 
test marks among the CEE member countries. 
Public supervision, government influence or even any sort of consumer involvement are 
scarcely conceivable in the CENELEC certification system. There is only very restrictively 
any competitive situation among individual test centres, or mutual verification. It is clear that 
in the case of certification, marketing interests outweigh verification of compliance with 
standards. Besides the necessary cross-co-operation among certification centres, an 
international certification system ought to require that certification be centralised in the 
individual Member States, precise requirements be placed on the staffing and equipment of 
centres, clear test criteria worked out and ample consensus reached among centres involved 
when defining the target safety standard. The requirements would have to be strict. Once 
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conformity marks have been conferred, marketing restrictions can be arrived at only through 
a time-consuming, rather cumbersome safeguard clause procedure. 
For certification questions arising in implementing the new approach, it would be useful to 
examine the extent to which use is made of certification by manufacturers even outside the 
industrial use of products, and what precautionary measures ought to or can be taken against 
misuse116. 
  
2.4 Inadmissible delegation of public tasks to private standardisation bodies? 
Finally, it should be considered whether the form of sliding reference to technical standards 
chosen in the Low Voltage Directive does not constitute inadmissible delegation of public 
tasks to private standardisation bodies. The ECJ has not dealt explicitly with this question, 
but has not expressed any doubt as to the admissibility of the reference technique employed 
in the Low Voltage Directive117. The possible criticism has been brought out very succinctly 
by E. Röhling118, in specific reference to the Low Voltage Directive, and can be summarised 
as follows: 
Sliding reference to technical standards in their current version is alleged to constitute 
inadmissible delegation of sovereign powers to non-sovereign organisations, since the tasks 
transferred go far beyond mere implementing powers, Community agencies are allowed 
practically no influence on the production of the technical standards and the balance between 
Community institutions is encroached upon. Reference to standards can allegedly not be 
justified even on the grounds that it is a very technical matter, regulation of which would 
present Community institutions with insoluble tasks. Given that only vague, undisputed 
general safety objectives are laid down, standard-setting bodies are alleged to decide by 
themselves as to the extent of hazards the public is to be exposed to. Community institutions, 
moreover, are not so much allowing themselves in the case of application of reference 
standards to be guided by consideration of the hazardousness of the individual products, but 
more by the extent to which international standards exist for the given areas, or at least 
international standardisation bodies are viable. The standard-setting bodies are made up 
largely of representatives of interested business circles, not subject to any effective public 
control, and on the whole do not offer the guarantee of setting technical specifications 
oriented solely towards the requirements of the common good (consumer and environmental 
protection, safety). Finally, there is an objection on grounds of democratic legitimation, 
namely that the however weak control over Council members by national parliaments is still 
undermined. 
These massive objections will not be gone into any further here in connection with the Low 
Voltage Directive. They arise in dealing with the new approach, in part with modified 
parameters, and will there be discussed in detail119. The Low Voltage Directive and the new 
approach have carefully been designed so as to leave the following legal fallback position 
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open120: products need meet only the essential safety requirements laid down by the Council. 
Harmonised standards, and to a restricted extent national standards, too, justify only a 
presumption of compliance with the general safety objectives, which could in principle also 
be met in other ways. Member States could satisfactorily meet their responsibility for 
consumer safety through the safeguard clause procedure as well as through the laying down 
of the fundamental safety requirements. 
  
3. The new approach to technical harmonisation and standards 
The development of a strategy aimed at guaranteeing the conditions for marketability of 
goods on European markets is among the essential legal requirements for renewed efforts to 
bring about the internal market. The new approach to harmonisation policy is justified above 
all by the principle of "equivalence" of safety policy objectives in Member States, supported 
by the Cassis de Dijon Judgment of 1978, which should require mutual recognition of 
national provisions121 and permit the generalisation of the reference technique first practised 
in the 1973 Low Voltage Directive122. But the political impulses and preliminary conceptual 
date much further back123. Both the European Parliament124 and the Economic and Social 
Committee125 had already recommended the reference method in their resolutions or opinions 
on the 1969 General Programme to eliminate technical barriers to trade, as an alternative to 
the "traditional" method of approximation of laws126. In the early 70's, these suggestions were 
taken up in the German literature, and the outlines of the new approach were formulated127: 
Directives should lay down "basic requirements", and conformity with technical standards 
should justify a presumption of compliance with these requirements128. In accordance with 
this presumption, Member States ought to take "all necessary measures to ensure that 
administrative authorities recognise as conforming with the basic requirements, such goods as 
meet standards laid down by the Commission, following consultation of the Standardisation 
Committee"129. Manufacturers can furthermore declare, and where necessary prove, the basic 
conformity of products not complying with standards130. 
But these proposals were by no means unanimously accepted. As suggested notably by 
Röhling131, the regulatory technique of reference to standards substantively meant delegation 
of legislative powers, inadmissible according to the EEC Treaty132; if the Community wished 
to take advantage of the expert knowledge of standardisation organisations, it ought first to 
guarantee the Commission's influence on the standardisation procedure in any such co-
operation, and then adopt the procedure of Art. 155, fourth indent, for the legal "ratification" 
of the results of standardisation133. 
This already brings out the major legislative policy problems to be overcome in working out 
the new approach. The following survey will however give legal assessment second place to 




3.1 The Information Directive of 20 March 1983 
The first legislative act in which the Community systematically embarked on the transition to 
a new harmonisation policy was the Directive of 20 March 1983 "laying down a procedure 
for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations"135. This 
Directive went beyond the existing restriction of harmonisation policy to the legal and 
administrative provisions mentioned in Art. 100 (1) EEC to cover also their non-
governmental appendage, namely national technical standards136. The directive was also 
innovative because of the measures by which it sought to oppose the emergence of technical 
barriers to trade. Art. 8 obliges Member States (and Art. 4 national standardisation bodies) to 
"immediately communicate to the Commission any technical draft regulation" (and national 
standards programmes and draft standards)137. This information is to enable the Commission 
to seek European solutions for the area concerned and initiate negotiations on such solutions. 
The legal instrument given by the Information Directive for this purpose is a time-limited 
anticipation of the primacy doctrine138, which replaces the "Gentlemen's Agreement" of 28 
May 1969139. The Commission or a Member State can cause adoption of technical regulations 
to be delayed for six months (Art. 9 (1)) and the Commission even by 12 months, if it 
announces an intended directive (Art. 9 (2)). Art. 7 (1) obliges Member States to ensure that 
standards are suspended for a period of six months if production of a European standard is 
intended. It is noteworthy that the Information Directive "institutionally" restricts the 
supremacy claim of European law by taking Member States' interests into account and giving 
standards institutions a possibility of collaboration140. These opportunities of influence are 
guaranteed by the Standing Committee of Member States' representatives set up by Art. 5, 
which shall be consulted on all important matters and may deal with any questions it finds 
important (cf. Art. 6 (5) and (6)). National and European standardisation organisations may 
themselves be represented on the Committee directly through experts or through advisers; in 
other respects they are recognised by Art. 6 (1) as permanent interlocutors. Member States' 
safety policy interests are taken into account by Art. 9 (3), which grants Member States the 
right "for urgent reasons relating to the protection of public health and safety" to introduce 
effective national provisions immediately. 
The objectives of Europeanisation of technical regulations and standards and the institutional 
innovations in the Information Directive already adumbrate important components of the new 
approach. The Information Directive itself admittedly imposes in the first place a very 
considerable burden of work upon the Commission. Following entry into force of the 
Directive on 1 January 1985, the Commission had by May 1986, already received 80 relevant 
communications, brought about the postponement of procedures in 32 cases and announced 
the adoption of directives in 10 cases141. 
Evidently, however, the "information ethics" documented in these figures is still not enough. 
At any rate, the Commission pointed out in a communication of 1 October 1096 that failure 
by Member States to comply with their information and postponement obligations was an 
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infringement of Community law from which citizens of the States concerned could derive a 
right to non-application of provisions enacted in contradiction with the provisions of the 
Information Directive142. The Commission can base its legal position on ECJ case law on the 
direct effect of secondary Community law. However, the expectation that the postponement 
periods provided for in the Information Directive could allow European solutions for the 
pertaining technical regulations and standards to be found and applied would be unrealistic. 
The most important effect of the Information Directive is no doubt instead that the creation of 
an information system at the Community level and the involvement of the Member States and 
their standardisation organisations in the process of Europeanisation of technical regulations 
and standards143. 
This assessment is confirmed by the proposals submitted by the Commission on 20 February 
1987. By these, the scope of the Information Directive is to be considerably expanded, 
extending in future to farm products, foodstuffs and fodder, pharmaceuticals and 
cosmetics144; at the same time, it is intended that the Standing Committee set up by Art. 5 of 
the Information Directive should be involved in working on standardisation contracts (Art. 1 
(2)). The postponement periods in Art. 9 of the Directive are not extended. However, in the 
future, communication of a proposal for a directive to the Council (and not only 
announcement of a corresponding "intention") would bring on the postponement obligation 
(Art. 1 (3)(b)). The Commission's explanatory document of 13 February 1987145 stresses that 
the various postponement periods resulting from the announcement to Member States of an 
intention and the communication of proposals for directives to the Council are not to be 
combined. 
  
3.2 Harmonisation of safety objectives and their implementation in standards 
The overstraining of the Community's law-making capacities by procedures under Art. 100 
(1) EEC has led to the testing of three146 strategies to reduce its burden. All are to be 
continued under the new approach. In accordance with the extensive interpretation of Art. 30 
EEC147 advocated by the Commission following the Cassis de Dijon decision148, in areas 
where reliance can be placed on mutual recognition of national regulations and standards, 
harmonisation of laws is to be avoided where possible; existing regulations and standards are 
instead to be checked for proportionality149. The scope of this strategy is, however, limited150. 
Another way of unburdening the cumbersome procedure of adopting new directives is 
through the delegation of power to enact implementing provisions to the Commission 
pursuant to Art. 155, fourth indent151. The White Paper mentions the success of this 
method152, which however cannot easily be reconciled with efforts at increasing involvement 
of standardisation organisations in harmonisation policy153. The third method of allievation, 
the reference technique first practised in the Low Voltage Directive of 19 February 1973154, 
is unambiguously and emphatically favoured in the new approach. 
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This means, in the White Paper's terms, that harmonisation of legal regulations should in 
future be confined to "binding health and safety requirements", to "basic preconditions for a 
product's marketability", while production of relevant technical specifications should be left 
to European standardisation organisations155. The allaying effect of this inclusion of 
standardisation organisations in harmonisation policy depends in the first place on the 
demarcation between the "basic safety requirements" and the "technical specifications". The 
Low Voltage Directive, explicitly emphasised in the explanatory memorandum on the new 
approach as a model for the new regulatory technique156, does describe the mandatory safety 
objectives comprehensively, but only by vague general clauses157. Descriptions of this nature, 
as the literature on the Low Voltage Directive brings out, allow only preliminary 
assessments; they become "practically applicable. . .only by actually adducing the 
standards"158. It is particularly this consequence of the reference technique that the new 
approach evidently does not wish to accept. According to the preparatory document of 31 
January 1985, the essential safety requirements must be worded precisely enough "in order to 
create, on transposition into national law, legally binding obligations which can be 
imposed"159. The Model Directive approved by the Council contains the following addition: 
"They should be so formulated as to enable the certification bodies immediately to certify 
products as being in conformity, having regard to those requirements in the absence of 
standards"160. 
This addition has led to considerable hesitation and controversies. Pelkmans, for instance, 
warns161 that it threatens to endanger the whole planning of the new approach and ought 
therefore to be understood merely as a call for involvement of national certification centres in 
cases where neither European or national standards guarantee the safety of a product162. In its 
report on technical harmonisation and standards in the Community163, the European 
Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy called for 
the deletion of this addition, and an April 1986 question by one MEP164 suggested that it be 
treated as non-mandatory. The answer to this question, communicated by Lord Cockfield on 
behalf of the Commission165, makes the legal position clear and yet seems to dodge the issue: 
As far as the requirements on the precision of safety objectives are concerned, the addition is 
"only a comment intended to define the relationship between the essential safety 
requirements (point B III) and the means of proof of conformity and effects (point B V 3). An 
essential aspect of the harmonisation arrangements proposed by the Commission in its 
communication of 31 January 1985 is that the manufacturer would be able to choose between 
certification by a third party on the basis of the essential requirements, on the one hand, and 
the declaration of conformity with standards, on the other. There is therefore a choice that 
makes it possible to retain the voluntary nature of standards, which is the basic feature of 
the Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata..  
The Commission in no way takes the view that this principle will necessarily lead the Council 
to adopt directives laying down very detailed essential safety requirements, since the testing 
bodies appointed by the Member States to check the conformity of manufactured products 
with the essential requirements, normally have expertise based on lengthy experience. This 
ensures that the obligations deriving from a directive that has clearly formulated the standard 
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of safety to be attained by the products in question will be correctly interpreted and applied.  
It will also be possible for suitable informal procedures to be established in each case, so as to 
allow satisfactory co-operation between the appointed certification and testing bodies, thus 
ensuring that the provisions of the directives in question are correctly and uniformly applied . 
. . The Commission considers, in any event, that such a question should be examined in 
connection with each specific case, rather than form the subject of a general discussion on the 
interpretation of the Council Resolution of 7 May 1985". 
In the meantime, the first directives or draft directives based on the Model Directive are 
available, providing clearer indications of the function of the essential safety requirements. 
The Directive for simple pressure vessels166, with its descriptions of the essential safety 
requirements, is not comparable with the general clauses of the Low Voltage Directive. The 
characteristics of the materials to be used are laid down in detail in Annex I167; further 
binding provisions deal with design and loading capacity, manufacturing procedures and 
requirements for commissioning the vessels. Regarding the volume of these provisions, the 
explanatory statement to the draft directive says that "differences of principle regarding 
aspects of safety" ought to be decided by the competent bodies of the Community, since 
otherwise they would "inevitably reappear at the level of European standardisation bodies"168. 
The second draft directive submitted on the basis of the new approach concerns the safety of 
toys169. Art. 2 (1) lays down a general safety obligation whereby manufacturers must bear in 
mind the foreseeable use of toys and the "normal behaviour of children". This general safety 
obligation is specified in Annex II, initially in "general principles", according to which 
children are to be protected not only against risks due to the construction and composition of 
the toy, but also, where design measures are not possible, against those inherent in its use170. 
The lengthy Annex II establishes requirements on physical and mechanical properties, 
flammability, chemical properties, explosion, electrical properties, hygiene and radioactivity. 
Annex IV additionally contains differentiated requirements as to warnings concerning the age 
of children, nature of the toys, and risks involved. All categories of risks and warnings were 
contained in the Commission's 3 July 1980171 Draft Directive, from which they were taken 
over into the proposal for a framework Directive of 23 June 1983172. The 1980 draft dealt in 
Annexes V and VI with Community standards for physical and technical properties and the 
flammability of toys, but in 1983 corresponding standards were incorporated into separate 
directives173. A simplified procedure for amending these mandatory standards had been 
provided for both in 1980 (Art. 17) and in 1983 (Art. 13). The regulatory technique of the 
draft as now submitted thus builds on preliminary work already done. This continuity 
emerges particularly clearly from the fact that the binding standards in the 1980 and 1983 
drafts merely took over provisions from the European standardisation organisations, seeking 
to make them mandatory even though not yet formally adopted at the time by the national 
standards organisations. These draft standards have since been developed into mandatory 
European standards. Article 5 of the new proposal can therefore now refer to the very 
regulations that previous drafts sought to make legally binding174. 
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The Commission's most recent project to date175, the proposal for a directive on construction 
products176, is likewise the resumption of a long-discussed project177. The development is 
very easy to follow, because the original draft provided for wide-ranging "implementing 
powers" for the Commission pursuant to Art. 155, fourth indent, and provoked considerable 
resistance from business circles involved. On the other hand, the circumstances that had at the 
time induced the Commission to take advantage of these regulatory powers have not 
changed: there are still hardly any European or international standards for construction 
materials, and the multiplicity of existing national standards referring to them relates to 
differing national statutory provisions on buildings178. In these circumstances, the 
Commission's proposal cannot apply the new approach in the way the Model Directive 
assumes. The safety requirements in the Directive on construction materials contain essential 
requirements to which construction works, i.e. buildings and civil engineering works, have to 
conform, and which may influence the specific characteristics for products relating to such 
points as stability, safety in case of fires, hygiene, health, the environment, safety in use, 
durability, protection against noise and energy saving179. The Commission explicitly stresses 
that it would not, in general, be possible on the basis of these requirements "to directly 
establish a presumption of conformity with the essential requirements by means of a type-
examination carried out by an approved body"180. Since the regulatory lacunae between the 
"essential requirements" and actual construction products will not in the foreseeable future be 
closed by European standards either, the Commission proposal provides for "European 
technical approval". Approval bodies authorised by Member States should, "on the basis of 
common approval guidelines for the product", in co-ordination with approval bodies in other 
States issue "European technical approval" on the legal basis of this directive (Annex II, (3) 
(1) and (6)). 
The multiplicity of regulatory proposals through which the Commission has sought to apply 
the new approach confirm the doubts of earlier commentators on the feasibility in practice of 
the Model Directive181. It also corresponds to the pragmatically sibylline statements by its 
leading supporters182. These were to the effect that, when delimiting "essential safety 
requirements" in need of harmonisation from mere specifications of those requirements 
which need not to be uniform, the ideas of the Model Directive could obviously not be taken 
over without review; instead, this delimitation would in each case have to be oriented 
according to the state of national and international standardisation, the range and objects of 
provisions in force, the nature of the risks concerned and the likely product users. 
It should be noted that these internal differentiations inevitably affect a further area already 
mentioned in the preparatory document to the new approach183 and now specifically stressed 
in the proposal for a directive on construction products184: the abandonment of detailed 
design specifications in favour of "performance" standards. The distinction between 
"performance" and design is evidently intended not merely to paraphrase the difference 
between "safety objectives" and their "specifications", but at the same time to refer to a more 
general competition-policy dimension of the debates on the regulatory technique of product 
safety law. The preferability of performance standards is because as repeatedly asserted in the 
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U.S., such provisions leave room for technical innovation and make it harder to turn the 
standard-setting process into a way of warding off competition185. 
The theoretically clear distinction between performance and design standards in the practice 
of standard setting has repeatedly lead to wellnigh unsolvable problems of demarcation. It 
may, moreover, prove questionable from a safety policy viewpoint where and in so far as 
alternative design solutions are not conceivable186. Accordingly, the Draft Toy Directive, to 
the extent that it deals with chemical properties of toys, contains threshold values for 
particular substances and references to relevant prohibitions in Community law187. The 
explanatory statement on the proposal for the Directive on simple pressure vessels points out, 
in connection with restrictions relating to materials, a further problem with performance 
standards188: the development of suitable certification procedures and mutual recognition of 
conformity certifications becomes more urgent and at the same time more difficult as the 
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The need to supplement the new approach to technical harmonisation and standards with a 
coherent European product safety policy 
The declared primary objective of the new approach to technical harmonisation and standards 
is to overcome the stagnation in law approximation policy and thus promote the realisation of 
the European internal market. Our survey of the most important aspects of the new approach 
has, however, already shown that the regulatory technique of reference to standards 
continually comes up against problems of product safety policy. Let us mention only the 
controversies about the degree of perception of the "basic safety requirements"1, the unsolved 
problems of recognition of national certification2, the decision-making powers of Member 
States under the safeguard clause procedure3and the endangerment of internal market policy 
through the reservations in Art. 100 a (4) SEA4. The following sections will go beyond these 
already visible points of contact to systematically consider the effects of the new approach on 
the beginnings of a European safety policy. It will not question the principle of the regulatory 
aspects of the new approach, but instead seek to bring out the ensuing problems the 
Community will have to solve if it is to push through its new harmonisation policy5. 
  
1. Product safety obligations 
Wherever it harmonises areas of law that also involve the safety of products, the Community 
must lay down a binding or optional European safety level. Here, the "traditional" method of 
approximation of laws has led to a many-faceted range of product safety duties. The Low 
Voltage Directive6 provides for protection only given "proper use". The medicaments 
Directive7 uses the same standard. By contrast, the consumer policy programmes of 1975 and 
1981 used the terms "normal" or "foreseeable"8. This formulation was taken up both in the 
preamble to the Directive on cosmetics9 and in the decision on the exchange of information 
on product hazards10, whereas the "new impetus for consumer protection policy" speaks only 
in general terms of the "need" to set "safety requirements at the Community level"11. The 
Product Liability Directive12, finally, refers to the justified safety expectations of users 
"taking all circumstances into account", in particular the "reasonably" foreseeable use. The 
relevant formulations in the model Directive of 4 May 198513 are kept vague: ". . . products . . 
. may be placed on the market only if they do not endanger the safety of persons, domestic 
animals or goods when properly installed and maintained and used for the purposes for which 
they are intended". Furthermore, "in certain cases, in particular with regard to the protection 
of workers and consumers, the conditions set out in this clause may be strengthened 
(foreseeable use)". The vagueness of this text seems striking; first, "intended" use is 
introduced as the normal criterion, but then the rule-exception relationship is reversed again 
because the reference to protection of workers and consumers applies to almost all 
conceivable goods; furthermore the tightening up of safety obligations in the areas mentioned 
is only a prospective possibility, and finally inevitable differentiations such as those of users' 
age are lacking. In any case the structure of the Model Directive shows the Community's 
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general tendency to orient the level of protection in consumer goods to "foreseeable" use. 
Furthermore, even the first two directives or proposals for directives submitted on the basis of 
the Model Directive introduced an unavoidable differentiation. While the Directive on simple 
pressure vessels seeks to guarantee the safety of persons, domestic animals and goods only 
given "proper use"14, toy manufacturers have to take "foreseeable" use into account, bearing 
in mind the "normal behaviour of children", and also take differences in children's ages into 
account15. The framework of the Model Directive is of fundamental importance in other 
respects too. It takes account of the fact that the reference method leaves the Community 
legislator's responsibilities for product safety unaffected and that harmonisation covering 
broad groups of products presupposes the laying down of appropriate safety duties. We will 
later return to the question whether this insight - still expressed in the Model Directive in 
relatively open, and above all non-mandatory, formulations - is to lead to the positive 
introduction of a Community general clause on product safety16. 
  
2. Internal market policy priorities and the demonstration project on accident information 
systems 
The list of "criteria for choosing priority areas", attached to the Model Directive of 7 May 
1985 and aimed at explaining its intended scope17, mentions mainly regulatory criteria. In 
principle, the new approach will be appropriate only where it is genuinely possible to 
distinguish between "essential requirements" and "manufacturing specifications" where the 
requirements for protecting safety make "inclusion of large numbers of manufacturing 
specifications" unnecessary18, and where, as with many "engineering products and building 
materials" not yet covered by Community regulations, essential safety requirements can be 
defined for a "wide range of products". The Commission White Paper19 sets the rather 
legislative criteria of the Model Directive in a more ambitious integration policy context. The 
legislative technique of reference to standards is assigned far-reaching functions: it is to 
enable the Community to create an expanding and flexible internal market, to increase the 
competitivity and innovative capacity of European industry and promote the introduction of 
new technologies. If the regulatory technique of the new approach is to be understood from 
the viewpoint of the ambitious policy perspectives of the White Paper, then law 
approximation projects brought in will be oriented towards industrial policy priorities. But 
even where the practice of harmonisation policy is pragmatically oriented towards the 
chances of implementing harmonisation measures, tensions between internal market policy 
and product safety policy priorities can be foreseen. For product safety policy, the 
Community has with the "demonstration project on a Community accident information 
system"20 created a mechanism which can, by collecting and assessing data on the number 
and severity of accidents, supply (among other things) knowledge about hazards arising from 
consumer goods and therefore contribute to clarifying where safety policy action is needed21. 
The discrepancies between internal market priorities and product safety policy priorities 
again bring up a conflict of objectives that already marked "traditional" approximation of 
laws22. The sixth recital and Art. 1 (2) of the decision on the demonstration project, at the 
same time show a way that would at least allow this conflict of objectives to be dealt with: 
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findings of accident research should be used in defining safety objectives and drawing up 
standards. This might be done by, for instance, carrying out in-depth studies on product risks 
preferentially in areas where the Commission has ordered a new standard or in which it has 
been presented with objections regarding the safety conformity of standards or certifications. 
This kind of feedback would of course assume that the Commission and the Standing 
Committee already set up by the Information Directive of 28 March 198323, and now 
entrusted also with the co-ordination tasks connected with the new standardisation policy24, 
would co-operate with the committees active in the area of product safety policy25. 
  
3. The primacy claim in the new approach and Member States' safety interests 
Even assuming the admissibility in Community law of reference to standards26, this does not 
mean that applicability of this regulatory technique is guaranteed. Experience shows that 
transposing directives into national law is a thorny process that has at all stages, from 
incorporation of the directives into national legislative acts up to judicial and administrative 
practice in Member States, to come to grips with varied resistance27. In the case of the new 
approach to technical harmonisation and standards, a regulatory technique justified on 
internal market policy considerations and unfamiliar to many Member States is to be 
additionally pushed through against other legal traditions and political demands28. Even now, 
a whole range of lines of resistance on safety grounds can be discerned. 
  
3.1 Conflict potential 
Following the model of the Low Voltage Directive of 19 February 197329, directives adopted 
on the basis of the new approach are to secure full harmonisation of the areas and types of 
risks covered30. They are therefore to be "directly effective", have primacy over contrary 
national law and "block" legislative activity. But all these doctrines on the effects of 
European directives, though recognised in principle, may cause considerable difficulties of 
application in practice. Extension of the doctrine of direct effect to directives is a reflection of 
the shortcomings of transposition in Member States; the doctrine therefore merely states that 
individuals may appeal against application of national law to the anti-Community conduct of 
the national legislator31. But the ECJ has now linked direct effect in favour of individuals 
with the conviction that "the relevant obligation (on the Member States) is unconditional and 
adequately precise"32. Accordingly, in the case of the new approach, controversy over the 
functions of the "essential safety requirements"33 can affect the applicability of the new 
directives. If in the future, the Community makes the safety objectives sufficiently precise "as 
to enable the certification bodies straight away to certify products as being in conformity, 
having regard to those requirements in the absence of standards"34, the chances for the 
application of European law increase; on the other hand, precise specification of safety 
objectives makes it harder to secure consensus when adopting new directives, and weakens 
the attractiveness of the regulatory technique to standardisation organisations. 
197
In applying the doctrine of primacy and blocking effect and also in connection with actions 
for breach of treaty brought by the Commission under Arts. 169 and 30 EEC, similar 
difficulties are foreseeable. The ECJ has given to understand that primacy of European law 
cannot depend on whether the primary motivation was internal market policy or safety 
policy35, and it follows from the judgment in the Cremonini v. Vrankovich case36 that 
Member States must, if they wish to assert their interests, keep to the procedures provided in 
the directives. These directives can and should, however, provide only a presumption of 
safety conformity of products bearing the relevant certifications. Controversy on the 
appropriate level of safety of products is therefore ultimately to be decided on the basis of the 
criteria laid down in the directives37. The wider the leeway for interpreting objectives left in 
the new directives, the greater the chance for Member States to secure their safety policy 
positions in the new procedures, even once they have formally transposed a directive. 
Explosive problems can continue to arise where a Member State takes additional measures to 
protect safety interests and decisions therefore have to be taken on the "blocking effect" of 
the new approach. The ECJ decisions in rebus Ratti38 and Grunert39 indicate that the Court 
wishes to base the "blocking effect" of Community law primarily on specific contradictions 
between the content of directives and Member States' legal provisions, and the ban on 
legislative action in an area dealt with by the Community assumes that the Community has 
also actually pursued its policy40. This again raises the question whether the Community 
ought not, in the interest of applicability of the new approach, to develop a more 
comprehensive product safety policy. 
  
3.2 Functions of the safeguard clause procedure 
All situations of dispute mentioned ultimately come down to the same point, namely whether 
the regulatory technique of reference to standards can establish itself not only as a strategy 
for internal market policy but also as a safety policy concept. The procedural provisions in 
the Model Directive guarantee that disputes about the European level of product safety can be 
brought in not only "preventively" in determining safety objectives and recognising standards 
and conformity certificates, but also "responsively" through subsequent objections to 
decisions taken at the Community level, via the safeguard clause procedure. 
The safeguard clause procedure, introduced by the Model Directive, had to go beyond the 
usual type of safeguard clause, given the merely presumptive effects of recognition of 
standards and of conformity certifications. Its function is, though the typical wording of the 
safeguard clause may not make this explicit, to give Member States possibilities for action in 
the event of hazards not yet recognised when a Community standard was adopted41. The 
practice has become that Member States, through their representatives on the administrative 
or regulatory committees, are being allowed decision-making powers in safeguard clause 
procedures42. The Model Directive departs from these examples in both respects: not only 
new objections can be considered in the safeguard clause procedure, but also all findings 
already arrived at can be questioned, and the Commission is left alone to decide as to the 
justifiability of any objections43. This means that the very difficulties in reaching agreement, 
the Council was to free itself of according to the new approach, must under the safeguard 
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clause procedure be solved by the Commission, which must undertake the actual fine tuning 
of product safety policy differences among Member States. Even setting aside legal 
reservations regarding such broad delegation of decision-making powers to the 
Commission44, it seems scarcely conceivable that the safeguard clause procedure in the 
Model Directive can be developed into a routine measure with short periods of decision and 
that Member States will rely on its possibilities for protecting their rights. These 
considerations concern both follow-up market controls45 and co-operation between the 
Standing Committee and committees at the Community level in the area of product safety 
policy46. 
  
3.3 Majority decisions pursuant to Art. 100 a (4) 
As a preliminary test of the applicability of the reference technique of the new approach to 
Member States' product safety law, we may take the power given to Member States, 
following ratification of the Single European Act47, by Art. 100 a (4) to apply their own 
safety law as apposed to harmonisation measures adopted only by qualified majority. The 
Commission can presume "arbitrary discrimination" or "disguised restraint of trade" pursuant 
to Art. 100 (4), second sentence, and the ECJ establish misuse of the rights under Art. 100 a 
(4), first sentence, pursuant to Art. 100 a (4), third sentence, only where the Community 
regulations in fact take account of Member States' interests in protection. Harmonisation 
measures decided by qualified majority must therefore apply the relatively highest standard if 
the unity of the Common Market is not to be endangered. The Single European Act's 
provisions on environmental protection may have the same effect, in so far as product 
regulations simultaneously take account of environmental and consumer policy interests. By 
Art. 130 t, Member States may take more stringent protective measures even where the 
Council has decided unanimously, as long as the measures are "compatible with the Treaty". 
Controversies as to the meaning of Art. 100 a (4) will seem hypothetical only when assuming 
that only outvoted Member States may assert their rights arising out of this provision48, and 
that at any rate, in the case of directives laying down only essential safety requirements, the 
unanimity principle will de facto not be deviated from. Irrespective of this, however, it is 
possible to link systematic conclusions with Art. 100 a (4). If even qualified majority 
decisions of the Council do not bind Member States, or only to a very limited extent, how are 
the Commission's sole rights of decision under the safeguard clause procedure to be justified? 
Such objections can be refuted only with the argument that Art. 100 a (4) is a special 
arrangement, not in itself compatible with the supranational structures of Community law, 
which does not change the binding effect of directives adopted pursuant to Art. 100 (1) EEC, 
and leaves the Council's powers of delegation pursuant to Art. 155, fourth indent, EEC 
unaffected. In its decision-making practice, the Commission will nevertheless not be able to 
avoid taking account of the sensitivity of Member States to interventions in their safety law 
on grounds of internal market policy, expressed in Art. 100 a (4). 
  
3.4 Compliance with standards 
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Probably the most problematic aspects of the reference to standards, favoured by the Model 
Directive as a regulatory instrument for safety policy, arise from the difficulties of imposing 
standards that are not legally binding. A comparison with the move from mandatory to 
voluntary standards in the US is instructive. The American Consumer Product Safety 
Commission plays an active part in developing voluntary safety standards; it pays attention to 
their effects on competition, to the involvement of consumer organisations in standardisation 
procedures, and verifies the content of standards produced and compliance with them49. The 
Model Directive and the agreement between the Commission and the European standards 
organisations admittedly contain a number of procedural guarantees (in part still in need of 
precise specification)50. But the only preventive control mechanisms the Commission can use 
to affect actual compliance with standards are the recognition procedures for standards and 
for conformity certificates; it can affect the practice of national certification centres only 
indirectly through the provisions contained in the directives or proposals for directives on 
simple pressure vessels, toys and construction products51. These limited possibilities of 
influence are in line with the internal market policy perspectives of the new approach, 
according to which the point is to ensure free movement of goods in the Community, so that 
what matters is only the equivalence of standards and conformity certificates recognised by 
the Community. But this internal market policy perspective neglects the decisive question 
from the product safety policy viewpoint, namely how a move to voluntary standards can be 
combined with actual guarantees of safety interests. 
  
4. Regulatory lacunae in the Model Directive in the case of emergency measures and follow-
up market controls 
The Model directives and the directives or proposals for directives on simple pressure 
vessels, toys and construction products explicitly recognise Member States' power to take 
directly effective measures in the interests of protecting safety52. A Member State that takes 
advantage of this possibility has to have recourse to the safeguard clause procedure. But the 
legally critical cases are not those where a Member State loses, since then it must accept the 
Commission decision, but instead the Commission's possibility of imposing measures it finds 
justified Europe-wide on the Member States. 
The pressure for action arising in such cases is irresistible, for both economic and legal policy 
reasons. Unilateral measures by a Member State encroach on the unity of the internal market 
which is the very point of the new harmonisation policy. Unilateral measures are, moreover, 
admissible only in accordance with the safety objectives of directives. Where the 
Commission has found such measures to be legally justified, this implicitly means that 
Member States that do not share the Commission's interpretation and do not follow the 
measures it recommends are disregarding the product safety duty under Community law. 
The Model Directive's laconic formulation that the Commission has to "remind" such 
Member States of their duty to act53 in no way guarantees, even if taken over into individual 
directives54, a uniform application of follow-up market controls within the Community. In the 
case of such controls, Member States apply administrative powers that the Community can 
influence only indirectly55. As with mutual recognition of administrative acts in general and 
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of national conformity certificates in particular56, the Community must seek to bring about 
uniform practice by Member States in follow-up market control. 
The more recent relevant directives or proposals for directives have in principle taken 
account of this perception. The proposal for a Directive on "products which, appearing to be 
other than they are, endanger the health or safety of consumers"57 had provided for 
implementation of a Community-wide prohibition (Art. 2), obligations on Member States to 
apply such bans (Art. 3) and provisions for Europeanising nationally decided bans (Arts. 4 
and 6). However, the since adopted directive58 lacks these provisions, as does the Directive 
on simple pressure vessels59. The Directive of 1 December 1986 on airborne noise emitted by 
household appliances60 differentiates in the monitoring of national decisions between 
objections by Member States to European standards and disputes as to national standards and 
regulations (Art. 9); this differentiation shows what resistance the Europeanisation of control 
measures has to reckon with even when "only" the enforcement of Community provisions is 
involved61. The proposal for a Directive on toys62, finally, must, in addition to provisions on 
bans and recalls (Art. 7 (1), first sentence) and on Europeanisation of such decisions by 
Member States (Art. 7 (1), second sentence, (2) - (4)), contain criteria for the recognition of 
national test centres (Annex III). The danger of "subsequent" splitting of the common market 
through single-handed administrative action in implementation of Community regulations 
can be opposed by the Commission only if it moves to bring about intensive co-operation 
among competent centres in Member States and in the Community. 
From all this, the recall issue provides the plainest proof that realisation of the European 
internal market must involve Europeanisation of product safety law. The more decisively the 
Community applies the conditions for the free marketability of products by making product 
safety obligations uniform, the more pressing becomes the need to harmonise control 
measures whereby Member States comply with these duties. We shall return to the practical 
consequences of these connections63. 
  
5. Reference to standards and product liability 
For product liability in accordance with the Directive of 25 July 198564, the new 
harmonisation policy is not of direct legal importance. The legal liability duty of product 
safety in Art. 6 of the Directive is to be interpreted autonomously by the civil courts. It will 
neither be tightened up nor slackened off through the product safety obligations of new 
directives. The European or national standards a manufacturer must comply with in order to 
market his products do not exclude liability in civil law pursuant to Art. 7 d of the Directive. 
Nor is this "state of science and technology" which by Art. 7 e limits manufacturer liability, 
identical with the state of European and national standards65. 
The legal independence of product liability and product regulation does not, however, in any 
way rule out de facto mutual influence, which can indirectly have considerable legal effects. 
American law provides the clearest example of this, as being the furthest developed both in 
the area of product liability and in that of standard setting by federal agencies. Thus, detailed 
concepts for taking safety aspects into account in product planning have been extrapolated 
from the exhaustive case law on design faults66. It is indisputable that product liability 
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procedures offer information of relevance not only legally but also technically, which can be 
used by Government agencies67, standardisation organisations and individual firms. 
Admittedly, empirical studies have shown that while firms react to the excessive damages 
imposed under American law, these reactions concentrate often on developing strategies to 
deal with damage suits68. Standardisation organisations seem neither ready nor able to make 
use of the dynamic development of product liability systematically in their work69. 
Conversely, both the standards set by federal agencies and voluntary standards of the 
standardisation organisations play a considerable part in product liability actions, both to 
establish the state of the art and to demonstrate technically feasible alternatives70. 
Comparably intensive interactions between product liability law and product safety law are 
unknown in Community Member States71 and cannot be expected even after the Product 
Liability Directive is converted into national law72. Nevertheless, directed measures to 
increase the degree of effectiveness of the Product Liability Directive for European product 
safety policy are entirely conceivable. Thus, systematic exploitation of the case law and of 
documents of relevant actions in Member States could clarify whether the safety law 
demonstrated by European conformity certifications is accepted or whether the case law is 
questioning the integrative objectives of the new approach through autonomous and/or 
divergent safety requirements. It is, however, equally conceivable to use them in the 
Europeanisation of standards, in the procedures for recognition of standards and conformity 
certificates and finally in the carrying out of recall actions. 
  
6. Involvement of consumers in technical standardisation 
The new approach to technical standardisation confers on the European standardisation 
organisations CEN/CENELEC the task of defining the European safety standards, or de 
facto "the European level of safety", on the basis of defined safety objectives which have to 
be converted into specific mandates. The privatisation of the law-making process goes hand 
in hand with the opening up of the standardisation procedure for interested circles, including 
consumers. Consumer involvement is aimed at providing democratic legitimacy for the new 
regulatory approach73. Participation can only succeed where the consumer interest is brought 
in to actual standardisation. The organisation of this involvement thus stands in the centre of 
interest. However, conceptual and organisational weaknesses of consumer involvement 
suggest a rather pessimistic view regarding the attainment of the ambitious goal. Conversely, 
it would be false to draw the conclusion from foreseeable difficulties, which are perhaps 
removable only conditionally, that consumer involvement at the Community level should be 
rejected. For the possibilities that have been opened up offer chances to influence the 
standard-setting process that did not previously exist. Consumer involvement has to live with 
the constant dilemma of on the one hand, being measured against expectations it can perhaps 
never meet, and therefore always with an alibi at hand, and on the other, of grasping the 
opportunities offered, however limited the resources might be. 
  
6.1 Basic questions of consumer involvement 
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Consumer involvement in standardisation has existed in some Member States, such as the 
Federal Republic of Germany, France and Britain for several decades74. Without seeking to 
define the exact starting point for consumer involvement75, all three countries have points in 
common which take on importance in assessing consumer involvement under the new 
approach. All three have in the course of the consumers' movement, intensified involvement 
in the 1970's, and all three are at the same time, the only countries in the European 
Community that have "organised" involvement, namely the DIN Consumer Council76, the 
AFNOR Consultative Committee and the Consumer Advisory Committee. Studies on 
whether the opening up of the procedure to consumers has led to different contents for 
standards are not available. The only study on consumer involvement so far was done in the 
Federal Republic of Germany77. Questions to groups involved in standardisation - industry, 
government and consumers - indicated a basically positive self-image. The consumer 
involvement was felt to have led to a change in the content of standards. Nevertheless, the 
authors diagnose structural defects that must be removed. 
  
6.1.1 Privatisation and participation 
In its agreement on co-operation with CEN/CENELEC78, the Commission transferred the co-
operation between State and business begun with the agreement between DIN and the 
German Government, to a European level79. Since the Community is not a State and since 
CEN/CENELEC merely brings together the national standards organisations, specific 
Community problems arise about which there is no experience at the national level. While the 
Commission is by Council Decision of 16 July 198480 formally legitimated to reach 
agreement with standardisation organisations, it cannot conclude any legally binding 
agreements providing for delegation of Community powers to private standardisation 
organisations, since this is not provided for by the Rome treaties. The "general guidelines on 
co-operation" were therefore arrived at, and could de facto develop the same legal quality as 
an international treaty or a "memorandum of agreement"81. CEN/CENELEC are being asked 
to do too much in applying the general guidelines, since the representatives of the European 
economy in fact are not members82. Specifically, the question arises whether consumer 
involvement should be brought about through national contributions in the CEN/CENELEC 
standardisation committees or at the European level, through the already existing European 
consumer organisations. 
The general guidelines contain no specifications in this regard. All that is stated is that "the 
Commission will, when appropriate, contribute to the establishment of suitable 
arrangements". But the agreement between the German Government and DIN83 does not 
contain any provisions on involvement of interested circles either. In para. 1 (2) DIN merely 
undertakes to take the public interest into account. It is only the notes that make it clear that 
this provisions is among other things aimed at an increase of consumer protection in 
standardisation84. 
What the new forms of co-operation at the national and European level have in common is 
not only that the functional delegation of legislative powers is bound up with the decision not 
to set substantive regulations85, here in connection with consumer safety and health, but that 
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the opening up of the procedure to particular interested circles (consumers) is not bound up 
with any formally guaranteed rights86. The "suitable arrangements" mentioned in the general 
guidelines are worked out in a procedure that involves only the Community administration 
and the standards organisations (CEN/CENELEC). Those whose right to speak is at stake 
may be heard, to be sure, but have a weak position in the negotiating process. What 
requirements can be deduced from "real involvement" and from support from the 
Commission "as appropriate" for the establishment of "suitable arrangements"? That 
sequence of phrases shows the openness of a process, the object of which is no less than the 
legitimisation of the new approach. 
On 11 December 1987, the Commission took an official position on consumer involvement in 
standardisation87. It pressed for strengthening of consumer participation at the national level, 
in order to ensure that consumer interests could be input into the position of national 
representations on CEN/CENELEC. What the way forward is to be at a European level, is on 
the other hand left open. The Commission wishes to arrive at "an agreement with 
CEN/CENELEC on a new way of working". Whatever this may mean, institutionally solid 
consumer participation does not at any rate seem to be within immediate grasp. One year later 
on 4 November 1988, the Council confirmed the Commission's position by enhancing the 
necessity to push for an effective consumer participation at the Member States level and by 
weakening consumer participation at the Community level88. The conclusion of an 
"agreement" is no longer mentioned; instead reference is made to a priority programme for 
consumer fairs and to seminars that should be held to increase the consumer input in 
standardisation. 
Involvement understood in this way, without substantive provisions and without procedural 
guarantees, cannot remain without consequences for the consumer input to standards. For if 
the conditions of consumer involvement are partly determined by the standards organisations, 
the obvious thing to do is channel the consumer interests in standardisation in accordance 
with the criteria set by business of the proportionality of consumer representatives, the 
technical relevance of their contributions and feasibility89, in order to exclude alternative 
(non-professional as being lay, non-technical as being sociological, and non-feasible as being 
economically expensive) product concepts from standardisation90. The whole of consumer 
protection thus becomes subordinated to the existing goals of standardisation and can be 
brought about only in a piggyback procedure unless other vehicles can be found, in other 
words, unless the goal is necessary for other reasons than those of health or safety protection. 
In this way, safety policy becomes integrated into internal market policy. Alternative product 
concepts, humanised technology as the object of product safety law, are placed institutionally 
under a constraint to provide justification. Safety objectives that go beyond the "generally 
accepted state of the art" will be accepted only where consumers can show that existing 
practice has led to severe accidents. This sets the framework for consumer involvement in 
private standardisation. Privatisation does by no means ensure true participation. 
  
6.1.2 The consumer interest in standardisation91 
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Consumers want better products, safer products. Consumer demands regularly lengthen the 
manufacturer's proceedings. They call for a little "more" than the manufacturers are prepared 
to give. This is in line with the institutional framework for consumer involvement. Separate 
product concepts, in order to avoid the word "alternative", could be brought about only in an 
offeror process92, but not as an appendix to standardisation oriented towards the needs of 
business. The slight experience with the American offeror process has at any rate shown that 
consumers can if given the chance, arrive at their own conceptions of product safety. In 
Community Member States, there have not been many attempts as yet to develop technical 
standards from the consumer's "own" point of view. Even differentiated models of the 
determination of the consumer interest concentrate on the manufacturer's perspectives and 
seek to load their position with consumer policy significance. 
Bosma93 has dealt comprehensively with the issue. She demands that an adequate consumer 
orientation in standards answer three questions: 
(1) Should the final consumer be directly involved in standardisation, and if so, how can such 
a commitment effectively be organised? Who can adequately represent the consumer, or also, 
who speaks "for" the consumer in the relevant bodies? 
(2) Where is the necessary scientific background to come from for choosing priorities that 
take account of individual households or society as a whole? 
(3) Where is the necessary scientific mechanism to come from in order to analyse the needs, 
wishes and behaviour of individual consumers? 
In order to arrive at an answer on the basis of these three questions, Bosma splits consumer 
interest into three categories94: consumer interest and marketing, consumer interest and 
product technology, consumer interest and product information. Bosma includes under 
marketing, among other things, requirements on consideration of foreseeable misuse in 
design, but also for possible recall or else liability in the event of product defectiveness95. 
Consumer requirements on product technology would be expressed through the requirement 
for a technology assessment (especially with new technologies), an estimate of the social 
consequences of the introduction of new or modified products and a quality assessment by 
the relevant testing agencies96. The interest in adequate product information is stated to 
require provision of special safety marks97.  
This ambitious concept of determination of the consumer interest is, in Bosma's view, 
demanding too much from the individual consumer98. The latter, often unsure or even 
unaware of their wishes, far less being in a position to set priorities, would have to be 
represented on the relevant bodies by experts. Bosma does not fail to see the problems facing 
realisation of this kind of concept, but feels that an intensive process of scientific study 
(processing of surveys, etc.)99 could permit adequate establishment of a consumer interest in 
standardisation. 
It would be attractive to differentiate the model proposed still further or even develop it 
towards an alternative consumer concept of consumers themselves. It is attractive because the 
proposed categories for including sociological findings as to the behaviour of consumers, the 
acceptance of environmental technologies, etc. are very inviting. The job is valuable and 
necessary and should be done, but there are a number of structural problems that should be 
borne in mind. The concept does not so far take account of the specific conditions for 
determining the consumer interest at a European level. At a national level it is hard to 
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determine "the" consumer interest. At the European level differences in familiarity with 
technical dangers also enter in to complicate the matter further, as well as differences in 
technical solutions to deal with the danger. These social and technical differences have led to 
different safety philosophies in the Community which now have to be combined within the 
standards organisations. Consumers are afraid, and can cite examples, that standardisation 
oriented towards creation of an internal market will lead to a reduction in the level of 
safety100. Though effective consumer involvement might help to avert this risk, there should 
still be consideration of whether it is all desirable to make the various safety philosophies in 
the Member States uniform. Thinking by both political and technical bodies is only at its 
outset. Already, however, it can be seen that work in standardisation bodies does not aim at 
levelling out differing safety philosophies and regulatory approaches, but wishes to let them 
continue to co-exist101. 
Another thing that seems problematic from the European viewpoint is the scientific 
presentation of consumer participation favoured by Bosma. In a European organisation of 
consumer involvement this would lead to a predominance of the industrial countries, 
Germany, France, and Britain, while southern European countries, with their experiences of 
handling technology, would be excluded102. The opening up of the prospect reveals the 
internal contradictoriness of the idea of making consumer involvement scientific. Consumer 
organisations have to meet the requirements on professionality in standardisation bodies; this 
is the only way they can stand up to argument. At the same time, this necessity cuts them off 
from their rank and file, since consumer organisations in developed industrial countries also 
derive their body of experience from sources that do not meet scientific demand, or do so 
only in part. The tendency to emphasise the scientific aspects of consumer imvolvement may 
in the long term affect the very foundations of consumer work, and lead in Germany, France 
and Britain to more technology-oriented consumer advice, but at the European level the 
differences are liable to continue for quite some time. What should be done therefore is to 
develop a model that does not rule out non-professional experience, particularly in the 
southern European countries, in handling technology, but includes it in an integrated concept 
of involvement in standardisation. 
  
6.1.3 Chances of consumer involvement 
In view of the multiplicity of tasks assigned to European consumer involvement in 
standardisation, the question arises as to where consumer are to gain the ability to do the job 
in substantive terms. Questionnaires to national consumer representations in standardisation 
organisations in European Community Member States have recently confirmed what was no 
surprise: even at national levels, there is a shortage of experts and of the requisite financial 
resources103. Experts are likely to be available in significant quantity only if consumer 
organisations have more recourse to technicians in their field work. But this would lead to a 
fundamental restructuring of the direct contact between organisations and consumers. 
Consumer organisations are traditionally concerned with personal product consultancy. The 
use of new media promises a considerable lightening of the burden, but at the same time 
tends to lead to conflicts among organisations. Ecotrophologists would be replaced by 
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technicians who not only handle media control product consultancy, but also a wide of 
complaints104.Only such a step can create the conditions for gradually increasing the number 
of experts, yet even this kind of restructuring cannot solve the financial problems of 
consumer organisations. Effective consumer involvement in standardisation will always 
remain dependent on governmental subsidies. 
The present standardisation problems arising from consumer involvement have been 
summarised by the DIN Consumer Advisory Council's office in a manual105. Honorary work 
on behalf of consumers in standardisation committees continually impinges on the recurrent 
structural pattern of "reasons for standardisation - person - object of standardisation - 
asserting of interest". In detail: 
"Whether there are grounds for standardisation is decided ultimately by the manufacturers. 
Consumers are therefore dependent on the goodwill of the other side if they wish to 
encourage standardisation of a particular product. The situation looks somewhat brighter in 
the area of safety standards, since the Appliances Safety Act has given consumers the 
necessary impetus to push safety standardisation forward. For this very reason, there is a need 
to press at the European level for stronger obligations on manufacturers, importers and 
traders to market only safe products106. Even inside safety standards, consumer 
representatives ought to take priority decisions in order to make it possible to find a 
standardisation project that will pay. It is in this very decision that the scarcity of resources 
comes into play. 
The manual then sets out clearly the compromises that the DIN Consumer Council has to 
engage in so as even to find consumer representatives that would commit themselves to 
standardisation work. Accordingly, the DIN Consumer Council has even accepted people not 
employed in a consumer institution. The principle applied is that people must have sufficient 
technical knowledge, which is not to be understood as actual specialisation, be motivated, be 
legitimated to speak on behalf of consumers and be able to defend their position in DIN 
working committees. 
The requirements for the person in each case depend quite largely on the object of 
standardisation. However, consumer representatives rarely get beyond the position of 
"informed laymen", measured by the standards of the other side. In order to meet the 
requirements on the professionality of contributions, the manual provides methodological 
indications for working out a consumer standpoint. If the problem is localised (safety, health), 
consumer protection objectives have to be defined in detail. Consumer representatives should 
have recourse here to complaints, accident statistics, tests of goods, etc. Particular difficulties 
face consumers when it comes to determining the actual level of safety. This is where the 
shortcomings of making things scientific become particularly clear. For empirical studies and 
scientific assessments are often replaced by mere exchange of experience, reference to test 
reports or comparable standards from other countries. If the grounds for standardisation are 
present, the right people found and the object for standardisation specified, the question still 
arises as to how the consumer side is to assert its position in the relevant committees. 
Experience in DIN confirms the need to utilise the procedural rights formally allowed to the 
full. The DIN manual could act as a model for working out procedural guarantees at the 
European level. 
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Experience with consumer involvement at a national level and the structural problems of 
consumer involvement pointed out by the DIN Consumer Council suggest the conclusion that 
the chances for European consumer involvement should be regarded rather skeptically. If 
experts are lacking even at a national level, where are they to be found at a European level? 
The financial problems are considerably increased by high travel costs. The structural 
problems of consumer involvement diagnosed in the DIN manual must each be increased by 
the dimension of co-ordinating consumer interests Europe-wide so that at every level - reason 
for standardisation, person, object of standardisation, strategies to follow - mechanisms have 
to be provided to ensure that national consumer interests are reconciled. Nevertheless, it 
would be over-hasty to deny consumer involvement in European standardisation work any 
prospect of success a priori. European involvement at the same time offers consumers 
chances to assert their interests that cannot be found in the same way at a national level. A 
decisive step in this direction would be to break into the organisational structure of 
CEN/CENELEC by involving European consumer organisations in the standardisation 
process. This kind of direct influence from the European angle would give consumers 
something of an edge over business, which must first co-ordinate its interests through 
national organisations. Moreover, consumer involvement ought not to be incorporated in the 
organisational structure CEN/CENELEC but just the contrary: it should be established 
independently of standardisation organisations. This very trend has been emerging 
recently107. 
But the institutional advantages can be fully utilised by consumer representatives at the 
European level only if they divide up tasks and capacities and concentrate their forces on 
putting the resources of the twelve Member States to their best advantage. This means setting 
up a "professional organisation" of consumer representatives at European level, since this is 
the only way to guarantee an adequate definition of the consumer interest in the sense of 
Bosma's idea. This kind of professionally organised consumer involvement should include 
specific measures in behalf of consumers from Southern Europe. 
  
6.1.4 Consumer access to public information 
The chances for effective consumer involvement depend largely on the capability of 
consumer representatives to provide and sutain relevant information to their committees. As 
well as mobilising sources of their own, they will have to depend here on access to 
information compiled either nationally or by Community institutions. The Commission has 
now considerably expanded its information policy in product safety standardisation, so that 
direct access by consumer representatives is here of considerable importance. The 
information procedure in the field of technical standards and regulations108 might provide 
consumer representatives in the area of safety standardisation with an overview of national 
differences and at the same time give them ideas as to which national safety standard should 
be favoured as the European solution109. The Community system for rapid exchange of 
information on hazards arising from consumer products110 and the Community information 
system on accidents caused by consumer goods111 theoretically create the conditions for 
bringing statistically supported information into the standardisation process. 
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In fact, all three projects hinder consumer access to information. The information procedure 
in the field of technical standards and regulations treats information received as 
confidential112. The European consumer representatives have no access to the 
CEN/CENELEC database. At most they can secure information from the national consumer 
representatives on the standardisation organisations. The Community system for rapid 
exchange of information on dangers arising in using consumer goods excludes the consumer 
a priori. Where a national authority so desires, information is treated confidentially in 
justified cases113. The accident information system, which is perhaps even more important, 
did not provide for any possibility of using accident statistics in standardisation procedures 
before the end of the model project in 1989114. This may change, especially if sources of 
danger that suddenly arise call for Community-wide measures. It is, though, very striking that 
all three projects bar consumers from access to information. 
  
6.2 The existing organisational structure of consumer involvement115 
Since December 1982 and April 1983 respectively, the four organisations represented on the 
Consumer Consultative Committee (CCC) (BEUC, the European Trade Union Conference, 
the Association of Community Family Organisations and the European Community of 
Consumer Cooperatives) have been sending observers to various technical committees of the 
European standardisation bodies CEN and CENELEC. This started with thorough discussions 
between the Commission, CEN and CENELEC and the European consumer organisations, 
concerning the form of possible involvement by European consumers. Ultimately, those 
involved agreed to direct collaboration of European consumers in standardisation, although it 
long seemed as if CEN/CENELEC would not be prepared to accept direct involvement since 
this would mean a break in CEN/CENELEC's organisational structure. Without pressure 
from the Commission it would not have come to direct involvement of European consumer 
representatives in standardisation. The Commission pays some of the expenses: its 
contribution was 60,000 ECU in 1984, 40,000 in 1985 and 90,000 in 1986. In October 1983 
the Commission (DG XI) and BEUC signed an agreement on the involvement of European 
consumers in European standardisation116. 
  
6.2.1 Consumer Advisory Committee, working group on standards and secretariat for co-
ordination</P> The Consumer Consultative Committee (CCC) has for many years had a 
working group on standards that was brought into negotiations between the Commission and 
CEN/CENELEC. The way towards a financing of European consumer involvement by the 
Commission was finally cleared when the four members of the CCC agreed to entrust BEUC 
with the task of co-ordinating European consumer involvement. The co-ordination secretariat 
is formally independent, with BEUC merely providing the institutional framework. 
To give a closer definition of the tasks of the co-ordination secretariat, it seems helpful to 
keep the three organisations involved, BEUC (as the contractual partner of the Commission), 
the CCC and the co-ordination secretariat separate. The BEUC has taken over merely formal 
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competence. It was mandated to: co-ordinate the positions of European national 
standardisation organisations in the area of standardisation; secure information on 
standardisation from European and national consumer organisations and pass it on; pay travel 
expenses for experts taking part in CEN/CENELEC meetings; hold co-ordination meetings 
on standardisation in order to arrive at a common position for European consumers on 
standardisation questions; provide for contacts between Commission offices, the 
standardisation organisations and consumer organisations in order to secure active and 
effective co-operation of European consumers on questions of European standardisation; take 
other measures suitable for contributing to the efficiency of consumer involvement in the 
work of CEN and CENELEC. Similarly, BEUC is obliged to bring interim reports and annual 
reports before the Commission. De facto, however, this work is done not by BEUC, but by an 
employee paid by the Commission who directs the co-ordination secretariat. 
The CCC's interest is to draw as clear a demarcation line as possible between the area of 
work of the European co-ordination secretariat and the work of the CCC working group on 
standards117. The co-ordination secretariat is to co-ordinate participation by consumer 
representatives in CEN/CENELEC (selection, appointment, reimbursement of expenses, 
training, co-ordination) and in national standardisation bodies, to give technical support to the 
CCC in its discussions and supply technical reports on specific topic at the request of 
Commission offices. The work of the working group on standards is to examine the following 
three fields: verification of new Commission initiatives in the area of standardisation policy; 
verification of proposals for directives in the area of standardisation and any setting of 
minimal requirements in the area of consumer protection; evaluating the annual report of the 
co-ordination secretariat. In other terms, the CCC working group on standards formulates 
policy and the co-ordination secretariat (BEUC) implements it. The working group on 
standards would thus as hitherto, and like the other CCC working groups, also prepare 
opinions for subsequent adoption by the plenary sessions. In addition to policy formulation, 
the working group on standards also wishes to exercise a supervisory function over the co-
ordination secretariat, which cannot necessary be reconciled with the CCC's range of tasks to 
date. 
  
6.2.2 Consumer observers on technical committees 
Only representatives of test institutes or members of independent research institutes act as 
consumer observers on the technical committees of CEN/CENELEC. Although unofficial, it 
seems to be clear inside the CCC that representatives of consumer committees in national 
standards organisations can at any rate not act as observers118. This does not rule out their 
inclusion as experts in co-ordination meetings. However, this prior decision by the CCC 
illustrates a certain skepticism regarding the independence of consumer representations 
institutionally involved in national standardisation organisations. The differing perspectives 
of testing and scientific institutions may be decisive here. For while consumer representatives 
on national standardisation organisations are supposed to find generally accepted solutions 
together with the manufacturers, the testing and scientific institutes may take the product 
standardised into consideration, relatively free from such economic pressures. The number of 
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consumer observers on CEN/CENELEC technical committees has steadily risen since work 
began119. In 1984 European consumer representatives were sending 4 observers to 9 technical 
committees. In 1985 it was 8 observers to 9 committees. Of these, however, only four 
committees were really active in 1985. Of the 58 committees in CEN, 8 do not work, 7 
involve consumers, while 34 would be of interest to them. Of the 34 committees in 
CENELEC, 3 involve consumers, while 7 would be of interest. This assessment is based in a 
selection according to the following criteria120: safety considerations, influence of standards 
on competition, consumer information, performance criteria, energy aspects. In fact the 
possibilities for European consumer associations to send observers are considerably 
restricted. First of all, one has to find an observer prepared to take the job on. This observer 
has to provide information on the state of work on a particular CEN/CENELEC committee, 
name the most important points for discussion, reflect the various standpoints of 
manufacturers and the national standardisation organisations, form an opinion of his own and 
above all send a report to the co-ordination secretariat after each meeting121. 
To avoid misunderstandings, it would seem appropriate to give some further explanations of 
the number of committees set up by CEN/CENELEC. Behind each technical committee there 
is a whole range of products. When European consumer associations send an observer to TC 
61 (safety of household appliances), he has to cover the whole product range of electrical 
appliances to be found in the home. The gamut runs from washing machines, dryers, electric 
cookers, toasters, refrigerators, freezers, coffee mills, clocks and irons to massage appliances, 
sun-ray lamps and sewing machines. And this list is by no means complete. A comparison 
with national sets of standards might lead to the conclusion that European standards are much 
broader in content than differentiated national standards. 
  
6.2.3 Observers' co-ordination meetings 
One of the most important tasks of the Co-ordination Secretariat is to hold co-ordination 
meeting with consumer observers and national consumer experts on the individual 
committees122. Since it is incumbent on the consumer observer to represent the interests of 
consumers in individual Member States, he must be informed and advised by national 
consumer experts in order to be able to intervene appropriately in CEN/CENELEC meetings. 
Accordingly, the co-ordination meetings are the core of European consumer participation. 
Theoretically, there is an entitlement to raise new projects for CEN/CENELEC 
standardisation through the co-ordination meetings. In practice, the co-ordination meetings 
serve mainly to tackle problems "brought back" by the observer from meetings of the 
technical committees. The Co-ordination Secretariat then has the task of drawing up an 
agenda, inviting the experts from the various Member States and distributing the necessary 
papers in advance. Since the national experts' work is honorary, the success of the co-
ordination meetings depends largely on voluntary commitment by the experts. At the same 
time, the greatest commitment is useless if the information flow among national consumer 
experts is not adequately organised. 
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6.3 Practice to date with consumer participation in CEN/CENELEC 
European consumer representatives can now look back on two and a half years of practical 
experience. The reporting duty placed upon BEUC by the Commission offers a good basis for 
making an initial analysis from an internal viewpoint. This seems all the more important 
because thinking is at present going on in DG XI about how consumer involvement is to be 
organised in the future. 
  
6.3.1 Procedural questions 
Observers on CEN/CENELEC technical committees meet a number of procedural obstacles 
at the start of their work that do not yet seem to have been removed. This annoyance can 
ultimately be removed only by written procedural guarantees, a conclusion that can be 
confirmed from experience with the DIN Consumer Council123. 
The first appearance of consumer observers on the technical committees regularly led to the 
question of what status the observer ought to have on the technical committes124. This was 
even though CEN/CENELEC had informed the relevant committees of the inclusion of 
consumers in standardisation through a circular. De facto, the consumer representatives faced 
the burden of justifying why they wanted to take part in the work. 
While these problems were more or less rapidly solved in the course of time, much more 
complex obstacles faced consumer representatives when it came to putting forward their 
position in discussion. Two areas proved particularly important: involvement in drawing up 
the agenda and inclusion of consumer positions set down in writing in the organised 
information flow within CEN/CENELEC. An example may illustrate this. 
The commitment of the consumer representatives on the CENELEC Committee on Safety of 
Household Appliances (TC 61) very quickly brought out the need to think about the extent to 
which technical standards ought to consider that children are not always under supervision 
(the so-called exclusion clause)125. At the co-ordination meeting in May 1984, the decision 
was taken to set a debate going in TC 61. At the next TC 61 meeting in June 1984, the Co-
ordination Secretariat's request was however rejected. Observers had according to the 
Committee Chairman, no possibility of bringing forward a paper in the Technical Committee. 
According to CENELEC procedural rules this was open only to the Secretariat and to 
national delegations. An exception might be made for consumer observers if the Commission 
asked CENELEC to consider a corresponding proposal126. Despite this unpromising 
beginning, the Co-ordination Secretariat, at the request of the observer, went further into the 
question. At the January 1985 co-ordination meeting a letter to the Chairman of TC 61 was 
drafted. The next meeting of TC 61 in May 1985 showed, however, that the paper had not 
been distributed127. The Co-ordination Secretariat thereupon decided to approach the 
President of TC 61 and urge that the letter be distributed. This letter was distributed to 
Committee members, with the agreement of the CENELEC Executive Secretary. At the next 
meeting of TC 61 in October 1985, the President then made it clear that henceforth be written 
comments of the consumer observer would automatically passed on to TC 61 members128. 
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Altogether it took more than a year to merely secure formal access to the debating forum, 
without a single substantive word having been spent on the actual issue. 
More fundamental in nature are the problems arising from the weak participation by 
consumer observers, from only four Member States. The committees ask observers for 
legitimation of their claim to speak on behalf of the European consumer when only four, or 
even three, consumer delegations out of twelve Member States are involved in co-ordinating 
a consumer standpoint129. The structural weaknesses are imputed to the consumers 
themselves and additionally the task is imposed on them of specifically ensuring inclusion of 
Southern European countries. This position may be used positively as an argument for asking 
the Commission for suitable financial contributions in order to organise this process. 
The remaining point is the difficulties that have arisen in the case of contracts issued to 
CEN/CENELEC by the Commission. With one exception130, consumers have not been 
included in the terms of the contract. And even this one Community measure happened more 
or less by chance, because the European consumer organisations had been informed of the 
Commission's intention in time. Practical problems with the technical committees arose 
particularly because the remit given by the Commission was often so imprecisely worded that 
the Technical Committee saw itself compelled to turn it again131. It should be noted in 
passing that the Commission is giving contracts to CEN/CENELEC before safety objectives 
under the new approach have yet been specified. 
  
6.3.2 Information and co-ordination 
Since consumers are cut off at the European level from Community information sources, the 
need to build up an internal information network and co-ordinate incoming information 
Community-wide takes on even greater importance. The importance of this task was just as 
clear to the CCC working group on standards as it was to BEUC when it set up the Co-
ordination Secretariat. But the Co-ordination Secretariat has neither the financial nor staff 
resources to build up this information and co-ordination network itself. Instead, it is 
dependent on co-operation by national experts on co-ordination committees and on their 
information sources in their home organisations. 
A clear tendency to professionalisation132 has emerged, which pursues more or less the 
following course: if an observer has been found for a technical committee of importance to 
European consumers, the Co-ordination Secretariat assembles the necessary information for 
an evaluation of the committee's work. This is the only guarantee that the observer can 
recognise his possibilities of influencing the ongoing procedure133. If problems arise in the 
technical committee, the observer approaches the Co-ordination Secretariat and asks for the 
calling of a co-ordination meeting. The Co-ordination Secretariat prepares the meeting, 
distributes all necessary material and/or asks for it from members of the co-ordination 
meeting. While in the initial stages, the members of the co-ordination meeting sought to 
assess the problems arising on the basis of their experience, a procedure has now been 
developed in which one of the members undertakes to produce a background paper which, 
according to the topic, assesses either specific scientific research or ad hoc studies within 
national consumer organisations134. This background paper is used by the observer, following 
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decision in the co-ordination meeting, for submission to the technical committee.  
The intensity of information exchange between the observer and the national representatives 
or experts in the co-ordination committee depends strongly on the activities of the technical 
committee. In other terms, CEN/CENELEC determines the rate of the consumer work. 
Besides current information and co-ordination needs, the Co-ordination Secretariat has begun 
a number of in-depth studies. These serve, on the one hand, the objective of proceeding in 
product-related fashion, as was the case with the study by the Consumer Association on the 
"bicycle market in the Community"135, but also through work directed at making up for 
shortcomings in knowledge on consumer participation, particularly in Southern European 
countries136. Attempts were also made to provide regular information through a newsletter on 
the state of standardisation work137. However, this proved difficult for two reasons. Firstly, 
due to the small circle of interest, it seemd advantagous to incorporate this newsletter into the 
general BEUC journal138, and secondly, this path was blocked because the CCC insisted on 
independence of the Co-ordination Secretariat. 
Despite all the tendencies towards professionalisation, so far there is no infrastructure intact 
to which the Secretariat can have recourse. Accident studies are not recorded centrally, nor 
can the Secretariat have access to the specific knowledge of safety standards accumulated 
particularly in test institutions. The only internal information network available to date - 
BEUC Interpol139 - is not included in the work140, which would in any case be possible only if 
an overall concept for building up an information and co-ordination network were available. 
  
6.3.3 Material questions 
The intention is not to provide a stock-taking141 of work to date, but merely to illustrate the 
points at dispute in the individual technical committees. 
(1) The starting point for the CEN TC 100 working group is a remit from the Commission to 
CEN142: 
"Initially, to determine the requirements for tactile hazard indications on packages intended 
as containers for substances and preparations classed as hazardous by national authorities; 
further, to work out standards for means to permit the perception of hazards by touching, in 
order, in particular, to comply with Art. 15 (2) and (3) of Directives 79/831 and 78/63". 
These terms of reference from the Community are aimed at combating accident risks from 
chemicals in the household using the safety technique of instruction, specifically through a 
tactile indication of hazard. But this safety philosophy was opposed not only by the consumer 
side, but also by some national standards organisations that called for special protective 
devices - child resistant closures143. This conflict was resolved when the members of the 
technical committee agreed to treat special protective devices as separate from tactile hazard 
indication systems, thereby requiring separate standardisation144. This compromise was 
facilitated by the need to develop a marking system as rapidly as possible in the specific 
interest of the poorly sighted. Ultimately, however, no agreement could be reached on the 
basis of this compromise either. It proved impossible from an industrial standpoint to develop 
a uniform method145, which had always been the priority goal of the consumer organisations. 
The latter had carried out a survey through the CCC that had brought out the interest in a 
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uniform method guaranteeing the unambiguous nature of the information146. The working 
group temporarily suspended its work and asked the Commission to lay down the 
requirements for standardisation in precisely worded terms of reference. The consumer side 
drew the conclusion from the failure of TC 100 that technical committees themselves were 
not in a position to secure compromises as to safety philosophy (safety technique of 
instruction versus protective devices). Only a suitably precisely worded remit that the 
consumer side would play a part in drawing up could prevent safety policy from failing to 
advance because "commercial circles involved" cannot agree147. 
(2) One of the important points at dispute in Technical Committee 61 (safety of electrical 
household appliances) is the so-called exclusion clause148. This states that electrical safety 
standards do not take account of the special hazards arising in children's rooms, 
kindergartens, etc. in which small children or the aged and infirm people are present without 
supervision. In such cases additional requirements are necessary:149 
"Except in so far as this standard deals with electric toys, it does not take into account the 
special hazards which exist in nurseries and other places where there are young children or 
aged or infirm persons without supervision; in such cases additional requirements may be 
necessary". 
The consumer side has now raised the question of the extent to which safety standards meet 
additional requirements, or whether the protection of children or elderly people is no longer 
guaranteed when they are left unsupervised in kitchens or other rooms of the home where 
there are electrical appliances150. The suppliers' side sought to downplay the accusation by 
referring to standardisation practices, in which safety is guaranteed even without such 
supervision151. Consumers again found themselves in a position of having to offer proof that 
the level of safety was not sufficient. In fact the consumer representatives managed to find 
that the exclusion clause had been adduced in a number of cases as an argument against the 
introduction of comprehensive protection measures152. Thus, protection against access to 
current carrying parts is tested with the "standard test finger", based on an "average" adult 
finger. This test may well not constitute adequate protection for many adults, but certainly 
does exclude children. This leads to considerable hazards from ventilator heaters or other 
flow heaters accessible to children. Nevertheless, CEN/CENELEC continues to reject the 
introduction of a child-sized test finger. No special child resistant closure is provided for in 
the case of spin-dryers and washing machines. Sockets on the front of electric cookers 
likewise have no protection for children, though this is already prescribed in the case of gas 
cookers. Surface temperatures of electrical appliances are another problem area. A large 
number of appliances provide no protection even against severe burns. The consumer side is 
not claiming that all appliances ought to be so hazard free that no parental supervision is 
necessary. However, avoidable hazards ought to be removed and electrical safety standards 
ought to take foreseeable conditions of use (not merely proper use) of particular appliances 
into account. On the basis of these considerations, the consumer observer, following 
consultation with national consumer experts in several co-ordination meetings, proposed a 
revision that positively asks for foreseeable misuse to be covered in the design of electrical 
appliances that might present a danger to children and elderly persons:153 
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"This standard takes account of foreseeable misuse (other than gross misuse) of equipment by 
users of all ages and also, so far as is reasonable, of the fact that the equipment covered by 
the standard may be used where there are young children and elderly persons". 
The suppliers' side rejected this proposal, but at the same time had to admit that the present 
text of the exclusion clause did not at any rate reflect practice in safety standardisation. It 
therefore seems to be possible that the consumer side may at least partly succeed with its 
move. At present, the wording proposed by the British Consumer Advisory Committee is 
before TC 61 for debate:154 
"So far is practicable, this standard deals with the common hazards presented by appliances 
which are encountered by all persons in and around the home. However, except in so far as 
this standard deals with electric toys, it does not in general take into account the use of 
appliances by young children or infirm persons without supervision; for such use additional 
requirements may be necessary". 
It is not yet clear whether the compromise proposal will be adopted. At any rate, the 
compromise formula, also supported by the IOCU Testing Committee155, means a 
considerable step back from the original position. For the consumer side gives up the 
inclusion of foreseeable misuse and contents itself with the much less specific formulation 
"common hazards", which is in turn in need of interpretation. On the positive side, there is 
now a much clearer formulation of the circumstances in which safety standards 
provide no protection for unsupervised persons. The scope has been reduced to children only, 
to avoid discrimination of elderly people. 
The arguments over the exclusion clarify the need for a safety philosophy along the lines of 
DIN 31000 at a European level. This project, which has been worked on since April 1985, 
has involved European consumer representatives since June 1986156. 
(3) Often, however, difficulties arise even among national consumer representatives in 
agreeing on a uniform safety philosophy. Thus, the consumer's protection against electric 
shock must be weighed against his interest in being able to do repair and maintenance work 
himself157. Even if one supports a right of access by consumers in principle, it remains to be 
decided whether consumers are to be explicitly encouraged to do work themselves and what 
protective measures are at all possible if consumers are to be allowed to do repairs or 
maintenance. Likewise, the question of the protective level for surface temperatures of 
household electrical appliances remains open. The British consumer representatives want the 
maximum limit brought below 50 degrees, while the German side does not even agree to a 
maximum of 80 degrees158. The list of examples could be extended, though the conclusion 
ought not to be drawn from these disagreements, that the consumer side is unable to develop 
a uniform European safety philosophy. 
  
6.4 Proposals for extending consumer involvement in standardisation 
The present organisation of technical standardisation is regarded by all those involved, the 
Commission, CEN/CENELEC, the Consumer Consultative Committee and the Co-ordination 
Secretariat, as a transitional stage. The policy of the new approach seems to have led to the 
insight by all those involved that in the long term, consumer involvement in standardisation 
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must be institutionalised. It is not yet foreseeable, however, what the outcome will be. 
Several proposals are available, but discussions have barely begun. 
  
6.4.1 The Bosma proposal159 
In her report for DG XI, Bosma proposed the setting up of a consumer advisory committee 
for technical standardisation, to be attached to the Standing Committee. The object is to 
guarantee access to European standardisation activities by consumer interests, through 
institutional collaboration between the Consumer Advisory Committee for Technical 
Standardisation and the Standing Committee. The committee is to be made up of 
representatives of European consumer organisations (though it is not said, this probably 
means CCC members) and European consumer research institutions such as Swoka, INC, 
Stiftung Warentest, Husholdningsrad, CRIOC160. While European consumer organisations 
should provide the political input, Bosman assigns to the research institutions listed the task 
of making the necessary technical know-how available. Accordingly, the Consumer Advisory 
Committee on Technical Standardisation would in this conception represent the collective 
European political and technical expertise of the consumer side. It should among other things 
have the following tasks:161 
- To point out to the Standing Committee, developments of special interest to the consumer, 
and make the necessary expertise available to the Standing Committee in order to assert 
consumer interests; 
- To develop consumer priorities in European standardisation; 
- To formulate a consumer safety policy, taking particular account of technical standards; 
- To list special research studies needed for consumer desires and needs to be recognised in 
standardisation; 
- To make contacts with consumer representations on national and international standards 
organisations. 
To be able to cope with the multiplicity of tasks, the Advisory Committee would in Bosma's 
view162 have to have special technical committees assigned to it: (1) food and nutrition; (2) 
household chemicals; (3) transport, in particular cars; (4) house and building materials 
including furniture; (5) electrical and electronic products. These technical committees are to 
provide the Advisory Committee with the necessary technical information, draw up 
background reports and develop specific proposals, in other words, do the complicated 
technical work. 
Correspondingly, these technical committees should also include experts with relevant 
experience in those areas. Bosma163 is thinking above all, apart from test institutions, of 
independent research institutes dealing with specific aspects of a product (ergonomics, 
safety). She then raises the question whether it would not be also advisable to include 
specialists from industry in the work of the technical committees. Though she does not 
ultimately answer the question, she is clearly thinking of an "ideology-free discussion" since 
the technical committees are only to have the task of supporting the Advisory Committee on 
standardisation in its work. It would be incumbent on the Advisory Committee for 
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standardisation to delegate observers to the technical committees of CEN/CENELEC and to 
maintain contacts with the Standing Committee. 
Bosma wishes to locate the Secretariat of the Consumer Advisory Committee on 
standardisation in DG XI. At the same time, she advocates formalisation of the consultative 
relationships between the Standing Committee and the Consumer Advisory Committee on 
Technical Standardisation. 
  
6.4.2 The thinking in DG XI164 
DG XI has put forward a proposal of its own for the organisation of consumer participation in 
standardisation. It is similarly contemplating setting up a special consumer advisory 
committee for technical standardisation. This is, however, to consist of CCC members, and 
no subdivision into special technical committees is contemplated. As before, actual 
administrative work is to be done by a secretariat to be located outside DG XI. "Political 
control" of the Consumer Advisory Committee for technical standardisation is to be handled 
by the CCC working group on standards. DG XI is thinking of a division of tasks as already 
similarly proposed by the CCC165. This would give the CCC working group on standards the 
task of formulating policy, while the Consumer Advisory Committee for technical 
standardisation would specify these outlines with technical content, with assistance from the 
Secretariat. There are no plans for formalising the relationships between the Standing 
Committee and the CCC. 
  
6.4.3 Assessment 
It is striking that neither proposal takes account of the outstanding importance of safety 
standards at the European level. Consumer safety problems appear as only one conceivable 
case of technical standardisation, although experience over the last two years shows that 
consumer observers on the technical committees overwhelmingly concentrate on safety 
questions. Bosma's model allows the importance of product safety to be accommodated, since 
it would be possible to set up a technical subcommittee on product safety that might also 
possibly involve manufacturers. This way out would not be possible in the DG XI proposal. 
Structural problems of consumer involvement arise in each proposal. Firstly, it is unclear why 
Bosma is so insistent on having the secretariat located in DG XI. This skepticism is all the 
more important since DG XI evidently has no interest in accommodating the secretariat. 
Bosma's concept completely lacks any discussion of the CCC as such and its working group 
on standards. Yet there is an important field here for conflict in the future shaping of 
consumer participation. DG XI seeks to take account of the institutional framework for 
consumer participation by seeking to bring the Consumer Advisory Committee on technical 
standardisation under the political control of the CAC working group on standards. But this 
division of tasks means that the Commission is opening up the possibility of potential conflict 
between the working group on standards and the new committee. Moreover, the DG XI 
proposal would ultimately lead to duplication of the work of the CCC, since the Consumer 
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Advisory Committee for technical standardisation would have the same expert 
representatives of the four consumer organisations sitting on it to deal with standardisation 
questions. In the long term, transferral of standardisation issues from the CCC's range of 
tasks might lead to its weakening. Accordingly, Bosma's proposal seems more convincing: 
the Consumer Advisory Committee on technical standardisation should, alongside the four 
consumer organisations, also have a place for institutions with years of experience in the area 
of technical standardisation. A final striking point is that neither Bosma nor DG XI in their 
proposals, provide for procedural rules to be laid down in writing concerning either the 
Standing Committee's relationship to the Consumer Advisory Committee for technical 
standardisation or the Consumer Advisory Committee on technical standardisation's 
relationship to CEN/CENELEC. But this would be one of the major pillars of a formal 
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Summary and conclusions 
Central to all the analyses in the foregoing chapters was the question of how the connections 
between the Community's efforts to establish a common market, with their inevitable 
influence on product safety law, would eventually affect integration. So far, the answers to 
this question have been anything but encouraging. Although "traditional" harmonisation 
policy has succeeded in individual sectors, the legislative tasks involved in continuing with 
such a policy exceed the legislative capacity of the Community; this is due to the broad scale 
of products concerned and the need to continuously update European directives1. This 
realisation explains the move towards a legal approximation policy that relieves the burden 
on Community legislators and delegates technical questions relating to safety law to the 
standards organisations. However, analysis of the Council resolution on a "new approach to 
technical harmonisation and standards"2 has shown that a retreat by Community legislators to 
fixing just "essential safety requirements" involves considerable difficulties. It is above all 
safety policy considerations that have led to ambivalent and unclear points in the programme 
of the Model Directive3, putting at risk the realisation of its internal market objectives4. Thus, 
the theme of the following arguments should already be apparent: if the Community is forced 
to deal with the effects of its new harmonisation policy on product safety law in the Member 
States, it has to supplement the new approach. For the moment, however, this statement 
describes merely a need for action, without defining the objectives and instruments with 
which the Community can counter the danger of internal market policy being frustrated by 
product safety policy. 
  
1. Product safety policy and product safety law in Member States 
The need for coordination of internal market and product safety policy is ultimately the 
consequence of safety matters being taken up in the respective legislations of the Member 
States. The General Programme of 28 May 1969 for eliminating technical barriers to trade 
regarding the movement of goods5 was an early response to the "discovery" that the 
achievement of a common market is hindered not only by tariffs and quantitative restrictions 
but also by differences in laws and administrative provisions in the Member States - not 
covered by the prohibition of Article 30 of the EEC Treaty. The differential application and 
limitation of the programme as a result of the provisions for optional harmonisation and the 
introduction of safeguard clauses were also concessions to the safety policy interests of 
Member States6. A further aim of these instruments, together with the introduction of the 
regulative and administrative committee procedure under Article 155, fourth indent7, was to 
relieve the burden on the Community's legislative process. The new harmonisation policy, 
which confines itself to setting essential safety requirements, represents a continuation of 
these efforts. The reasoning behind the Model Directive does not, however, call into question 
in principle the legitimacy of government provisions for product safety8, but rather 
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presupposes that the new harmonisation policy should be compatible with the safety interests 




The comparative survey of the law in the economically most important Member States of the 
Community and the USA reveals an astonishing convergence of regulatory approaches, 
which will contribute towards acceptance of the new harmonisation policy. An essentially 
positive attitude was to be expected from the Federal Republic of Germany, because co-
operation between government bodies and self-governing industrial organisations in the field 
of technical safety law has been part of German legal tradition since the 19th century9, and 
because the Federal Republic also played a major part in implementing the "model" for the 
Model Directive, i.e. the Low-Voltage Directive of 197310. However, for the United 
Kingdom and France, the adoption of a regulatory system for product safety law based on the 
method of reference to standards is anything but obvious. With the CPA 1961, safety 
legislation in the United Kingdom opted for a government-administered approach to 
regulation. This approach was already modified by the 1978 Consumer Safety Act11. But it 
was not until 1984 that the White Paper "The safety of goods"12 made the first move toward a 
rapprochement with German law, with its proposal for a general product safety obligation to 
be defined with reference to "sound modern standards of safety". This convergence is even 
more obvious in the efforts to strengthen the British standards organisations and ensure their 
formal recognition by government13. In France the development is less clear, if only because 
standardisation is closely linked, legally speaking as well, with the government 
administration, and because product standardisation and the protection of safety interests are 
regarded as two separate government functions14. Furthermore, the Consumer Safety Law of 
21 July 198315and its new instruments are as yet virtually untested in practice16. The 
argument that developments in France are moving towards the legislative approach of the 
Model Directive thus rests on the assumption that in France, too, the preventive protection of 
safety interests is increasingly being approached through co-operation between government 
administration and AFNOR, whereby the administrative controls provided for in the 1983 
Consumer Safety Law are not being fully exploited to regulate the development of safety law. 
The Commission can be confident that this convergence of developments in the economically 
most important Member States will influence the Community as a whole, and it can point to 
the fact that important non-member countries are also increasingly favouring the use of 
voluntary standards in their product safety policies17. 
  
1.2 Divergences 
However, the trend towards encouraging voluntary standards does not in itself guarantee the 
smooth harmonisation of their function as regards safety policy. The stable co-operation 
between government and standards organisations in Germany, which has led to the wide 
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acceptance of the reference method as a means of safety regulation, is the outcome of a long 
historical process. This process cannot simply be copied, and the role of government 
administration in co-operation with standards organisations will continue to vary from 
country to country18. In particular, the concrete results of standardisation will in all 
probability differ. Before the House of Lords Select Committee on European Community 
Consumer Policy, the BSI representative emphasised that, particularly where safety standards 
were concerned, differing national conditions played a considerable role and, moreover, there 
were substantial differences in the standard of safety within the Community19. 
In addition, there are significant differences in national standardisation procedures, 
particularly with regard to the participation of consumer organisations20, the coverage of 
standards work and the actual use of standards in industrial production. Finally, it remains to 
be seen whether the national standards organisations can develop a common "safety 
philosophy", and what effect differences in their general attitude to safety policy will have, 
for example in their assessment of the functions of accident information systems21. It goes 
without saying that all these difficulties in ensuring an equal standard of safety in the 
Community are compounded when the countries "below the olive line"22 and their industrial 
and administrative infrastructures are taken into account23. Accordingly, the importance of 
the parallels between the traditions of German technical safety law and the strengthening of 
the standards organisations in the United Kingdom and France should not be exaggerated. 
The convergences observed are - like the Community's new harmonisation policy - 
essentially motivated by industrial policy. The linking of standardisation and safety policy 
could once again be called into question in changed political circumstances. 
It would be hazardous to assume that the German approach to product safety will 
automatically provide a model for others, if only because product safety issues repeatedly 
attract public attention in all Member States in cycles that are difficult to predict, and then 
prompt widely differing reactions24. Individual Member States are therefore always likely to 
resort to special measures to counter certain product risks, to question the appropriateness of 
the reference method as far as safety law is concerned (or at least to wish to strengthen their 
control over private standards organisations) and to augment their range of instruments for 
product safety policy. Finally, the different situations of "manufacturing" and "importing" 
countries should also be recalled25. Since "importing countries" have no influence on the 
fixing of national standards and can be bypassed at the European level as regards both 
standardisation and the recognition procedure26, and as they need to consider only price 
effects and safety interests when deciding on the level of product safety, they would not 
necessarily be committed to either the forms or the result of the new regulatory method27. 
Consequently, the Community must assume that product safety policy will remain a critical 
issue within Member States, that the search for appropriate regulatory instruments will 
continue and that not the issue of legal protection as such, but at most the forms this will take, 
will be subject to political negotiation. If this diagnosis is correct, there is no real alternative 
for the Community, either, but to carry on with both elements of its integration policy - 
internal market policy and product safety policy. 
  
2. Integration policy options 
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The finding that the integrative force of the new regulatory system in the Model Directive 
will hardly suffice to overcome impediments to the free movement of goods, due to differing 
product safety requirements, simply means that the Community has to exert even stronger 
influence on legal controversies as to the content and form of product safety law, than it has 
already done with its new approach to technical harmonisation and standards. 
However, this still leaves open the form to be taken by such influence; the Community can 
either seek to reduce national powers of intervention, or extend its attempts to move towards 
a "positive" integration of product safety policy. 
  
2.1 Internal market policy as a deregulation strategy 
  
The results of the Community's endeavours to implement its consumer policy programmes 
have been modest28. This suggests that a Community strategy for the "deregulation" of 
product safety law in the Member States will have more chance of success than a fresh 
attempt at "positive" integration. The new harmonisation policy has hence been interpreted as 
heralding such a deregulation strategy. 
Probably the most prominent advocate of such an interpretation, or at any rate the most 
forceful, is the Wissenschaftlicher Beirat (Scientific Advisory Council) of the German 
Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs29. It bases its interpretation of the new approach on the 
statement contained in the Cassis de Dijon judgment30, and taken up by the Commission in its 
communication of 3 October 198031, to the effect that any product lawfully produced and 
marketed in one Member State must be admitted to the market of any other Member State32. 
In the view of the Beirat, the mutual recognition of safety standards is the consequence of this 
principle, so the harmonisation of safety requirements is not necessary for the establishment 
of the internal market except in exceptional cases33. However, the Beirat bases its thesis not 
only on the text of the Commission's White Paper but also on independent arguments relating 
to the competition policy and regulative functions of the principle of the free movement of 
goods: in principle (it argues) it is up to the European consumer (not the individual Member 
State) to decide the standard of quality and safety of products. Therefore it concludes that 
where governments cannot agree on the harmonisation of product standards, competition 
between products manufactured according to different standards is reasonable and, in the 
long term, the price-performance ratio (or range of products) that best meets consumer 
demands will prevail34. 
However, this is not a valid interpretation of the Commission's White Paper or the case law of 
the European Court of Justice. The statement quoted by the Beirat from the White Paper is 
based, as is apparent from the 
context, on the - albeit problematical35 - assumption that provisions in Member States 
governing safety are generally equivalent; neither in its Cassis decision nor in any subsequent 
judgments has the European Court suspended safety requirements in the Member States 
pursuant to Article 30 of the EEC Treaty regarding imports36; an obligation as to "mutual 
recognition" of safety measures taken by the Member States presupposes the harmonisation 
of the preconditions for recognition37. 
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The position of the Beirat is, however, questionable not just in exegetic and legal terms but 
also - and especially - in terms of legal policy and integration policy. The first point at issue 
is the initial normative premise that the decision as to the standard of protection provided by 
product regulations is in principle to be left to the end-user, whose protection is to be ensured 
primarily by means of information, obligatory labelling and "strict producer liability"38. The 
Beirat does not attempt to justify its regulatory principles vis-à-vis alternative views of 
product safety policy. If it had done so, it would have become clear first of all that 
influencing of the safety practice of consumers "in line with market principles" - the only 
approach envisaged by the Beirat - and obligatory or semi-governmental product regulation, 
which are the main targets of the removal of technical barriers to trade, have widely differing 
objectives and cannot simply be subsumed together as functionally equivalent measures39. 
The distinction between "market", "interventionist" and "self-regulating" regulatory 
instruments also shows that the standpoint of the Beirat on 
integration policy has no normative justification and is scarcely feasible in positive terms. 
The demand that the Community should at all times enforce the principle of the free 
movement of goods and promote "intra-Community competition between standards", even 
where harmonisation of product regulations cannot be achieved, in fact means that enterprises 
in the "safety countries" will be forced to accept cost disadvantages in competition with 
enterprises in "risk countries"40. The disadvantaged enterprises may respond to these 
distortions of competition by exerting political pressure to ease domestic safety regulations or 
shifting their production to "risk countries" - whatever happens, the "safety countries" would 
be under pressure to adopt a deregulation policy. Such consequences pose a threat to 
regulatory measures that are justified in themselves, and are unacceptable, amongst other 
things because they remove the decision for or against safety regulations from the political 
decision-making process and place it at the mercy of the strategic calculations of individual 
countries and enterprises. 
The views of the Beirat on integration policy moreover ignore an option that suggests itself, 
at any rate as a "normative" approach, particularly where there are differences in product 
regulation, an opinion that is furthermore constantly emphasised in the economic theory of 
federalism41: the performance or coordination of regulatory functions at European level may 
secure administrative cost benefits and also be "beneficial" where the positive "external 
effects" of a government measure cannot be confined to a single area of jurisdiction. 
However, an integration policy strategy that uses the principle of the free movement of goods 
as an instrument to deregulate product safety law in the Member States would be not only 
dubious as a "normative" approach but also scarcely feasible in positive terms. Any lowering 
of the standard of product safety does not a priori meet a genuine interest of "the" European 
economy. 
On the contrary, enterprises in Member States with high standards may even secure 
competitive advantages from a general raising of the standard of safety. Furthermore, in view 
of the political sensitivity of safety issues, the Member States cannot call into question their 
own product regulations just like that. The history of the Single European Act42 and also the 
discussion to date on the new approach point in the same direction. It was not the "risk 
countries" which insisted on the proviso of Article 100 (a) (4)43, nor does agreement to the 
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"reference method" of the new approach indicate that the "safety countries" are prepared to 
accept a reduction in the level of safety provided by their standards44. 
  
2.2 Positive integration as an alternative 
The "traditional" alternative to the deregulation of safety law in Member States has been the 
sectorial (vertical) harmonisation of their product regulations. This policy has failed because 
it both overtaxes the legislative capacity of the Community45 and blocks the emergence of a 
coherent European safety policy46. However, the acceptance of these objections to the 
traditional policy of legal approximation itself raises the question of whether the New 
Approach in its present form does in fact inaugurate a new epoch in market integration. This 
skepticism ultimately derives from the fact that the new harmonisation policy does not 
eliminate all the causes of the difficulties in reaching agreement at a European level, but 
simply adopts a new procedure for tackling them: for example, the economic conflicts of 
interest between Member States remain in spite of the delegation of technical harmonisation 
to the standards organisations. 
Although the involvement of technical experts and the majority-voting rules of the standards 
organisations may make it easier to reach decisions, the Member States can assert their 
interest when deciding on the implementation of individual directives, defining safety 
objectives and, in particular, when making subsequent use of the safeguard procedures - 
experience with the Low-Voltage Directive also shows that provisions for follow-up control 
are in fact exploited as preventive measures47. 
In addition, in view of the vagueness and non-binding nature of the provisions of the Model 
Directive concerning safety law48, there are likely to be great problems identifying and 
preventing self-interested policies motivated by protectionism in negotiations on the 
implementation of new directives. In addition to economic conflicts of interest, political 
conflicts in the area of product safety policy continue to be disruptive factors. Because of its 
one-sided bias towards the free movement of goods and its neglect of the safety policy 
dimension of the integration process, the new standardisation policy will not be able to 
prevent Member States from continuing to develop instruments for product safety law 
independently and applying them in different ways49. 
  
3. Towards augmenting the new approach in terms of safety law 
Internal market policy and consumer policy are handled by different Directorates-General; 
the original programmes in both policy areas have developed independently in terms of both 
content and timing. 
This applies to the General Programme of 1969 for eliminating technical barriers to trade and 
the new approach of 1985, and likewise to the consumer policy programmes of 1975 and 
1981. The safety issue links both areas, but in terms of internal market policy it has been seen 
primarily as a "barrier to trade", while in the context of consumer policy it has been 
proclaimed as a goal in itself, as the "right to the protection of health and safety". The 
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Commission document "A new impetus for consumer protection policy"50 is the clearest 
expression so far of the endeavour to overcome the separation of internal market policy and 
consumer policy. The perspectives set out in this document accord with the results of our 
analyses: because the new harmonisation policy would not be viable as a mere deregulation 
strategy, because a return to "traditional" legal approximation policy is ruled out, the 
Community does indeed require a "comprehensive product safety policy"51. Coordination of 
internal market and consumer policies does not necessarily mean that their specific priorities 
will be ignored, yet it can improve the chances of success for both areas. With internal market 
policy, the aim is to counter any threat posed to the free movement of goods by divergent 
product safety policies in the Member States; consumer policy can take up this interest and 
hence at the same time meet the objections to the legitimacy of the Europeanisation of 
product safety law. 
  
3.1 Co-ordination mechanisms 
The coordination of internal market and product safety policies requires both internal 
synchronisation within the Commission and ongoing co-operation with the Member States. 
The analysis of the effects of the new approach on product safety law has already produced 
concrete proposals for internal coordination at the Community level. The main tasks are the 
development of safety objectives and the preparation of corresponding standards. With its 
"demonstration project" for accident information system52, the Community has an instrument 
at its disposal for recording and analysing product hazards. All countries that have set up 
similar systems make use of the results for their product safety policies and for 
standardisation53, and the Community's demonstration project also has these objectives54. 
Although it can hardly be expected that new harmonisation efforts will be oriented solely 
towards safety policy priorities dictated by the accident information system, the findings of 
the latter should be taken into account in decisions on the recognition of standards and 
attestation of conformity, in safeguard procedures and in the preparation of European 
standards. Conversely, the accident information system can help to settle doubts and 
controversies concerning the administration of the new standardisation policy, by 
concentrating resources for in-depth studies of accident risks on those areas in which 
Community decisions are pending and standardisation work has started. 
Also worth recalling is the possibility of underpinning harmonisation policy by means of a 
systematic evaluation of product liability procedures in Member States55. 
  
With regard to the Member States, the task is to monitor implementation of the reference 
method, while taking safety policy requirements into account and endeavouring to ensure that 
safety law develops along lines compatible with the freedom of movement of goods. The 
Information Directive of 28 March 198356 already ensures that the Commission is provided 
with extensive information on relevant plans in Member States. However, the chances of 
exerting influence via the "standstill" arrangements in Articles 7 and 9 are limited and do not 
cover urgent measures motivated by safety policy (Article 9 (3))57. As the new harmonisation 
policy is implemented, the information available to the Community will improve, given the 
232
recognition and safeguard procedures and as a result of co-operation with certification bodies 
in Member States. On the other hand, the concomitant decision-making tasks will become 
more complicated. These tasks can be approached only through a long-term process of 
exerting influence to coordinate national developments58. 
The solution that suggests itself is to establish a Standing Committee on product safety 
law for these tasks, to ensure the ongoing involvement of national bodies responsible for 
product safety in the Community policy-making process, covering the entire activities of the 
Community in the field of product safety policy - following the example of the Standing 
Committee set up under the 1983 Information Directive. This Committee could also 
contribute to the internal synchronisation referred to above between internal market policy 
and product safety policy, and coordinate the work of bodies charged by the Community with 
specific tasks in the field of product safety policy59. These tasks are described in more detail 
below. The decisive point is that Member States be represented on the proposed new 
committee by representatives and experts responsible nationally for the administration of 
product safety law. This would lead to the following general division of functions: 
Table 1: Division of functions between the Standing Committee on technical standards and 
regulations and a Standing Committee on product safety. 
Standing Committee on technical 
standards and regulations 
(Information Directive of 1983 
and Model Directive of 1985) 
Standing Committee on product safety 
(future Product Safety Directive) 
- Co-operation with Member 
States 
- Long-term coordination of product 
safety policy in Member States 
- Participation in decision-making 
by the Commission 
- Participation in decision-making 
- Legal status: 
regulatory and/or administrative 
committee60 
- Legal status: 
advisory committee62 
Co-operation between the two Standing Committees should be provided for in a future 
Product Safety Directive, with the details to be regulated by their rules of procedure. 
  
3.2 Standardisation procedures and consumer participation 
A method of regulation such as reference to standards cannot be introduced in isolation. It 
requires adaptation on the part of the institutions concerned and furthermore a framework to 
meet objections to the legitimacy of this form of regulation. This has already become 
apparent from the need to ensure equivalence in the working of national certification bodies 
by means of Community rules62. However, this also applies to the legislative conditions 
required for the reference method itself. Significantly, the convergence in standardisation 
policies in the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, France and at Community 
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level already extends to standardisation procedures. In these Member States, government 
influence on standardisation has been secured by agreements with the standards 
organisations, while consumer organisations have been given the opportunity to participate in 
the preparation of safety standards for consumer goods63. 
The Guidelines agreed on by the Commission and CEN/CENELEC on 13 November 1984 
are analogous arrangements. The main principles of Community standardisation policy are 
thus: government influence on standardisation projects, consumer participation and legal 
control of standardisation results. All these principles still need to be worked out in detail and 
established as binding rules. 
  
3.2.1 Rights of participation 
Particularly urgent with regard to enhancing the status of European standardisation64 is 
clarification of the role of consumer participation65. The Community's standardisation policy 
takes a long-term approach. Under Article 6 of the Information Directive of 28 March 198366, 
the Commission consults with the Standing Committee on technical standards and regulations 
on the working of the Directive and on standardisation priorities. In accordance with Article 6 
(7) of the Directive, these discussions are confidential. However, this does not rule out 
consultation of experts, and the General Guidelines of 13 November 1984 for co-operation 
between the 
Commission and CEN/CENELEC67 indicate that participation by the European 
standardisation organisations is desirable at this early stage. Such early co-operation is useful 
in order to ensure mutual coordination of working programmes. The same applies to 
consumer participation, given that the establishment of priorities requires a trade-off between 
internal-market and safety policy interests. Consumer participation is particularly essential 
where the granting of standardisation mandates is concerned. In accordance with Annex II of 
the Council Decision of 7 May 198568, these mandates are intended to ensure the "quality of 
harmonised standards". They thus interpret and work out in detail the safety objectives of 
new directives and hence form an integral part of standardisation work, in which consumer 
participation is provided for by Section B (V) (4) of the Model Directive. However, the main 
work involved in preparing safety standards will be carried out by the technical committees 
of CEN/CENELEC. The most important part of consumer participation is hence sitting on 
these committees. 
One of the functions of consumer involvement is to represent safety interests independently 
of the interests of enterprises, as the parties directly addressed by standards. The performance 
of this function requires not only participation in standardisation work but also access to 
information relevant to safety policy. The main source of information - the data from the 
demonstration project on accident information systems - is not public, pursuant to Article 7 
(1) of the Council Decision of 22 April 198669. The exchange of information on hazards 
arising from the use of consumer goods is also confined by the Council Decision of 2 March 
1984 to communication between competent authorities70. These restrictions are not 
compatible with the requirements of meaningful consumer participation. 
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3.2.2 Organisational structures 
Consumer participation at all stages of standardisation work stems from the realisation that 
informed involvement requires continuous collaboration throughout the standardisation 
process. Also essential for informed participation, however, is the establishment of suitable 
infrastructures. To this end, a forum should first of all be created for European consumers - a 
"Consumers' Consultative Committee on standardisation". The task of this committee would 
be to ensure that consumers have a say in negotiating standardisation mandates in the 
Standing Committee and to organise the input from the consumer side to CEN/CENELEC. 
This dual function requires political and technical expertise. In addition to the four member 
organisations of the Consumers' Consultative Committee (CCC), competent experts from 
national consumer testing institutes and scientific research establishments therefore need to 
be involved. The administration of the Consumers' Consultative Committee on 
standardisation should be in the hands of a secretariat, as heretofore. The exact division of 
tasks between the Committee and the secretariat would need to be set out in rules of 
procedure. It would be advisable to leave the secretariat in the hands of the BEUC (Bureau 
Européen des Unions des Consommateurs), as it already has a well-established network of 
information and contacts with national member organisations. The only legal basis required is 
for the existence of such a committee, its composition and the establishment of a secretariat. 
  
This means that the scheme outlined above needs to be extended as follows: 
Table 2: Involvement of private parties in the Standing Committees on technical standards 
and regulations and on product safety 
Commission: Standing Committee on Standing Committee on  
technical standards product safety  
Private CEN/CENELEC Consumers' Consultative Committee  
parties:  
The General Guidelines of 13 November 1984 provide in principle for access by such a 
"Consumers' Consultative Committee on standardisation" to the work of CEN/CENELEC. 
The revision of CEN/CENELEC rules of procedure to this end could take national models as 
examples. The rules of procedure of the Standing Committee on technical standards and 
regulations should provide opportunities for participation. 
  
3.3 General product safety obligation 
  
The coordination of product safety law in Member States and the elimination of resistance 
motivated by safety policy considerations to implementation of the new harmonisation policy 
are aims that do not necessarily require the establishment of detailed safety requirements - 
they are more likely to succeed through a broader form of influence on product safety law in 
Community Member States. A step in this direction - and one that can be put into effect 
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immediately - has already been announced as part of the "New Impetus" for consumer policy: 
the introduction of a general product safety obligation71. A product safety obligation laid 
down in Community law would have limited but varied functions. Initially, it would 
contribute towards the cohesion of product safety and standardisation policy by establishing a 
universally binding fundamental principle. 
  
The Model Directive, which implicitly presupposes a general product safety policy, is unable 
to perform this function, if only because it is formulated too vaguely and is not even legally 
binding72. By imposing a general product safety obligation, the Community would secure the 
harmonisation of existing product safety laws and planned legislation in Member States. 
However, such an obligation would in particular have an immediate practical impact in all 
those countries that do not yet have general product safety laws. In such cases, it would 
provide the competent authorities with grounds for intervention and hence promote adherence 
to directives and standards. At the same time, it would encourage standards organisations to 
step up work on safety standards. 
Product safety obligations in the various national legislations differ in the way they are 
formulated. The German Appliances Safety Law (Gerätesicherheitsgesetz) refers to 
"generally recognised rules of the art" (allgemein anerkannte Regeln der Technik) and 
provides protection in the case of "proper use" (bestimmungsgemäße Verwendung) - 
although the basic standards DIN 820, Part 12 and DIN 31.000/VDE 1000 call for 
"foreseeable misuse" (voraussehbares Fehlverhalten)73 to be taken into account. Article 1 of 
the French Consumer Safety Law74 refers to "normal" use (condition normale) or use that can 
be reasonably foreseen by the manufacturer (condition raisonnablement prévisible), and 
"legitimate" consumer expectations. The US Consumer Product Safety Act uses the 
expressions "unreasonable risk of injury" (for product bans under § 8 CPSA) and "substantial 
risk of injury" (for recall procedures pursuant to § 15 
CPSA), requiring that foreseeable misuse be taken into account75. § 3 (1) of the British 
Consumer Protection Act 198776 follows the model of the Product Liability Directive ("There 
is a defect in a product. . . if the safety of the product is not such as persons generally are 
entitled to expect. . ."); but the description of the product safety requirement for the purposes 
of the criminal law in § 10 (2) says: ". . .consumer goods fail to comply with the general 
safety requirement if they are not reasonably safe having regard to all the circumstances. . .". 
Article 14 (a) in the Dutch bill amending the "Warenwet" (Goods Law) aims to provide 
protection against hazards arising from reasonably foreseeable use (overeenkomstig 
redelijkerwijze te verwachten gebruik)77. 
A decision in favour of a European general clause is made easier by the fundamental 
consensus on safety policy, which is evident in spite of the wide variation among the 
examples mentioned, and by the limited functions of such a general clause. There is a 
consensus that safety criteria should not be defined unilaterally by the manufacturer78. This 
principle, which is common to all modern product safety laws and which is set out, as far as 
the Federal Republic of Germany is concerned, in the basic safety standards DIN 820, Part 12 
and DIN 31.000/VDE 1000, precludes the adoption of the expression "proper use" 
(bestimmungsgemäßer Gebrauch) employed in § 3 of the German Appliances Safety Law79. 
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The general clause is intended to anticipate standardisation in individual sectors and help 
consolidate European legislation. It is also intended to provide for powers of intervention in 
those Member States that do not possess fully-fledged systems of national standards, and 
cover products for which there are no safety standards. It necessarily follows from the above 
that the general cause cannot refer to standards as such. 
Finally, in view of the interest of the Community in a safety counterpart to the principle of 
the free movement of goods, the product safety obligation must extend explicitly to importers 
and dealers as well. No distinction should be made between importers and dealers in intra-
Community trade, since the aim of the efforts to achieve the internal market is precisely to 
secure a common European standard of safety and mutual recognition of national control 
measures. On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the various administrations remains confined 
to their respective territories. The safety loopholes this entails can only be closed by 
extending the product safety obligation to cover the trade sector80. 
Accordingly, the question remains as to which alternative to "proper use" should be 
incorporated in the general clause. Reliable pointers exist for this decision as well. Firstly, the 
general clause must be formulated so broadly as to cover the safety needs of all consumer 
groups, particularly children. Consequently, it should take account of "foreseeable misuse"81. 
On the other hand, however, the criterion of foreseeable misuse cannot be assumed to apply 
to all products without taking their use and users into account. In particular, there is no 
question that, in addition to the definition of the responsibilities of manufacturers and users, a 
large number of additional factors are relevant for a normative assessment of risks: the 
usefulness of the product, the likelihood of harm being caused and the extent of potential 
hazards, the availability of suitable technical alternatives, and the cost of safety design 
requirements82. A formulation that provides for 
distinctions to be made and for all factors relevant for assessing safety to be taken into 
account is contained in the Product Liability Directive83, which refers to "the safety which a 
person is entitled to expect". There are pragmatic considerations in favour of such a criterion. 
Parallel development of product liability law and safety law would help consolidate 
Community law, while the Member States should find it easier to agree on a previously 
accepted standard than to consent to a new formulation. The choice of this criterion is, 
moreover, in line with the development of the law in the Member States. It accords with 
French law and the Dutch "Warenwet"84, should be reconcilable with the likely application of 
the British Consumer Protection Act 198785, and is de facto compatible with the legal 
situation in the Federal Republic of Germany86. 
  
3.4 Follow-up market control 
The main practical point of connection between the Community's internal market policy and 
its product safety policy is follow-up market control. The attitude of the Community to this 
tool represents the acid test of the quality of its new legal approximation policy. The 
following considerations are intended as suggestions for Community framework regulations 
on follow-up market control. They first of all explain why a bold harmonisation policy that 
goes beyond mere approximation of existing legal provisions is necessary in this area (3.4.1), 
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and go on to develop proposals that build on the beginnings already present in Community 
directives or draft directives, as well as on relevant national provisions. 
  
3.4.1 Integration policy functions 
As far as national product safety policy is concerned, follow-up market control essentially 
involves penalising breaches of product safety obligations, responding to newly identified 
risks and ensuring compensation for financial loss87. 
All these aspects are also relevant to a European product safety policy. The introduction of a 
general product safety obligation would be practically meaningless if breaches were not 
punishable - the legal need for provision for follow-up action is incontrovertible in view of 
the inevitable gaps in preventive control measures, and any elimination of product risks must, 
in order to be fair, also ensure compensation for any damage or injury caused. 
However, these general safety policy tasks of follow-up market control, gain appreciably in 
importance in the context of the new harmonisation policy. The declared aim of the new 
approach is to improve the conditions for the marketability of products in the common 
market. This objective explains the provisions for the equivalence of European standards and 
national standards (where included in the standards list), the admissibility of attestations of 
conformity for "products for which the manufacturer has not applied any standard", and 
mutual recognition of attestations of conformity issued by national certification bodies88. 
However, these improvements to the conditions governing the marketability of products, 
which are motivated by competition and internal market policy considerations, inevitably 
reinforce the legal need for surveillance of their conformity to safety standards. Here too - as 
with the product safety obligation - the territorially restricted application of administrative 
measures means that Member States can react to identified product hazards only within their 
own territories. Each Member State has therefore to take such action on its own account. In 
addition to these functions, which are 
primarily concerned with safety policy, follow-up market control also has genuine internal 
market functions, which too have been taken into account in the Model Directive: easing the 
burden on the Community's legislative procedures with the new reference method has its 
price in terms of integration policy - it allows only the substantiation of market access rights 
on the basis of "presumption of conformity", while conceding to Member States the power to 
check the justification of such presumptions. The dangers that these Member States' powers 
pose to the unity of the internal market can be countered only ex post in the safeguard clause 
procedure. However, this corrective function requires equivalent standards for follow-up 
market control89 if it is to be effective. 
The new harmonisation policy has thus produced a "regulatory gap" as far as follow-up 
market control is concerned. This term refers to the inadvertent creation of a need for positive 
intervention by a policy aimed at market integration90. Indeed, the Member States have 
neglected the development of follow-up market control as an instrument for product safety 
policy91; now they are under pressure from the "anti-interventionist" principle of the free 
movement of goods and the "anti-interventionist" reference method to introduce positive 
regulation. This consequence appears paradoxical only at first sight. It is in line with the logic 
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of an integration policy that does not allow the achievements of a single internal market to be 
jeopardised again by one-sided and uncoordinated safety policy measures of Member States. 
  
  
3.4.2 Information sources 
The intensity with which Member States seek to detect hazards is the essential determinant of 
the practical importance of their safety provisions, and the well-considered utilisation of 
information is one essential condition for rational use of administrative resources. To date, 
the Community has contributed to controlling the "information input" to follow-up market 
control essentially only through the decision on exchange of information on product 
hazards92. It has however begun to build on this pledge. By Articles 12 and 13 of the draft 
Toy Directive93, Member States would be obliged to verify observance of toy safety 
requirements by export checks and inform the Commission on application of the test and 
supervision procedures94. Similar supervisory measures are provided for in the Directive on 
airborne noise emitted by household appliances95. Article 4 of the Directive on dangerous 
imitations of consumer goods96, finally, provides that information on measures taken by a 
Member State may be communicated prior to an "exchange of views" on their justification. 
The most obvious way of systematically advancing from these starting points is offered by 
the demonstration project on a Community accident information system97. Its data can, as 
American experience with NEISS shows98, be utilised for follow-up market control. Data 
from the European accident information system are suitable as a primary information source. 
Since they are collected according to uniform criteria Community-wide, making use of them 
would help to harmonise administrative practices99. 
However, accident information systems cannot be the sole source of information. Member 
States must be free to make use of their existing administrative facilities and, for example, to 
evaluate studies carried out by test institutes. However, a range of information sources should 
be underpined by uniform principles: the admissibility of consumer complaints, the 
admissibility of input from consumer organisations, the obligation to take account of legal 
judgments concerning product liability, and an obligation of enterprises to provide 
notification whenever they possess knowledge from which it can be reasonably concluded 
that the products they market represent a significant hazard100. 
Consideration of legal judgments concerning product liability fulfils a function specifically 
related to integration policy, because it indirectly101 contributes towards the harmonisation of 
safety law criteria. In contrast, the obligation on enterprises to provide notification primarily 
furthers safety policy. Especially where serious risks are involved, enterprises will move to 
eliminate them of their own accord, and for instance voluntarily make recalls102. It should not 
be assumed, however, that the willingness to do so exists throughout an entire industry or will 
(or even can) lead to corresponding action on export markets. Nevertheless, the obligation to 
provide notification would not only meet the safety requirements of consumers but also 




3.4.3 Requirements for intervention and instruments for taking action 
Public law product safety duties are intended to provide the competent authorities with 
possibilities of intervention to ward off product hazards. In legally specifying such 
intervention rights, general clauses are indispensable. This follows even from the fact that 
product safety duties in the form of "basic safety requirements" can in principle only set 
"performance requirements", but not prescribe definite design characteristics103. This is also 
in line with the regulatory functions of a general duty of product safety in the sense proposed 
above. While "legally" the general product safety obligation acts "preventively", it at the 
same time turns away in practice from the hopeless attempt to guarantee the safety of 
consumer goods preventively, by specifying particular design requirements. But just because 
specific prior binding instructions are not given, government must nevertheless remain in a 
position to meet its responsibilities for product safety by responding to dangers that do 
become evident. The embodiment of this power of intervention in the form of a general 
clause in safety law is thus the necessary consequence of abandoning specific governmental 
product regulations. 
But even if Community law preconditions for the intervention powers of the competent 
authorities in Member States can thus be laid down only in general form, it is possible, and 
imperative, to adopt detailed regulations on the instruments of follow-up market control. The 
Directive on dangerous imitations of consumer goods104 states that Member States should set 
up a body with powers to remove, or cause to be removed, products from the market (Article 
3). The draft Toy Directive105 says less specifically that Member States should "take all 
appropriate measures to withdraw" unsafe toys "from the market and prohibit their placing on 
the market" (Article 7 (1))106. 
It does indeed seem appropriate to leave Member States the freedom to use institutional 
solutions that are in line with their various legal traditions. For example, the obvious 
approach for the Federal Republic of Germany would be to entrust follow-up market control 
to the industrial inspectorate (Gewerbeaufsicht)107, while France would do best to maintain 
the division of functions between the Commission for Consumer Safety and government 
administration108, and the United Kingdom should retain the responsibility of local 
authorities109. Finally, the establishment of independent commissions is also conceivable110. 
However, as regards the legal instruments to be made available to these bodies, Community 
coordination would be advisable. The possibilities are bans, confiscations, recalls, warnings 
and compensation to consumers affected by recalls. 
The type of action taken should depend on the nature and severity of the hazards. Bans or 
even confiscations are not always necessary, but may sometimes be insufficient. It may 
suffice to have the manufacturer rectify faults. However, it may also be necessary to have 
products replaced or recalled, with compensation for financial losses. The right to inform the 
public or demand that the manufacturer or importer provide appropriate information is 
essential, but the necessity and nature of the information will in turn depend on the 
seriousness of the product risk. For example, a public information campaign will not be 
required if the manufacturer is able to identify the customers concerned directly from its files 
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and contact them. This particular example illustrates that the appropriate control measures 
should best be agreed in conjunction with the manufacturer or importer. A commitment by 
the concerned enterprise to propose, in the event of significant product hazards, a catalogue 
of measures for preventing such dangers, would normally enable a settlement to be reached, 
as is shown by the example of US law111. 
  
3.4.4 The role of the Community in follow-up market control 
The development of the law relating to follow-up market control is not an end in itself, but 
fulfils a dual function in terms of both safety policy and internal market policy. The aim of 
Europeanising follow-up market control is to reduce the potential for conflict in the field of 
safety policy resulting from the objectives of internal market policy112, by Europeanising the 
practice of safety law. 
  
3.4.4.1 Standing Committee on technical standards and regulations and a "committee on 
follow-up market control" 
The Model Directive provides for all questions connected with the implementation of new 
directives to be handled by the Standing Committee on technical standards and regulations. 
However, the main task of this committee is to advise on new plans for directives and 
standards. In addition, the primary function of the safeguard procedure is to examine the 
quality of European and national standards and, when necessary, ensure that they are 
developed further. On the other hand, follow-up market control essentially involves executive 
tasks. The question of whether certain risks require intervention can be considered separately 
from the question of whether these risks require changes to European or national standards. 
This distinction could also be taken into account in the institutional arrangements: the 
Standing Committee on technical standards and regulations should be relieved of executive 
tasks to allow it to concentrate entirely on problems of legislation and standardisation. 
The executive tasks are difficult enough. Harmonisation of informational sources, conditions 
for intervention and instruments of follow-up market control are necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for achieving an equal standard of safety throughout Europe. The Community thus 
requires a body through which differences of opinion between the competent bodies can be 
argued out and settled. With a view to harmonising practice in Member States, their inclusion 
on a "Committee on follow-up market control" is to be recommended here as well. However, 
since it will be concerned with executive questions, this committee does not need the legal 
status of an administrative or regulatory committee, but should be set up as a subcommittee 
of the Advisory Committee on product safety proposed above113. 
Making the administration of follow-up market control institutionally autonomous does not 
immediately seem to be in line with approaches in the Community's recent legal acts in the 
area. The Directive on airborne noise emitted by household appliances114 explicitly refers all 
questions in connection with its implementation to the Standing Committee set up by 
Directive 83/189/EEC (Article 9 (1))115. The draft Toy Directive116 takes the position that the 
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Commission alone will decide on questions of follow-up market control (Article 7 (4)), and 
where shortcomings in harmonised standards or gaps in the standards become apparent, will 
provide for consultation of the Standing Committee on technical standards and regulations 
(Articles 5 and 7 (2)). The Directive on dangerous imitations of consumer goods entrusted the 
Advisory Committee on information exchange on dangers arising from the use of consumer 
products, set up by Decision 84/133 of 2 March 1984, with the tasks of coordinating 
measures by individual States117. 
  
3.4.4.2 Decision-making powers of the Commission 
The above-mentioned functions of the Europeanisation of follow-up market control entail 
requirements that cannot be met simply by an exchange of information restricted to the 
authorities concerned, which leaves any reaction to hazards at the discretion of Member 
States. The Community must therefore go well beyond the Council Decision of 2 March 
1984118. It requires comprehensive information and considerable decision-making powers. 
Initially, it needs to be informed of decisions by the competent bodies in the Member States. 
However, the obligation on Member States to supply information should not be confined to 
cases where positive measures are ordered. It ought also to cover cases where a settlement 
was reached or where intervention was rejected, since such procedures are no less important 
for the harmonisation of administrative practice, and their justification can be just as 
questionable as the ordering of positive measures. Decision-making in the Commission and 
the Advisory Committee on follow-up market control proposed here can also be aided by the 
findings of the demonstration project on accident information systems, as well as by other 
own sources of information. Consumer organisations should be allowed to approach the 
Commission, and the "Consumers' Consultative Committee on standardisation"119 should 
have access to Commission decisions. 
Two types of decision in the area of follow-up market control can be distinguished: responses 
to urgent measures and definitive decisions on conflicts concerning the justification or 
necessity of measures. In cases of "serious and immediate risk", which already have to be 
notified "immediately" to the Commission under Article 1 (1) of the Council Decision of 2 
March 1984, the safety policy function of follow-up market control calls for the Commission 
to have the authority to order other Member States to take provisional measures. However, 
such measures should then be discussed with the Advisory Committee on follow-up market 
control before the Commission takes a final decision. In all cases where no immediate action 
is required on the part of the Commission, the Committee should be consulted before a 
decision is taken. Its participation is essential for the development of common assessment 
criteria in the Community. 
  
4. Institutional measures to coordinate internal market and product safety policy 
The network of committees and co-operative relationships sketched out in the foregoing 
sections may look over-differentiated and too intricate. Nevertheless, all these proposals are 
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ultimately concerned only with the institutional consequences of two conceptual premises 
embodied in the Community's objectives for realising the internal market themselves. The 
first premise concerns the relationship between internal market and product safety policies. It 
states that the legal harmonisation essential in the interest of free movement of goods in the 
Community is inseparably linked with the elaboration of a European product safety policy, 
but that both elements of the integration process, that is, mutual interpenetration of economic 
sectors on the one hand, and the achievement of closer integration through a European 
product safety policy on the other, call for separate forward-looking policies and 
organisational structures. This premise is the basis for the proposals for giving the tasks in 
internal market policy and in product safety policy an independent organisational form in 
different ways, related to the historical separation of these policy areas in the Community. 
The second premise concerns the Community's relationships with Member States, and states 
that both for its legal harmonisation policy and the Europeanisation of administrative tasks 
essential in connection with it, the Community is dependent on continuing co-operation with 
Member States. This need for co-operation is confirmed not only by theoretical analysis of 
the Community's political system and of specific features of European federalism120, but also 
by the practice of Community politics, where decision-making processes are open at all levels 
to influence from the Member States. This development has gone hand in hand with the 
setting up of administrative, regulatory and advisory committees, something that started early 
in internal market policy, and is also indispensable in product safety policy. 
A first conclusion drawn from these premises is the proposal to set up, alongside the Standing 
Committee on technical standards and regulations created by the Information Directive 
83/189/EEC, a Standing Committee on product safety121. It is indubitable that, in drawing up 
directives and standardisation mandates, safety concerns belong among the most important 
tasks for the Standing Committee on technical standards and regulations. But whether at 
national or Community level, product safety policy is not confined to questions of law-
making and standardisation. Instead, it belongs much more in the whole context of 
comprehensive, varied machinery for guaranteeing consumer safety. The Community must in 
the long term develop such a policy, and will in doing so, be dependent on co-operation with 
the competent bodies and institutions responsible for product safety policy in Member States. 
Equally, a legal harmonisation policy concerned with achieving the internal market has to 
concentrate on the steps necessary to that end, and thus set its priorities primarily from an 
economic viewpoint, on which it will seek the necessary agreements. Accordingly, 
organisational differentiation between internal market and product safety policy does not in 
any way promote competing political projects, but instead aims at easing the burden on both 
areas and promoting their co-operation. 
A second organisational proposal, namely to set up a Consumers' Consultative Committee on 
standardisation122, is connected with the differentiation between internal market and product 
safety policy and the Community's relationship with Member States, but is primarily a 
consequence of the technique of reference to standards favoured in the new harmonisation 
policy. This legal technique links up the European standardisation organisations on 
"functional" law-making tasks. Because of these de facto effects of the reference technique, 
the justification for calls for consumer participation is in principle indisputable. Our 
proposals for giving shape to this participation are meant to implement this concept, so as to 
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take account of the organisational and staff constraints on consumer organisations and 
formally guarantee them possibilities of collaboration. 
The third proposal, namely to set up a separate committee on follow-up market control, is a 
direct consequence of the distinction between internal market and product safety policy, but 
is also connected with the peculiarities of the new legal harmonisation method. On our 
proposal, the tasks of verifying the substance of European and national standards and 
developing them further should remain with the Standing Committee on technical standards 
and regulations, since from a functional viewpoint this is a future oriented law-making 
activity. Follow-up market control is, instead, often concerned with urgent decisions to deal 
with acute dangers to consumer safety. In each case, where such decisions need to be 
implemented, the Community is de facto dependent on co-operation from the competent 
authorities in Member States. By its very nature, the case is one of nothing less than the 
Europeanisation of administrative tasks. In view of these far-reaching implications, it would 
seem appropriate to create the organisational prerequisites for setting administrative co-
operation between Community and Member States on a permanent footing. 
In conclusion, the institutional proposals in this section are set out below in an overview: 
Table 3: Overview of Standing Committees in the area of internal market and product safety 
policies 
  
Internal market policy Product safety policy 
  
Involvement of Standing Committee on technical Standing Committee on product 
Member States standards and regulations (1983 safety (future Product 
Information Directive and 1985 Safety Directive) 
Model Directive)  
 
Subcommittees for individual Committee on accident  
directives (e.g. for simple information systems 
pressure vessels, toys, (Council Decision  
construction materials) of 22 April 1986) 
 
Committee on follow-up  
market control (future 
product safety Directive) 
 
Involvement of CEN/CENELEC Consumers' Consultative  
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